Neg for Venezuela Practice Debate

Advantage One answers

Advantage One frontline

( ) Venezuela doesn’t sponsor dangerous Hezbollah activity – that’s a myth.

Tegel ‘13

Simeon Tegel is a British journalist based in Peru and is GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America. He writes about a broad range of themes across Latin America – “American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove” – Salon.com – Jan 8, 2013 – http://www.salon.com/2013/01/08/is_venezuela_harboring_hezbollah/

American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove Is Venezuela providing operational support to Islamic terrorists? That deadly serious question is increasingly troubling foreign policy and security experts as the South American country and Iran — which funds Hezbollah — move ever closer. Despite deep cultural differences, a shared antagonism toward the US has drawn Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, into an unlikely political friendship in recent years. “Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity, revolution, strong faith,” Chavez said during one early visit to Tehran. “We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don’t want a single power [i.e., the US].” Beyond the rhetoric lies a strategic alliance that has seen Caracas, along with Damascus and Havana, vote against United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and increasing Iranian investment in the Venezuelan economy, now worth more than $5 billion. All of that is very public. But, according to critics such as veteran US Republican Latin Americanist Roger Noriega, Venezuela is also providing operational support to Hezbollah, the Lebanese-based organization classified as terrorist by the US, UK and other allies. It even came up in November’s US elections, with the Republicans claiming in their official online party platform: “Venezuela has become a narco-terrorist state, turning it into an Iranian outpost in the Western hemisphere.” “The current regime issues Venezuelan passports or visas to thousands of Middle Eastern terrorists offering safe haven to Hezbollah trainers, operatives, recruiters and fundraisers.” The GOP did not respond to GlobalPost’s requests for comment. But its claim was questioned — and even ridiculed — by several security experts in Israel and South America contacted by GlobalPost. “That is exaggerated. Generally, this kind of activity [terrorism] is conducted by small units. It is political rhetoric,” said Ely Karmon, one of Israel’s top independent counter-terrorism experts. Nicholas Watson, a senior analyst at British firm Control Risks, who specializes in South America, agreed, describing it as “unhelpful.” He added: “That kind of rhetoric, the blatant accusations, doesn’t help the US’ position in the region. It actually plays into Chavez’s hands and strengthens him within Venezuela.” That Hezbollah has been active in Latin America is hardly news. Argentine investigators have linked the group to two deadly bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Together, the attacks on the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center killed 114 people. One of five Iranians wanted by Interpol over the second bombing, Ahmad Vahidi, is now Iran’s defense minister. Last year, he had to make a rapid departure during a state visit to Bolivia when Argentine prosecutors requested Bolivian police arrest him. Meanwhile, according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington, DC, nonprofit research group, there’s growing evidence that Hezbollah is infiltrating other parts of Latin America, taking advantage of widespread corruption and drug trafficking to raise funds for its activities in the Middle East. The Buenos Aires attacks took place years before Chavez, now cancer-stricken but recently re-elected, came to power in Venezuela. He was even in jail, awaiting trial for his role in a failed coup, at the time of the first bombing, on the Israeli embassy. Nevertheless, a jigsaw of data, put together by everyone from Karmon to Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, paints a disturbing picture of apparent bilateral cooperation in areas such as Iran’s outlawed nuclear ambitions and the Venezuelan military’s adoption of Tehran’s defense doctrine of “asymmetrical” warfare; in other words, guerrilla resistance to a potential US invasion. Now canceled, there was also a secretive weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated jointly by Iran Air and Conviasa, the state airlines in Iran and Venezuela respectively. Karmon and others say the passengers did not pass through customs. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s Lebanese-born Interior Minister Tareck El Aissami — who was previously in charge of the country’s passport office, fueling the Republican claim of papers being given to Islamic terrorists — makes no secret of his sympathies. “I’m also the son of Arabs, I’m Palestinian, I’m Iraqi, and today we are the resistance force,” he said at a 2009 event in support of Palestinians in Gaza. “There are Hezbollah supporters in the Venezuelan government. They have been neither investigated nor fired. They have been kept in their jobs,” said Roman D. Ortiz, director of Bogota-based security consultancy Decisive Point. But does that translate into the Chavez government arming or providing training facilities or other logistical support to Hezbollah? “The existence of a Lebanese community [in Venezuela] plus a left-wing populist government plus the anti-American rhetoric does not equal terrorism,” says Control Risks’ Watson. “That is speculation.”

The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led doctrine — that dies out with Maduro

Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida Ghitis, World Politics Review, 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive Chávez?”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez, Accessed 06-30-2013 | AK)
During almost 14 years in office, Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions. The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time. Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery, Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas. The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And yet, there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez. There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. A close relationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela.

( ) Hezbollah not a threat to the US and Noriega is wrong.

Willans ‘13

Pierce Willans is currently pursuing a degree in political science at Seton Hall University – “Venezuela News: Hezbollah is in Venezuela, But There's No Threat to U.S. Security” – Policymic – March – http://www.policymic.com/articles/29303/venezuela-news-hezbollah-is-in-venezuela-but-there-s-no-threat-to-u-s-security

Is Hezbollah in Venezuela? Probably. A more interesting question is: Does it matter, and if so, how much? American foreign policy hawks have been sounding the alarm on this for years, claiming Hezbollah’s activities in South America, which they often refer to as "America’s backyard," are a threat to national security. The U.S. State Department labels Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and Iranian proxy. The origins of Hezbollah are murky, but it first emerged as a force in the early 1980s, in reaction to Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. During this period, the group quickly gained infamy in the United States when it blew up the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 200 Marines, only months after it had blown up the U.S. Embassy there. That being said, attacks on American targets have been the exception, rather than the rule. Throughout its history, the majority of Hezbollah’s energies have been directed towards Israel. In the decades since its creation, Hezbollah has evolved and expanded its activities, operating as a political party in Lebanon while simultaneously maintaining its separate criminal and military activities. Sometime in the 1980s they are believed to have established a foothold in South America, probably to raise funds from the large Lebanese community there. It has been established that the group is engaged in narcotrafficking and money laundering, no doubt spurred in part by Iran’s declining support due to the crushing international sanctions against it. Though their activities in Latin America appear to be primarily aimed at raising money, fears of Hezbollah’s capacity for violence in the region are not without basis; Hezbollah is widely blamed for bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and then again that city’s Jewish Community Center in the early 90s, killing over 100 people. The fears of a Venezuelan-Hezbollah axis seem to be spurred in large part by the highly visible personal friendship between the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This unlikely alliance between two men of such different cultural backgrounds appears to be a product of their respective governments’ isolation and shared antagonism towards the United States. In the UN, Venezuela has voted against international sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. Iran has billions of dollars invested in Venezuela. There is, however, nothing particularly treacherous about that. The claims of a more sinister relationship have been most prominently voiced by Roger Noriega. Mr. Noriega is currently a visiting fellow at conservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Noriega is no stranger to murky Iran-Latin American intrigue; while at the U.S. Agency for International Development, he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Scandal during the Reagan administration. He subsequently served in high-level diplomatic posts under President George W. Bush, including as Ambassador to the Organization of American States, where he supported the abortive coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002. More recently, he has publicly accused Venezuela of having a secret nuclear program. In his July 2011 testimony before Congress, Mr. Noriega further stoked the fires by claiming that Venezuela actually supports Hezbollah and allows it and drug cartel members to operate in its territory, though he offered no proof. He also hinted darkly that the federal government knows more than it is willing to say publicly on the subject. Noriega clearly knows how to get attention in Washington, but that is not the same as offering well-informed advice. In this post-9/11 foreign policy environment, his efforts seem to be aimed at reinforcing conservatives’ penchant for conflating a group’s stated anti-American sentiments with an unstated intention to actually do us harm. In many ways, Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America are similar to those of other drug cartels, which are rightly viewed as a problem. But their activies are a law enforcement problem, and needs to be confronted without the hysteria that seems to accompany any statement containing "Hezbollah" and "America’s backyard" in the same breath.

( ) Noriega wrong and alarmist

Sigger ‘10

Jason Sigger – Jason Sigger is a defense policy analyst and the proprietor of the blog Armchair Generalist – “Neocon Invents Venezuela Nuke Threat” – Crooks and Liars – October 6, 2010 – http://crooksandliars.com/node/40459/print

On the one hand, it's admirable that the Foreign Policy website offers views from both the right and the left on controversial public policy issues. On the other hand, it would be nice if they added some kind of warning label. I don't know, something like "actual reality may differ from author's perspective." I have this in mind as Roger Noriega (former Bush political appointee, current AEI fellow) warns us of Hugo Chavez's supposed plans to develop nuclear weapons with Iran's help.¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez admitted last week that his government is "carrying out the first studies" of a nuclear program. He attempted to portray it as an innocuous program designed solely for peaceful purposes.¶ --------¶ Chávez's suggestion that he is merely studying the idea of a nuclear energy program is misleading. In fact, in November 2008, Iranian and Venezuelan officials signed a secret "science and technology" agreement formalizing cooperation "in the field of nuclear technology." (The text of the agreement, available in Farsi and Spanish, is available here.) The week after the agreement was signed, Venezuela's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum prepared a presentation for the International Atomic Energy Agency documenting the establishment of a "nuclear power programme" in Venezuela. That presentation, obtained from sources within the Venezuelan government, reveals that an "Atomic Energy Committee" has been managing the nuclear program since 2007.¶ All countries have the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which Venezuela is a signatory. However, Chávez's decision to rely on one of the world's worst proliferators to help develop his country's capabilities in this sensitive technology sets alarm bells ringing. And his recent public declarations understating the nature of his nuclear program raise more questions than they answer.¶ Just for the sake of accuracy, I'd note that China, Pakistan, and North Korea are far more busy in weapons proliferation than Iran, particularly with high-tech equipment and materials. But this kind of language isn't new for Noriega. He is a particular hard-liner against Cuba and Venezuela, with a long history of alarmist speeches and attacks against those governments. So it's not surprising to see this language, and it's easier to shoot holes into his argument.

( ) Iran prolif not inevitable – prefer expert reporters.

Hibbs ‘13

(Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12^th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)

You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do you think that we've reached the point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I don't believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.

( ) Iran Prolif not dangerous and wouldn’t cascade.

Hobbs& Moran ‘12

Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at King's College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship between nuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy-making. Guardian: Julian Borger’s Security Blog – 12-19-12 – http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/dec/19/iran-nuclear-middle-east-arms-race

Inevitably, Iran's nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that, at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a 'proliferation cascade' in the Middle East. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons – whatever form that scenario may take - its regional rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, we find that the counter-argument is more compelling.¶ The idea that 'proliferation begets proliferation' is not new. Dire forecasts on the seemingly inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states have been made since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1963, for example, US President JF Kennedy predicted that there might be up to twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within the next decade. However, proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in 2006 following North Korea's nuclear test.¶ The flawed logic of 'proliferation begets proliferation' is clearly demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatile relations. In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in dissuading these countries from going nuclear.¶ Ironically, the Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear proliferation is not inevitable. Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israel acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and over four decades later still remains the only nuclear power in the region.¶ Now the threat posed by Iran to its neighbours is arguably greater given Tehran's aggressive posturing and regional ambitions. However our research finds that those states deemed most likely to go nuclear due to their proximity to Iran and their suspected past interest in acquiring nuclear weapons (namely Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), would have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down such a route.¶ Take Saudi Arabia, for example. Iran has long been at political and ideological odds with the kingdom across the Gulf. And at first sight, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran down the nuclear path. In February, Saudi officials were reported as claiming that Riyadh would launch a "twin-track nuclear weapons programme" in the event of a successful Iranian nuclear test. An article published in the London Times in February [£] described a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia would attempt to purchase warheads from abroad while also adding a military dimension to its planned civil nuclear programme at home.¶ Look more closely, however, and there is a much stronger case to be made against Saudi nuclearisation. Beyond the Kingdom's primitive nuclear infrastructure – the country lacks sufficient experience and expertise in practically all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle – Saudi Arabia's political and strategic context does not favour the acquisition of nuclear weapons.¶ From a security perspective, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has held firm since the 1940s, despite a number of challenges – most notably the participation of a number of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The relationship barters Saudi oil for US conventional arms and an implicit commitment to Saudi's defence.¶ In recent years, the role of Washington as the silent guarantor of Riyadh's security has grown apace with the structural changes in the Middle East. The fall of the pro-Saudi Mubarak regime in Egypt; protests and instability in Bahrain and Yemen; the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon; and civil war in Syria have upended the established regional order and made Riyadh's position less secure.¶ In this context, and given the determination of the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region, a move by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons holds few positives for Riyadh's security calculus.¶ From and economic perspective, Saudi Arabia's policy outlook exemplifies Etel Solingen's seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalism and nuclear restraint. Solingen argues that political coalitions favouring the reduction of state control over markets and increased privatisation and foreign investment – are less likely to adopt a nuclear posture that would endanger their economic interests.¶ In this regard, Saudi Arabia's emphasis on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. Riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international powers, keen to attract foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local population (population growth of almost two percent equates to a need for some 200,000 new jobs per year), and reinvigorating the Saudi private sector.¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economic isolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom's international trade relations. Saudi's interests are best served by nuclear restraint.¶ In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear restraint in the cases of other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons - in December 2011, following the United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia's Patriot missile defence system, for example – to facilitating increased integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear weapons.¶ Ultimately, many see a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation. But when the stakes are this high, it is important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there is substantial evidence to suggest that regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.

