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most persuasive feature that attracts followers to Al-Itixaad
,
the group supposed to be Al Qaeda’s main branch in the country, ‘is its
financial clout: few Somalis are attracted by the movement’s theologi-
cal pedantry or its proclivity to violence’. Moreover, Islamists are the
last addition to a ‘witches’ brew of ethnic, religious, and geopolitical
tensions’ in Somalia and thus have to compete with domestic, regional
and foreign forces in a ‘crowded political arena’ (Bryden 2003, 26). Thus,
he concludes, ‘Somalia poses a more concrete and immediate threat to
international security as a cockpit for regional interests than as a link in
the chain of transnational terrorism’ (Bryden 2003, 26). In fact, as Shinn
(2003, 80) commented, the ‘underlying conditions’ of East Africa and
the Horn ‘contribute directly to conflict and the use of terrorist tactics’;
the region has porous borders and readily available weapons, and
poverty and social injustice are widespread.
In the long history of tribal confrontations affecting the Sudan (and
South Sudan), religion is often said to play a central role. However,
Islamic identity has proved not to be a fixed or constant marker of
Sudanese communal tensions. Instead, it has been tactically played
(i.e. taken up and also in turn abandoned) under particular circumstanc-
es by different groups and individuals (Jok 2007). Identities, we know,
are never static and are always socially constructed, but this appears
to be especially true for Sudan, where the notions of racial, ethnic and
religious identity are particularly fluid (Jok 2007).
Cramer and Goodhand (2002) are also interested in how those vying
for authority seek to gain legitimacy in failed or collapsed states. They
identify three methods that historically have been used for gaining
legitimacy in Afghanistan, namely tribalism, Islam and nationalism. They
explain that many Afghans perceive the nation as a religious community
and therefore during times of crisis, the notion of jihad has been used
to mobilise the population. They track the historical use of Islam in
British Academy //
The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding
27
the development of the state and argue that the emergence of the
Taliban was part of a process of different forms of Islamic influence in
Afghanistan’s history. Radicalisation of Islamic groups in the 2000s was
a means of gaining legitimacy in response to the crisis of political Islam
(Roy cited in Cramer & Goodhand 2002, 903).
Verhoevan (2009, 419) presents another dimension of the rise of Islamic
extremism in failed states, arguing that in the case of Somalia, external
factors had the greatest impact. He argues that US-led fears of an
‘Al Qaeda safe-haven’ forming in Somalia led to ‘a self-fulfilling prophe-
cy’. He argues that America’s fear that the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)
were Somalia’s ‘neo-Taliban’, caused them to create conditions, through
the American-Ethiopian axis, which pushed the moderate nationalist
militants who were actually succeeding in creating order and stability,
towards the radical, ‘real (inter)national jihadis’. (2009, 407). Verhoeven
then concludes that the international community must move away from
the terrorism/failed state nexus and conceptualise ‘state collapse as
a series of painful but essential processes of “creative destruction”’.
Hossein-Zadeh (2005, 2) also deems external factors important in the
link between failed states and terrorism, arguing that it was Western
imperialism and Western policies in the Middle East region that caused
the Muslim world to turn to conservative religious leaders ‘as a source
of defiance’, against the Western powers, rather than the nature of Islam
or the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory. He assesses Western intervention
efforts and development programmes in the Middle East, arguing that
at times when these programmes met the hopes and aspirations of the
people, an Islamic alternative was not embraced. However, when the
people were demoralised and disappointed, an Islamic revival was nur-
tured instead. The study therefore disputes the proposition that Islam is
inherently confrontational and claims that socioeconomic and geopoliti-
cal policies account for the reactions of the Muslim people. His conclu-
sion, however, that Islam is not more violent than other religions does
not follow from his study, but the historical account of the factors that
influenced the Islamic revival is useful in highlighting the peripheral role
of religion.
While all of this evidence shows the presence of religious factors or ac-
tors in failed, weak or collapsing states, there seems to be a consensus
among experts that the relationship between religion, state failure and
violence is not unidirectional. Indeed, for many, the structural absence
or malfunctioning of institutions, the prevailing cultures of fear, as well
28
The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding
// British Academy
as regional dynamics of instability, pave the way for extremist religious
ideologies and ethnic rivalries to take over, rather than the other way
round (see among others Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wolff 2006, 2011).
4.4. Religion as a driver of peace
Academic and policy-oriented literature on religion and international
affairs is rich in publications arguing that religion is a useful – if not
necessary – instrument for achieving peace. More specifically, religious
beliefs/values, religious leaders and faith-based organisations are
thought to have huge potential in promoting peace in any society and/
or in the international arena. Scholars in the US (Johnston and Sampson
1994; Johnston 2003; Appleby 2001; Gopin 2000; Smock 2002; Shah et
al. 2012; Coward and Smith 2004; Little 2007) seem to be leading this
school of thought. In fact, ‘faith-based’ diplomacy was invented in the
US (see for example the journal
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