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Alternatives

Generic

2nc – at: alternative fails

Our anti-statist vision may not abolish the state, but it energizes social movements against state power. The plan’s reformist strategy props up the state and demobilizes opposition by providing the illusion of protection

Martin, 98 – Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia (Brian, “Antisurveillance” Information Liberation, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/98il/il04.html
From vision to strategy

This institutional change programme is radical, going to the roots of the problem of surveillance. It is hardly a practical proposition, though, to implement these solutions through a short, sharp campaign. What use, then, is the programme?

First, it draws attention to the way that surveillance is deeply embedded in today's social institutions and is becoming more and more pervasive. The real idealism is to imagine that the problem can be solved by legislative and regulatory measures by the very institutions that are responsible for the problem. The radical agenda should warn against investing too much energy or hope in reform efforts, which may give only an illusion of protection.

Second, the programme provides an additional argument to challenge and replace hierarchical social structures. Alone, the problem of surveillance is hardly serious enough to question the value of nuclear power, corporate capitalism or the state. But surveillance is an important factor which should not be neglected in a focus on environmental impacts, war or exploitation of workers.

Third, the programme highlights the range of triggers for surveillance: "national security," marketing, protection against dangerous technologies, provision of welfare. There is no evil agency that is responsible for all surveillance.

Undoubtedly, most surveillance is carried out with the very best of intentions: to protect the nation, to provide better products to consumers, to economise on government expenditure. Surveillance is not a product of evil schemers. The debate over surveillance concerns different conceptions of the good.

Fourth, a programme of radical solutions provides a direction for campaigns today. While it is impossible to introduce collective provision or to abolish the state overnight, it is quite sensible to examine campaigns to see whether they aid the capacity for community self-reliance and whether they weaken rather than strengthen the power of the state.

The claim that the alternative is too radical is a power legitimating tactic that reinforces state authority – this is also a link and wrecks the permutation

Shantz, 13 – professor of critical criminology at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in Surrey, BC. (Jeff, “In Defense of Radicalism”, Radical Criminology, Summer, http://journal.radicalcriminology.org/index.php/rc/article/view/34/html
Powerholders will always seek to discredit or delegitimize resistance to their privilege and deployment of loaded (misconstructed and misconstrued by powerholders) terms like radicalism will be a tactic in this. One can follow the reconstruction of the term "terror" to see an example of such processes. The term 'terror' was initially used to designate state violence deployed against anyone deemed to be a threat to instituted authority, to the state. (Badiou 2011, 17) Only later-as an outcome of hegemonic struggle-did terror come (for state powerholders) to designate actions of civilians-even actions against the state.

And it often works. Certainly, it has played a part in the dampening or softening of potentialities for alternative globalization movements, as has been the case in previous periods of struggle. In this such anti-radical activists inevitably bolster state capitalist power and authority and reinforce injustice.

Yet we need to be optimistic as well. The charge of radicalism from above (assertive on the surface) is also a cry for help on behalf of power. It is a plea by power to the non-committal sectors, the soft middle, to tilt away from the resisting sectors and side with power (states and capital) in re-asserting the status quo (or extending relations and practices they find beneficial, a new status quo of privilege)-the conditions of conquest and exploitation.

Radicalism (or extremism, or terrorism) is the charge used by power to quell unrest by drawing support toward the ruling interests. In that sense it suggests a certain desperation on behalf of the powerful-one that should be seized upon, not played into or alleviated.

In periods of rising mass struggles, the issue of radicalism is inevitably posed. It is in these times that a radical orientation breaks through the confines of hegemonic legitimation-posing new questions, better answers, and real alternatives. To oppose radicalism is to oppose thought itself. To oppose radicalism is to accept the terms set out by power, to limit oneself to that which power will allow.

Cosmopolitanism

2nc – at: cosmopolitanism bad

That’s not our cosmopolitianism – it describes existing cosmopolitanism that’s been driven by state choices - they’ve read a disad to the perm not the alt

Beck and Sznaider 10 -- Department of Sociology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich and School of Behavioral Sciences,Academic College of Tel-Aviv Yaffo, Israel (Ulrich and Natan, “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda”, January 2010, The British Journal of Sociology) KW

Like the distinction between ‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’, we have to distinguish between cosmopolitanism as a set of normative principles and (really existing) cosmopolitanization. This distinction turns on the rejection of the claim that cosmopolitanism is a conscious and voluntary choice, and all too often the choice of an elite. The notion ‘cosmopolitanization’ is designed to draw attention to the fact that the emerging cosmopolitan of reality is also, and even primarily, a function of coerced choices or a side-effect of unconscious decisions. The choice to become or remain an ‘alien’ or a ‘non-national’ is not as a general rule a voluntary one but a response to acute need, political repression or a threat of starvation. A ‘banal’ cosmopolitanism in this sense unfolds beneath the surface or behind the façades of persisting national spaces, jurisdiction and labelling, while national flags continue to be hoisted and national attitudes, identities and consciousness remain dominant. Judged by the lofty standards of ethical and academic morality, this latent character renders cosmopolitanism trivial, unworthy of comment, even suspect.An ideal that formerly strutted the stage of world history as an ornament of the elite cannot possibly slink into social and political reality by the backdoor.Thus, we emphasize the centrality of emotional engagement and social integration and not only fragmentation as part of the cosmopolitan world.And this emphasizes that the process of cosmopolitanization is bound up with symbol and ritual, and not just with spoken ideas. And it is symbol and ritual that turns philosophy into personal and social identity and consequently relevant for social analysis. The more such rituals contribute to individuals’ personal sense of conviction, the larger the critical mass available to be mobilized in cosmopolitan reform movements for instance, be they movements against global inequality or human rights violations (see the contributions by Robert Fine (2006: 49–67) and Angela McRobbie (2006: 69–86)). And the farther cosmopolitan rituals and symbols spread, the more chance there will be of someday achieving a cosmopolitan political order. This is where normative and empirical cosmopolitanism meet. At the same time, we must remember that a cosmopolitan morality is not the only historically important form of today’s globalized world.Another one is nationalism.The nation-state was originally formed out of local units to which people were fiercely attached. They considered these local attachments ‘natural’ and the nation-state to be soulless and arti- ficial – Gesellschaft compared to the local Gemeinschaft. But thanks to national rituals and symbols, that eventually changed completely. Now today many people consider national identity to be natural and cosmopolitan or world identity to be an artificial construct. They are right. It will be an artificial construct, if artificial means made by humans. But they are wrong if they think artificial origins prevent something from eventually being regarded as natural. It did not stop the nation-state. And there is no reason it has to stop cosmopolitan morality. However, the challenge will be to see these moral orders not as contradictory but as living side by side in the global world. Cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not mutually exclusive, neither methodologically nor normatively.

There can be no doubt that a cosmopolitanism that is passively and unwillingly suffered is a deformed cosmopolitanism. The fact that really-existing cosmopolitanization is not achieved through struggle, that it is not chosen, that it does not come into the world as progress with the reflected moral authority of the Enlightenment, but as something deformed and profane, cloaked in the anonymity of side-effects – this is an essential founding moment within cosmopolitan realism in the social sciences. Our main point is here to make a distinction between the moral ideal of cosmopolitanism (as expressed in Enlightenment philosophy) and the above mentioned cosmopolitan condition of real people. It’s also the distinction between theory and praxis. This means, in our case, the distinction between a cosmopolitan philosophy and a cosmopolitan sociology.

2nc – at: no blueprint

Using transnational civil actors to advance human rights discourse is the only way to provide legitimacy to supranational institutions and creates concrete change- means the alt is not abstract moralism

Cohen, 99- Jean Louise Cohen is the Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Thought at Columbia University

(Jean, September 1999, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos”, International Sociology 14.3, 245-268)//Yak

Liberal cosmopolitans are quick to point out that civil as distinct from political society has taken the lead in reviving human rights discourses including the crucial idea that everyone has the right to have rights (legal protection and legal personhood) (Falk, 1992; Held, 1995). Claims for expanding rights irrespective of citizenship status, for new sorts of rights and for new forms of protections for rights emerge first from civil rather than from political actors (Alter, 1996). For civil society is a locus for the spontaneous development of free association, civil publics and new powers. Civil actors establish connections and relations that render economic and technological interdependencies 'social', as the proliferation today on the transnational level of a wide and highly articulated range of associations, non-governmental organizations, networks, interconnected publics and social movements witnesses. Thus a context is being created in which people can act in concert as peers, exchange opinions and develop the civic competence and trust needed for exercising influence on political entities, administrative bodies and courts. The relations established by international civil society are what carry and give political weight to the universalist dimension of human rights discourses.

The more important supranational organizational structures become, the more important the role of international civil society is in monitoring, gaining access to and influencing them and keeping them open to the concerns of relevant publics.

Thus supranational courts and the administrative/political bodies of regional federations do not function in a vacuum, but they do lack the democratic legitimacy that courts and legislative bodies on the level of the constitutional territorial state enjoy. The only meaningful way to rectify this legitimization deficit is to construe such quasi-governmental institutions as the receptors of influence from civil society and to institutionalize access to these along with forums for public debate. But this influence not only has to be institutionalized, it must also be 'legitimate' in the sense of following certain standards. For this we must recognize the increased importance of human rights discourses and supranational courts in such a constellation. From the point of view of the liberal cosmopolitan, the most important development in this regard is the emergence of supranational legal regimes that take cognizance of interdependency by acknowledging new subjects of international law ranging all the way from individuals, indigenous peoples, and oppressed groups to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These developments enable cosmopolitans to parry the charges of foundationalism and abstract, empty moralistic universalism. The referent of human rights is no longer a mere moral ought, a 'worldless' humanity stripped of all bonds, relationships and context. Rather, human rights discourse now have a context (various interdependences) and refer to real subjects. This implies that the appropriate symbolic referent of legal personhood is not the territorial state but, rather and after all, a globally interrelated humanity whose rights are articulated in international discourses and defended by a multiplicity of legal and political instances (Cohen, 1996). The diversity of levels of governance articulating and backing up rights is the key innovation here.

Indeed it is increasingly the case that the legitimacy of rights now lies at the level of the international order. The transnational discourse of human rights articulated in international law and incorporated increasingly in supranational (regional) covenants and national constitutions, backed up by supranational courts, and monitored by a range of NGOs provides a normative framework that constrains governmental actors, even if it remains the case that states are the entities that implement civil and political rights and provide for social rights (Alter, 1996). In short, human rights discourses are now a pervasive feature of global public culture. Their effectiveness goes well beyond moralistic exhortation: they constitute an international symbolic order, a political-cultural framework, and an institutional set of norms and rules for the global system that orients and constrains states.

The fact that these discourses refer to the rights of man rather than citizens should not be misconstrued. It does not return us to natural law dogma, to empty abstractions, or to foundationalist forms of justification. But it does leave us with a question: if the new international institutions render discourses of human rights more effective, what serves to ground either the principle of universal human rights or particular interpretations and institutionalizations of them?

2nc – at: state good

AT State Good

Even if the state is good, the alt does not mean the state would be destroyed.

Critique of methodological nationalism

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization.

The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions:

[Like] stamp collecting... social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system – not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies – were the currency of social research.

The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated – in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the ‘domestic’ forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000: 68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (as all the research shows – see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science.

As many authors – including the ones in this volume – criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities. In the case of the cosmopolitan ‘Wertbeziehung’ (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of sociology appears problematic.

In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within the context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences. Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state’s own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nation-state.That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner’s paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 133–51).This does not mean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. This is valid to the extent that the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted as transdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism.

These premises also structure empirical research, for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed.

Viewing the world as nation states leads to states attempting complete control.

AT nation-state inevitable

Voice can be institutionalized on the supranational level even if nation-states still exist

Cohen, 99- Jean Louise Cohen is the Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Thought at Columbia University

(Jean, September 1999, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos”, International Sociology 14.3, 245-268)//Yak

New meaning can certainly be given to the multiple levels of belonging, the various loci of identity (local, national, regional, global), the differing forms of participation and the intersecting complexes of rights, duties and loyalties that characterize multicultural polities existing in a global context. But we must honestly acknowledge that the distribution of competencies in specifying rights is an issue that can only be resolved politically. Hopefully this will be done democratically, informed as much as possible by considerations of justice. We will avoid the Scylla of foundationalism and the Charybdis of democratic despotism only if we acknowledge that substance and process, justice and democracy are in a recursive relationship to each other. The assertion of basic rights in civil public spaces requires moral justification through the giving of substantive reasons and free argumentation. An independent judiciary to protect rights is crucial. But so are democratic political institutions that legislate and make policy in light of publicly justifiable reasons (Gutman and Thompson, 1997). Democracy cannot guarantee justice, but neither can moral justification appeal to some absolute truth that exists independently of consensus.

My abstract discussion of the logic of citizenship on a 'postmodern' paradigm has institutional implications. I would like to suggest that instead of assuming that the future will entail either a new system of sovereign federal mega-states, a return to liberally national nation-states, a world government, or some sort of cosmopolitan world legal order, one must imagine a combination of the elements of all of these. The idea of world government in which liberal and democratic considerations would merge is both implausible and undesirable since it would threaten political diversity. As already stated, quasi-governmental institutions must be open to the influence of civil society. Governmental structures on the national, supra- and subnational levels must have 'receptors' for this influence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that political parties might emerge on the supranational level to supplement national parties and help to articulate and redesign political institutions in a democratic direction, as Habermas hopes. Institutional redesign that makes federations more democratic and states more open to norms articulated on higher levels and to the diversity emerging internally is also called for.

But it is not necessary to envisage federations replacing the territorial state. Instead we must be open to a plurality of forums, and of modes of institutionalizing voice on the supranational level. Existing state jurisdictions would certainly retain control in many areas and be the instances that implement many rights and norms articulated on other political and legal levels (covenants, court decisions and so forth). Democratic, constitutional nation-states could remain a level of political identification for the local citizenry. But new identities and new forms of representation could follow new institutionalizations, complicating the levels of belonging and allegiance in salutary ways. At the same time each state's sovereignty could be tempered by the rules of the federation and other supranational bodies.

My theoretical point is that only if the various elements of the citizenship principle are disaggregated and reinstitutionalized on independent levels of governance with different powers articulating and backing them up will they be able to counter the flaws intrinsic to each of them and function productively as mutual counter-powers. For example, the disaggregation of the rights of persons from the rights of citizens has already diminished the opposition between citizen and alien, allowing for a greater separation of the identity component and the rights component of the citizenship principle. It is only a further development in this direction that would allow for the universalistic principles of justice (equal concern and respect for every individual) and the principle of democracy (participatory parity in public life) to be mutually reinforcing and to inform everyone's conception of the good.

AT: Can’t make a world State

We don’t need to make a world state – moral cosmopolitanism solves

Tan, asst philosophy prof, 4 (Kok-Chor, “Justice Without Borders: Cosmpolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism,” Cambridge University Press, p. 93-4)

Moral and institutional cosmopolitanism

It is often charged that cosmopolitanism is inherently anti-nationalistic because it calls for the creation of a world state (or some similar global institutional form) and, consequently, the cultivation of world citizenship. This is how one prominent critic of cosmopolitanism, Danielo Zolo, understands the cosmopolitan position – consequently, Zolo goes on to reject the cosmopolitan ideal by showing that the idea of a world state is a non-starter (Zolo 1997). Nationalism, in contrast, enjoins the right to national self-determination, which may take the form of sovereign state-hood or, if not feasible, other forms of autonomous political arrangements such as a multinational federalism (Tamir 1992, p. 9). In either case, national self-determination calls for the establishment and strengthening of certain major public institutions (e.g., in education, immigration/naturalization policies, etc.) at the national level, in order to bring about (relatively) autonomous political institutions that “members might see as ‘their own,’” and a public sphere in which the national culture may be expressed (Tamir 1992). Thus cosmopolitanism understood as “world statism” is obviously in tension with nationalism. Each makes opposing institutional demands – one aiming to concentrate and locate political sovereignty in a centralized world body, the other to keep sovereignty decentralized and dispersed at the national level.

But few contemporary cosmopolitans, pace Zolo, actually support the idea of a world state and the subsequent outright rejection of national self-determination. Adapting Charles Beitz’s terminology, I shall call the above interpretation of cosmopolitanism institutional cosmopolitanism, and contrast it with moral cosmopolitanism (Beitz 1999b, p. 287). Unlike institutional cosmopolitanism, which calls for the establishment of a world state, moral cosmopolitanism makes no necessary institutional demands or recommendations. Moral cosmopolitanism simply says that the individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth and concern, and that how we ought to act or what kinds of institutions we ought to establish “should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected” by our choices (Beitz 1999b). In other words, moral cosmopolitanism is not concerned directly with the question of how global institutions are to be ordered, but with the justificatory basis of these institutions. And nothing in this interpretation of cosmopolitanism necessitates the idea of a world state. On the contrary, a moral cosmopolitan can as well defend national self-determination if she believes the ideal of equal and impartial concern for individuals is best realized by respecting their claims to national sovereignty. So there is no necessary conflict between moral cosmopolitanism and the idea of national self-determination.

It is plain that the cosmopolitan conception of distributive justice depends fundamentally on the cosmopolitan moral view – that individuals are the ultimate units of moral worth and are entitled to equal and impartial concern regardless of their nationality. But it is far from evidence that this idea of justice must also depend on institutional cosmopolitanism (i.e., a world government). We can think of different feasible global institutional arrangement for redistributing wealth and resources globally with recourse to the punitive and administrative powers of a world state. Proposals like the Tobin Tax (that would tax short-term capital flows and currency speculation), or Thomas Pogge’s global resource tax (that would tax countries for extracting national resources) are global distributive schemes that are not tied to the idea of a world state (Pogge 1994).

AT: Cosmopolitanism is Eurocentric

Critical cosmopolitanism recognizes multiple kinds of cosmopolitanism- avoids the pitfalls of Enlightenment principles

The point of departure for this kind of critical cosmopolitan social theory is the recognition that the very notion of cosmopolitanism compels the recognition of multiple kinds of cosmopolitanism, including earlier kinds of cosmopolitanism, and which cannot be explained in terms of a single, western notion of modernity or in terms of globalization. Cosmopolitanism refers to the multiplicity of ways in which the social world is constructed in different modernities. Rather than see cosmopolitanism as a particular or singular condition that either exists or does not, a state or goal to be realized, it should instead be seen as a cultural medium of societal transformation that is based on the principle of world openness, which is associated with the notion of global publics. Today global publics are playing a critical role in such processes of transformation. In equating world openness rather than universalism as such with cosmopolitanism the basis for a more hermeneutic and critical cosmopolitan sociology will hopefully be established. In sum, then, the argument of this paper is that a sociologically driven critical cosmopolitanism concerns the analysis of cultural modes of mediation by which the social world is shaped and where the emphasis is on moments of world openness created out of the encounter of the local with the global.

Cosmopolitanism requires looking at the world from multiple perspectives – not just one.

How and why is the twenty-first century very different from France in 1912 when Durkheim published The Elementary Forms of Religious Life? One obvious difference is that Australian aboriginals have access to Durkheim’s sociology of religion either through their interaction with contemporary anthropologists, or through educational web-sites, or through participation in university discourses on Durkheim’s sociological theory. Cosmopolitan understanding, despite the existence of digital divide, is discursive, dialogic and reflexive.Whereas the Elementary Forms assumed hat the Aunta tribe was a passive object of sociological inquiry, the contemporary world is connected together as a (more or less) unified place in a (more or less) simultaneous time. Network society makes endless and instant dialogue. (Turner 2004: 11)

The distinction between the actor perspective of society and politics and the observer perspective of the social sciences only unfolds its disruptive potential when the expanded options opened up by cosmopolitanization are viewed from both perspectives. It then becomes clear that cosmopolitanization, in both the agent and the observer perspectives, must be developed as a new politics of perspectives (of starting points, modes of access, standards, framings, foregrounds and backgrounds, etc.). (On the ‘politics of scale’ – i.e., the negotiation of hierarchy and legitimacy among different ‘scales’ of social interaction – see Brenner 1999, 2000; Tsing 2000; Burawoy et al. 2000). It follows that social science can conceptualize and thematize the relational patterns ‘transnational’,‘global–local’,‘global–national’,‘national–global’ or ‘global–global’:

• with a local focus (e.g. transnational lifestyles of Turks in London; global co-operation and conflict within the World Trade Organization, the American government or NGOs; conflicts between national and Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 397 British Journal of Sociology © London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 communal governments over fertility policy; anti-poverty initiatives in New Delhi; the impact of the BSE risk on an agricultural community in Scotland); or

• with a national focus (e.g. transnational forms of marriage and family in different countries; the modes and frequency of transnational communication in the USA, Russia, China, North Korea and South Africa; the nationalities and languages of schoolchildren in different countries, etc.); or

• with a transnational (or translocal) focus (e.g. German Turks who have developed a transnational lifestyle moving between Berlin and Istanbul are being researched in both Berlin and Istanbul; this involves an exchange of perspectives which sets the nation-state framings of Turkey and Germany into systematic relations with each other (as regards values, administrative regulations, cultural stereotypes, etc., which determine, facilitate or prevent transnationalization); the transnational dynamics of risk and conflict of the BSE crisis and their cultural perception and evaluation in different European countries are being investigated in a comparative study); or

• with a global focus (how far advanced is the internal and external cosmopolitanization of national domains of experience in particular countries, what implications does this have, and what theoretical, empirical and political conclusions can be drawn from it?).

Thus methodological cosmopolitanism is not mono- but multi-perspectival. More precisely, it can and must observe and investigate the boundarytranscending and boundary-effacing multi-perspectivalism of social and political agents through very different ‘lenses’.A single phenomenon, transnationality, for example, can, perhaps even must, be analysed both locally and nationally and transnationally and trans-locally and globally.

Universalism and cosmopolitanism are distinct – their argument doesn’t apply

What distinguishes the cosmopolitan outlook from a universalistic outlook? And what makes the cosmopolitan outlook at the beginning of the twenty-first century ‘realistic’, in contrast with cosmopolitan idealism? Here are just a few considerations by way of exploring these questions: Political cosmopolitanism in sociological terms answers the question: how do societies deal with difference and borders under conditions of global interdependence crises?

Different social modalities of dealing with difference have to be distinguished – universalism, relativism, ethnicity, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, etc. Universalistic practices, for example, but also relativism, etc., involve conflicting impulses. Universalism obliges us to respect others as equals as a matter of principle, yet for that very reason it does not involve any requirement that would arouse curiosity or respect for what makes others different. On the contrary, the particularity of others is sacrificed to an assumption of universal equality which denies its own context of emergence and interests. Universalism thereby becomes two-faced: respect and hegemony, rationality and terror. Similarly, the emphasis on context and on the relativity of standpoints springs from an impulse to acknowledge the difference of others, but when it is absolutized in thought and practice it flips over into an incommensurability of perspectives which amounts to pre-established ignorance.

Realistic cosmopolitanism – this is the inference – should be conceived, elaborated and practiced not in an exclusive manner but in an inclusive relation to universalism, contextualism, nationalism, transnationalism, etc. It is this particular combination of semantic elements which the cosmopolitan outlook shares with the universalistic, relativistic and national outlooks and which at the same time distinguishes it from these other approaches.

Realistic cosmopolitanism presupposes a universalistic minimum involving a number of substantive norms which must be upheld at all costs. The principle that women and children should not be sold or enslaved, the principle that people should be able speak freely about God or their government without being tortured or their lives being threatened – these are so self-evident that no violation of them could meet with cosmopolitan tolerance.We can speak of ‘cosmopolitan common sense’ when we have good reasons to assume that a majority of human beings would be willing to defend these minimum universal norms wherever they have the power, if called upon to do so.

On the other hand, realistic cosmopolitanism includes universal procedural norms, since they alone make it possible to regulate how difference is dealt with across cultures.Accordingly, realistic cosmopolitanism must also confront the painful questions and dilemmas, such as the universalist–pluralist dilemma: is cosmopolitanism single or multiple?

AT: Causes globalization

Cosmopolitanism is distinct from globalization.

Cosmopolitanism and globalization

But, one might object, isn’t ‘cosmopolitanization’ simply a new word for what used to be called ‘globalization’? The answer is ‘no’: globalization is something taking place ‘out there’, cosmopolitanization happens ‘from within’. Whereas globalization presupposes, cosmopolitanization dissolves the ‘onion model’ of the world, where the local and the national form the core and inner layer and the international and the global form the outer layers. Cosmopolitanization thus points to the irreversible fact that people, from Moscow to Paris, from Rio to Tokyo, have long since been living in really-existing relations of interdependence; they are as much responsible for the intensification of these relations through their production and consumption as are the resulting global risks that impinge on their everyday lives. The question, then, is: how should we operationalize this conception of the world as a collection of different cultures and divergent modernities? Cosmopolitanization should be chiefly conceived of as globalization from within, as internalized cosmopolitanism. This is how we can suspend the assumption of the nation-state, and this is how we can make the empirical investigation of local–global phenomena possible.We can frame our questions so as to illuminate the transnationality that is arising inside nationstates. This is what a cosmopolitan sociology looks like.

Our version of cosmopolitanism isn’t about globalization – it’s about translating cultural identity to be more open towards difference. We can reject nationalism without facilitating greater globalization

Delanty, 6- Gerard Delanty is a British sociologist and Professor of Sociology and Social & Political Thought at the University of Sussex (Gerard Delanty, 2006, “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory”, http://www.oneworlduv.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/cosmopolitan_imagination.pdf)//Yak
The indicators of cosmopolitanism go beyond shifts in identity to wider discursive and cultural transformation. In methodological terms, cosmopolitan indicators are necessarily ones concerning socio-cultural mediation. If the cosmopolitan moment arises in the construction and emergence of new identities or forms of self-understanding, cultural frames and cultural models, then mediation is the key to it. This emphasis on mediation between, for example, competing conceptions of the social world accords with the cosmopolitan idea in all its forms: the desire to go beyond ethnocentricity and particularity. In this sense then critical cosmopolitanism is an open process by which the social world is made intelligible; it should be seen as the expression of new ideas, opening spaces of discourse, identifying possibilities for translation and the construction of the social world. Following Bryan Turner’s analysis, it can be related to such virtues as irony (emotional distance from one’s own history and culture), reflexivity (the recognition that all perspectives are culturally conditioned and contingent), scepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies, care for other cultures and an acceptance of cultural hybridization, an ecumenical commitment to dialogue with other cultures, especially religious ones, and nomadism, as a condition of never being fully at home in cultural categories or geo-political boundaries (Turner 2001; Turner and Rojek 2001: 225). This is also reiterated in the arguments of other social theorists, such as Calhoun (2003), Gilroy (2004) and Kurasawa (2004) that cosmopolitanism does not entail the negation of solidarities, as liberal cosmopolitan theorists, such as Nussbaum (1996) argue, but is more situated and, as Appiah (2005) argues, it is also ‘rooted’.

This notion of cosmopolitanism goes beyond conventional associations of cosmopolitanism with world polity or with global flows. The article stresses the socially situated nature of cosmopolitan processes while recognizing that these processes are world-constituting or constructivist ones. Such processes take the form of translations between things that are different. The space of cosmopolitanism is the space of such translations. While the capacity for translation has always existed, at least since the advent of writing, it is only with modernity that translation or translatability, has itself become the dominant cultural form for all societies. Translation once served the function of communication and was not the basis of a given culture. It is only becoming fully apparent today what the logic of translation has extended beyond the simple belief that everything can be translated to the recognition that every culture can translate itself and others. The most general one is the translation of inside/outside as a solution to the problem of inclusion and exclusion. Other dynamics of translation are those of the local and global, self and other, particular and universal, past and present, core and periphery. It is the nature of such translations that the very terms of the translation is altered in the process of translation and something new is created. This is because every translation is at the same time an evaluation. Without this dimension of self-transcendence, cosmopolitanism is a meaningless term. Conceived of in such terms, cosmopolitanism entails the opening up of normative questions within the cultural imaginaries of societies. The research object for critical cosmopolitan sociology concerns precisely this space, the discursive space of translations.