( ) US won’t respond with nuclear lash-out.

Washington Post ‘7

(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

Extensions – Iran not have sinister activities in Venezuela

( ) Iran doesn’t have sinister activities in Venezuela

Goodman ‘13

Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26^th – http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

The U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of the Americas.¶ “It’s a shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for some -- especially Congress -- attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration,” Sabatini said via e-mail.¶ Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavez’s funeral in March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later.

( ) Iran’s activities in Venezuela aren’t profitable or dangerous.

Goodman ‘13

Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26^th – http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

Under Ahmadinejad’s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more than doubled trade with Brazil, the region’s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support everything from a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as “atomic” two-wheelers.¶ The two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which together with its main Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle for the Ahmadinejad government’s funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah.¶ Yet with Iran’s economy crippled by sanctions, many of the projects haven’t gotten off the ground. For example, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help build a $350 million deep-water port off Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a “huge” embassy in Managua.¶ That hasn’t prevented the Obama administration from trying to curb Iran’s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington.

( ) Iran’s influence in Latin America decreasing and not supporting terror.

Goodman ‘13

Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26^th – http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report.¶ While Iran’s interest in Latin America is a “concern,” sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report.¶ “As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” according to the report.

Extension – Nuclear Iran won’t cause War or Domino

( ) Iran Prolif not dangerous – wouldn’t cause instability or domino effect.

Keck ‘12

(Zachary Keck is deputy editor of e-International Relations and an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. His commentary has appeared at Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review and Small Wars Journal – “False Prophets of Nuclear Proliferation” – National Interest – April 5^th –

