The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

on the Post-Soeharto Era (Doredrecht: Republic of Letters, 2010), 45–6 (footnotes omitted).

31 

Tim  Lindsey, ‘Indonesia: Devaluing Asian Values, Rewriting Rule of Law’, in Randall 

 

Peerenboom (ed.), Asian Discourses of Rule of Law (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) 479.

32 

Butt and Lindsey, ‘Judicial Mafia: The Courts and State Illegality in Indonesia’.

33 

Muhammad  Yamin,  Naskah-Persiapan Undang–Undang Dasar 1945 (Djakarta:  Jajasan 

Prapantja, 1959–60) 114.

34 

Herbert  Feith and Lance  Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965 (Ithaca: 

 Cornell University Press, 1970) 185.

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310 

Simon Butt

the concept was used, or rather misused, almost exclusively as a political tool 

during the Soekarno and Soeharto presidencies. Because no law or judicial 

decision explained the Negara Hukum – and legal scholars were divided or 

muted by the military – the regimes could interpret it to suit their own pur-

poses.

35

 For example, Soekarno’s Old Order (Orde Lama) used the Negara 

Hukum concept as a nation-building ideology, which gained strong popular 

support because many Indonesians were optimistic for change after the long 

revolution against the Dutch.

36

 Yet Soekarno introduced policies and laws that 

were contrary to the ‘rule of law’. For example, in 1964, he issued a decree that 

purported to dissolve the separation of powers doctrine and allow the govern-

ment to directly interfere in judicial decision-making.

By contrast, Soeharto (1965–98) used the concept of Negara Hukum as 

a legitimising tool – both to present himself as the legitimate successor to 

Soekarno and to set his regime apart from Soeharto’s. According to Soeharto’s 

government, Soekarno had failed to uphold the Negara Hukum, which caused 

dire economic and social consequences.

37

 The New Order promised to ‘con-

sistently and purely’ implement the 1945 Constitution, including the Negara 

Hukum, outlining the concept as follows:

  1.  legality, in the sense of law in all its forms;

  2.  a judiciary which is independent, impartial and free from the influence 

of any other power in force; and

  3.  recognition and protection of fundamental rights, embodying equality 

in politics, law, and in the social, economic, cultural and educational 

spheres.

38

Ironically, though using the Negara Hukum to legitimise itself during its 

early years, the New Order in practice became the very antithesis of the rule 

of law, at least as understood in many Western countries. Contrary to Negara 

Hukum ideals, the regime became highly repressive of its citizens and set-up 

mechanisms to ensure that the government and military enjoyed virtual 

35 

T. Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal–Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 

1966–1990 (Jakarta:  PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama in cooperation with SPES Foundation, 

1993), 88.

36 

D. S. Lev, ‘Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtsstaat’ (1978) 13 Law 

and Society Review 44.

37 

See the Preamble (point 2) of MPR Decree No. XX/1966, which claims that divergence from 

the 1945 Constitution partially caused the 1965 coup attempt.

38 

As contained in the MPR’s first Five Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima