59
local communities have been characterized by the U.S. and Iraqi leadership as bands of
outlaws threatening U.S. and Iraqi security. This exacerbates the inability of the Iraqi
government and U.S. military to positively influence the local community,
as insecurity
grows while prominent members of the community that have served as local protectorates
are vilified. This has led much of the Shia population that was formerly protected by the
militia to see the government as not only untrustworthy, but a “threat to their existence as
well.”
181
The U.S. policy regarding the dissolution of Shia militias (as per CPA Order 91,
June 2004) has been counter-productive to the future stability of Iraq. Evidence suggests
that Iranian sponsored groups have gladly accepted the role with training,
funding and
equipping Shia militias that are similar in fashion to the strategy that U.S. forces taken in
training, equipping and funding Sunni militias to assume a greater role in combating
insurgents groups, specifically al Qaeda, at the local level. In November 2007, Rear
Admiral Gregory Smith a senior U.S. military spokesman stated that “Iran has been the
principal supplier of weapons, arms, training and funding of many militia groups.”
182
This suggest that the U.S. strategy towards Shia militias can be attributed to proliferation
of dangerous factions and splinter militia cells that have turned
to external states for
funding and training, which can also be attributed to increased sectarian tension and
violence.
Evidence in Shia-dominated cities also suggests that Shia militias are increasingly
influenced by external actors. Shia militia strongholds of Karbala and Najaf are rarely
patrolled by U.S. forces any more. The majority of U.S. forces are deployed in and
around Baghdad leaving only a small U.S. military contingent to conducts short visits
with local officials without being able to confirm the presence of Iranian influence. Yet
U.S. intelligence reports suggests that these cities are where
the elite Iranian military
force know as the Revolutionary Guard has “opened training camps in the area for Iraqi
181
Glenn R. Thomas and Terry Hodgson, “Militias: Is there a Role for them in U.S. Foreign Policy?”
Special Warfare Journal
20, no. 6 (November-December, 2007), 18 (accessed November 16, 2007).
182
Sudarsan Raghavan and David Finkel, “US Cites Drop in Attacks Sine Build-Up; Bombs Kill 20,”
Washington Post
November 19, 2007, 2007, http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20071119562323.html (accessed
November 19, 2007).
60
guerillas”
183
to allow “Shia militants [to] gather, train and arm themselves…for attacks
against U.S. forces farther north.”
184
In November 2007, U.S. Army Colonel Donald
Farris who is in charge of the notoriously dominated area of Baghdad called Sadr City
and Adhamiya said that “there has been no decline in the operations of Shi’ite extremist
groups or the support they
receive from Iran in weapons, funding, or training.”
185
Colonel Farris recognizes that the 2004 cease-fire with the Mahdi Militia is still in effect,
but that the “special groups” that evolved from the militia outside of U.S., Iraqi, and
Sadr’s oversight have continued their operations. Two Iraqis recently captured by his
forces “admitted to receiving training in Iran and [are] acting as agents for a group in
Iran.”
186
Recent evidence highlighting increase in number of Iranian made roadside
bombs known as explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) found in Colonel Farris’ area of
operations also suggest that extremist militias are gaining strength and continuing to turn
to Iran for support. Nine EFPs were either discovered or employed in October 2007
compared to seven in May 2007.
187
These are just a few
examples of how militias
initially created to support and secure local neighborhoods, outlawed by U.S. policy-
makers turned to Iran. Unfortunately this has allowed for the negative influence of
outside actors like Iran to employ a strategy of engagement, increase the number of
extremist groups with nefarious intentions while simultaneously destabilizing the positive
influence of Shia militias which has led to a more threatening
security environment for
U.S. forces, Iraqi forces and local residents. This evidence makes it difficult to ignore the
unwillingness by U.S. decision-makers to engage and co-opt Shia militias like the Mahdi
Army and how that may have also prevented extremist members formerly tied to militias
from seeking and accepting support from Iranian military units.
183
Mark Kukis, “Has the US Ceded Southern Iraq?” Time,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1669249,00.html?xid=feed-yahoo-full-world-related
(accessed November 26, 2007).
184
Kukis.
185
Kristen Roberts, “U.S. Commander: Iran Still Supporting Iraqi Militias,” Yahoo News,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071126/ts_nm/iraq_usa_iran_dc (accessed 11/26/2007, 2007).
186
Roberts.
187
Ibid
.