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-prophets-nuclear-proliferation-6725)
Even as other issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program are debated, there is a wide-ranging consensus in the West that an Iranian bomb would precipitate a regional nuclear-arms race, if not a global one. Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC), Robert Casey (D-PA) and Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) said as much in the pages of the Wall Street Journal in March. Similarly, British foreign secretary William Hague worries that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, “the most serious round of nuclear proliferation” to date would commence. And recently in the New York Times, Ari Shavit of Haaretz stated matter-of-factly that “an Iranian bomb will bring about universal nuclear proliferation.”¶ Fortunately for mankind’s sake, there is no evidence to support these apocalyptic prophecies. Although some precautionary actions might be prudent, neither history nor contemporary circumstances indicate that an Iranian atomic weapon would be a nuclear catalyst.¶ Historical Precedents¶ To begin with, fears of an impending nuclear tipping point have been a regular feature of the nuclear age. The CIA is a case in point. Whereas in 1957 the agency predicted ten countries could go nuclear within a decade, by 1975 it concluded that “logically” nuclear proliferation would only subside when “all political actors, state and non-state, are equipped with nuclear armaments.” A quarter century and one nuclear power later (both South Africa and Pakistan acquired a nuclear-weapons capability during this time, but South Africa dismantled all its nuclear weapons by 1991), CIA director George Tenet announced in 2003 that we had entered “a new world of proliferation” and warned “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.”¶ The 1960s were equally remarkable. As a presidential candidate in 1960, for example, John F. Kennedy foresaw “ten, fifteen, or twenty nations” acquiring a nuclear capability by the 1964 election. The following year, the Kennedy administration was so certain a Chinese nuclear test would trigger a global wave of nuclear proliferation that it considered simply giving Beijing’s neighbors “defensive nuclear weapons.” Although not a single additional nuclear power emerged by 1963, President Kennedy remained “haunted by the feeling” that there would be fifteen or twenty of them by 1975 and possibly twenty-five by the end of that decade.¶ And yet nearly half a century after the Cuban missile crisis there are only nine nuclear-weapon states, five more than when Kennedy was elected and two of which already had advanced nuclear weapon programs during his presidency. During the same time interval, four states have voluntarily given up their nuclear arsenals and an estimated forty nations have not built them despite possessing the technical capability to do so.¶ Still, just because nuclear forbearance has been the norm thus far doesn’t necessarily mean this will continue into the future. In fact, according to Shavit, an Iranian bomb would “force Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to acquire their own.” Similarly, President Barack Obama is “almost certain” that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, its neighbors will be “compelled” to do the same.¶ Once again, there’s not much evidence to support these assertions. Although a few countries have built nuclear weapons because a rival acquired them, these are the exceptions to the general rule. Of the quantitative studies done on reactive proliferation, none have found a nuclear-armed rival makes a state more likely to even initiate a nuclear-weapons program, much less succeed. Furthermore, as the political scientist Jacques Hymans documents in a forthcoming book, despite the diffusion of technology, nuclear aspirants have become increasingly inefficient and unsuccessful over time.¶ It’s therefore not surprising that in-depth case studies of Turkey’s, Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia's nuclear prospects have found no cause for concern. Turkey is the most capable of building nuclear weapons but already has a nuclear deterrent in the form of an estimated ninety nuclear warheads hosted on its territory for the United States. This is far more than what it is capable of producing indigenously. Additionally, it’s hard to square Turkey’s supposed nuclear ambitions with the recent removal of its entire stockpile of highly enriched uranium.¶ Egypt is far less capable of building a bomb than Turkey. Indeed, it already had a dysfunctional nuclear program during the 1960s that was abandoned despite Israel, its archenemy at the time, acquiring a nuclear capability. Even before the onset of the Arab Spring, proliferation analyst Jim Walsh argued it was “not likely that Egypt will seek, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons.” In the aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrow, any government in Cairo will be preoccupied with improving the lot of its people, lest it too wind up on trial. Achieving economic growth will require sustained access to foreign capital, markets and financial assistance, none of which would be forthcoming if Cairo initiated a nuclear-weapons program.¶ Given its long-standing rivalry with Tehran, Saudi Arabia is certainly the most alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Moreover, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of intelligence and ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom, has repeatedly warned that if Iran is allowed to get nuclear weapons, the kingdom may well do the same. Of course, this might be what a nation would say if it wanted Washington to “cut off the head of the snake” in Tehran.¶ In fact, as Nuclear Threat Initiative concludes, “no convincing evidence exists . . . that Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclear weapons program.” Similarly, in his comprehensive study that included fieldwork inside the kingdom, Ibrahim Al-Marashi found “little evidence . . . that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage directly in a regional nuclear arms race.”¶ If Saudi Arabia did pursue nuclear weapons, however, it would be almost certain to fail. Even those most concerned about a Saudi bomb don’t claim it can build one itself. Rather, they contend Riyadh will buy a ready-made nuclear deterrent from Pakistan. Pakistan’s willingness to take this unprecedented action is based on pure speculation, past Saudi aid to Pakistan and a host of unsubstantiated claims, most notably those made by Mohammed al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat at the UN who defected in 1994. In seeking to gain asylum into the United States, al-Khilewi told U.S. authorities that in exchange for financial aid, Pakistan had agreed to provide Riyadh with a nuclear deterrent should the need ever arise.¶ Besides al-Khilewi’s obvious motives for fabricating this story, it’s doubtful Islamabad would uphold its end of the alleged bargain. After all, in the wake of 9/11 Washington gave Islamabad $22 billion to fight terrorism and later found Osama bin Laden living amongst Pakistan’s military cadets. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are exceedingly paranoid their nuclear arsenal would not withstand an Indian or U.S. first strike. It’s therefore difficult to imagine them willingly parting with any nuclear warheads.¶ Even if Islamabad did have some to spare, Riyadh would be an unlikely recipient. Given the world’s dependence on Saudi crude, Pakistan would be the target of exceptionally harsh and unrelenting international condemnation, including from its “all-weather friend” China, which has recently been getting 20 percent of its oil supplies from Riyadh. Iran would also be outraged and almost certain to respond by aligning itself squarely with India. Pakistani leaders have gone to great lengths to avoid this outcome, and they wouldn’t suddenly invite it just to keep a promise their predecessors might have made.¶ If Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, there’s no reason to think a regional nuclear-arms race would follow. Washington and its allies have avoided this outcome in the past, and nothing suggests this time would be different.

No impact to Iranian proliferation — multiple warrants — their evidence reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of IR

Waltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N. Waltz, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf, Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms. It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less. Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

Extensions – US won’t respond with nuclear lash-out

( ) Obama won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons

Crowley ‘10

(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, Jan 10^th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

( ) Nuclear retaliation won’t happen.

Bremmer ‘4

(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new 9/11 hit America”)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on terror'. And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

( ) The U.S. won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense

Spring ‘1

(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)

Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland. But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States, the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States needs to be able to resort to defensive options.