Conclusion

Cosmopolitanism does not refer simply to a global space or to post-national phenomena that have come into existence today as a result of globalization. The argument advanced in this paper is that it resides in social mechanisms and dynamics that can exist in any society at any time in history where world openness has a resonance. Clearly cosmopolitanism has become relevant today, due not least to the impact of globalization. Cosmopolitanism concerns processes of self-transformation in which new cultural forms take shape and where new spaces of discourse open up leading to a transformation in the social world. The cosmopolitan imagination from the perspective of a critical social theory of modernity tries to capture the transformative moment, interactive relations between societies and modernities, the developmental and dialogic.

For these reasons, methodologically speaking, a critical cosmopolitan sociology proceeds on the assumption that culture contains capacities for learning and that societies have developmental possibilities. The article has highlighted translations as one of the central mechanisms of cosmopolitan transformation and which occurs on macro-societal and on micro dimensions as well as being played on in the continued transformation of modernities. Cosmopolitan sociology is a means of making sense of social transformation and therefore entails an unavoidable degree of moral and political evaluation. To this extent, cosmopolitanism is a connecting strand between sociology and political discourse in society and in political theory. It has a critical role to play in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in resisting both globalization and nationalism.

AT: Mobility K

Mobility is not the critical element of cosmpolitanism- ignores notions of society that are not territorially bounded and reduces cosmopolitanism to globalization

Delanty, 6- Gerard Delanty is a British sociologist and Professor of Sociology and Social & Political Thought at the University of Sussex (Gerard Delanty, 2006, “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory”, http://www.oneworlduv.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/cosmopolitan_imagination.pdf)//Yak
According to Urry (2000, 2002), who also aligns his position more explicitly with cosmopolitanism, the key feature of the current situation is the fact of mobility. For Urry mobility is an ontological condition and is expressed in processes as different as global complexity and reflexive modernity: people, commodities, cultures, technologies are all mobile and their reality is one of mobility. Mobilities are not just flows but networked relations and are globally organized in new kinds of spaces and temporal processes. In his theory, which is a development of Castell’s and influenced by Bruno Latour, the idea of society is redundant and with it all of classical sociology because it suggests an entity that is bounded, territorial and constituted by the state. Global processes have undermined the nation-state creating an entirely new context for social relations, which instead of being relations between people are relations between mobile and immobile elements. This thesis lends itself to a cosmopolitan perspective since it sees the social world in terms of open as opposed to closed processes. The difficulty with this argument is two-fold. On the one side, the argument that society has become redundant makes unwarranted assumptions about the concept of society in classical sociology as entirely defined by the categories of the nation-state and thus neglects earlier and more cosmopolitan notions of society which cannot be reduced to territorially bounded ideas. On the other side, it exaggerates the novelty of current mobilities. Aside from neglecting earlier mobilities, such as Marx’s definition of capital, the main drawback with this approach is that too much explanatory power is given to global mobilities and hyper-chaotic phenomena. For instance, it is by no means evident that nation-states outside the relatively small part of the world within the European Union are losing power. If anything they are gaining power, as the examples of the USA and China suggest. Moreover, if the concept of society is jettisoned it will have to be replaced by something similar. From the perspective of a cosmopolitan social theory, global mobilities are of central importance, but the fact of mobility is not the key feature of the cosmopolitan movement. Indeed, many kinds of mobilities are not cosmopolitan in the sense used here. They may be open structures, as Urry argues, but the openness that he associated with cosmopolitanism is in fact global fluidity, or ‘cosmopolitan global fluids’ (Urry 2002: 133). The problem here, again, is the reduction of cosmopolitanism to globalization. In opposition to this emphasis on mobility as the chief characteristic of cosmopolitanism, the argument in this paper is that cosmopolitanism cannot be entirely separated from the normative vision of an alternative society and that this imaginary is also present as a cultural model within the cultural traditions of societies.5 Identities and modes of cultural belonging, while being influenced by global mobilities, are not reducible to mobility. The aspect of globalization that is more pertinent is the abstract presence of the global public within the social world.

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