The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Albert H. Y. Chen and P. Y. Lo

may interpret the MBL in the course of adjudicating cases, they surely may 

reach a conclusion that a law or administrative regulation is in contravention 

of the MBL and in such a situation, they must, without prejudice to art. 143 

of the MBL (which makes provision for the power of interpretation on their 

own of the provisions of the MBL within the limits of the autonomy of the 

Region), enforce the provision in art. 11 of the MBL, and not apply the legisla-

tion/regulation that contravenes a provision of the MBL or a principle of such 

a provision.

71

 The TUI further referred to the work of the Portuguese jurist 

Gomes Canotilho on constitutional theory, which explained that where the 

laws applicable to the same case are in conflict, the judge should choose the 

law of the higher rank (equivalent to constitutional law) and at the same time 

refuse and not apply the law of the lower rank. The TUI lastly considered that 

such a power must be exercised as part of the court’s function, ‘as in all legal 

orders where the judge may resort to the constitution, this is also the approach 

in the majority of legal systems’.

72

 Applying the above principles, and after 

referring to the legal systems of pre-1999 Macau, Portugal and the PRC on the 

enactment and effect of administrative regulations, the TUI then determined 

the question of interpretation of the MBL concerning the power of the Chief 

Executive of the MSAR to adopt administrative regulations, and remitted the 

remainder of the case to the Macau Court of Appeal (Tribunal de Segunda 

Instancia or TSI).

73

However, the TSI that heard the remitted case expressed on 13 December 

2007 strong disagreement, ‘in the spirit of exploring the law’,

74

 with how the 

the Basic Law on the courts that the courts shall exercise constitutional review in the special 

administrative region; see Wang, Zhenmin, China’s Systems of Constitutional Review (Zhong-

guo weixian shencha zhidu 中國違憲審查制度) (Beijing: China University of Political Sci-

ence and Law Press, 2004) 356, 357 (in Chinese).

71 

See TUI Case No 28/2006 (18 July 2007) 31 (如果法院在審理案件中可以解釋《基本

法》，肯定可以得出某些法律規定或行政法規違反《基本法》的結論，在此情況下，必

須執行《基本法》第 

11  條中的規定  ：因此，不能適用那些違反《基本法》規定或其

中規定的原則的那些法規，但該法第 

143 條規定除外。). Jiang Chaoyang, in his survey of 

the judicial application of the MBL, accepted that the MSAR courts are entitled to directly 

apply the provisions of the MBL in the adjudication of cases as a ground for the adjudication, 

or to apply them to resolve a conflict of legal norms, by virtue of art. 11 thereof. Indeed Jiang 

acknowledged the practical need for such a form of ‘incidental judicial review’, but warned of 

the risk of this form of review usurping the constitutional functions of the executive and the 

legislature; see Jiang, Supra note 64.

72 

See TUI Case No 28/2006 (18 July 2007) 31 (一如在法官可以求諸於憲法的所有法律秩序中

那樣，這也是現在在大部分法律制度中的做法。

).

73 

The TUI considered the legal system under both the historical constitutions and the current 

constitution of Portugal and the PRC.

74 

The TSI believed that this was not out of order, for the judgment of the Macao Court of 

Final Appeal’s effect was confined to its decision and not inclusive of the legal reasons for the 

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The Constitutional Orders of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 

251

TUI had interpreted the relevant provisions of the MBL, suggesting that the 

TUI’s opinion had undermined the mechanism in art. 17 of the MBL for 

reporting laws of the MSAR to the NPCSC for the record and altered substan-

tially the manner of distribution and check and balance in the enactment of 

legal norms as between the Legislative Council of the MSAR and the Chief 

Executive of the MSAR.

75

In spite of the judicial controversy recounted above, the TUI continued 

to expound in Case No 8/2007 (30 April 2008) the constitutional principle of 

legal normative ranking (falü guifan weijie yuanze法律規範位階原則): where 

a court of the MSAR considers in the course of adjudication that the norm 

previously applied in the case was in contravention of a norm of superior 

rank, the court should apply the norm of superior rank or some other lawful 

norm and must not apply the unlawful norm of inferior rank.

76

 The TUI then 

indicated that it follows that the court may on its own initiative or as requested 

examine, at the time of application of a law, the validity of that law, particularly 

on whether it is in contravention of a law of superior rank. But the TUI empha-

sised that a finding that a norm is in contravention of a law of superior rank is 

only part of the reasoning of the judgment, a step in the legal logical deduc-

tion in the course of reaching the judgment in the end, and not the substance 

of the determination of the adjudication; the courts may not on the basis of 

the finding give judgment of general binding effect that a particular norm is 

in contravention. The relevant finding only has effect in the corresponding 

case and does not have effect in respect of other cases or other courts. The 

norm that is considered to be in contravention is not rendered invalid for this 

decision (裁判書的既判力祇限於裁決本身而非亦包含裁決的法律理由); see TSI Case No 

223/2005 (13 December 2007).

75 

Ibid.

, 64–5. The TUI thereafter upheld in several rulings the effect of administrative regula-

tions the TSI had sought to impugn. In response to the controversy, the Legislative Council 

of the MSAR enacted Law No 13/2009 (Regime juridico de enquadramento das fontes norma-

tivas internas), entitled ‘The Legal System for the Enactment of Internal Norms’, prescribing 

the hierarchy of internal norms of laws (lei) enacted by the Legislative Council, independent 

administrative regulations (regulamento administrativo independente) of the Chief Executive, 

and supplementary administrative regulations (regulamento administrativo complementar) of 

the Chief Executive. For an overview of this saga, see Chang, Xu, ‘The Right of Formulating the 

Administrative Regulations of the Macau SAR and Its Solution from the Perspective of Jurispru-

dence Study’ (2010) 6 Academic Journal of One Country Two Systems (‘Yiguo liangzhi’yanjiu ‘一 

國兩制

’研究) 44–67 (in Chinese).

76 

See TUI Case No 8/2007 (30 April 2008) 8–9 (如果法院在審判時認為，案件原應適用的規

範違反了比它位階高的規範時，法院應適用位階高的，或其他合法的規範，而不能適

用位階較低、屬違法的規範。

).

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252 

Albert H. Y. Chen and P. Y. Lo

reason.

77

 Rather, if a MSAR court considers a norm to be in contravention of 

a norm of superior rank and for this reason does not apply it, that court may 

apply the law/regulation that regulates the matter previously, a law/regulation 

that is applicable in a supplementary manner or a norm of superior hierarchy 

directly, in order to reach judgment on the substantive question of the case.

78

 

The TUI cited in support of its exposition texts of Portuguese jurists on consti-

tutional and administrative law.

79

The TUI did examine the validity of a legal norm in Case No 5/2010 where 

it held, after consulting a text by two Portuguese jurists on the principle of 

equality, that a norm was in breach of the MBL’s constitutional guarantee of 

equality and that by reason of that breach, the norm, which applied two mutu-

ally contradictory systems to the same class of civil servants, was inapplicable, 

with the consequence that the administrative act under appeal was set aside. 

And, when the TUI did so, it underlined that it was doing a form of ‘passive’ 

determination, which means that the court acts only after excluding all other 

legal solutions on the basis that they could not be regarded as reasonable, 

since the court’s control of the legality of legal norms on the standard of the  

provisions of the MBL does not go as far as acting like or substituting for  

the legislature to produce what it considers to be reasonable, just or ideal  

for the case at hand.

80

 Later, in Case No 25/2011, the TUI applied the MBL,