Moral Political Economy and Poverty in Rural India: Four Theoretical Schools Compared

4. Complex Moral Reasoning
All four major schools of thought use complex moral reasoning. Table 2 summarises six of the strategies found. I refer to the India-based works in order to give concreteness and flavour to the table. In discussing moral reasoning, Sayer (2000a) argues against seeing well-being purely in social constructivist terms. He also argues against seeing change purely in rational terms, which in this paper is followed up by arguing against a purely economic, land-based, or money-based analysis. The term that Sayer uses for the complex iteration of academic and lay normativities, taking into account both the economic and the social/cultural axes, is ‘ethical naturalism’ (2005: 21). This is a wide philosophical debate, and I have not considered the whole range of strategies of moral reasoning here. Instead using the existing literature I draw out the competing strategies actually found in one specific policy debate about land-renting. What emerges is indeed a complex normative scene. This section summarises the normative reasoning of the writers in the tenancy debate.
Many of the writers in this debate have allowed for iteration of the economic and social aspects, and are thus interdisciplinary. They have also advocated (and/or conducted) fieldwork about differentiated households/people as well as meta-analysis of policy and of grassroots proposals for change. Within this scene, given that we are looking at tenancy and at these four schools of thought, six of the strategies for looking at norms were:
A neoliberal approach (focusing on marketised activities of individuals), which however did allow for open-ness of the economic system.
Here, growth with equity was assumed to be possible. Incomes were not seen as necessarily a zero-sum game, and land productivity in particular was not perceived as a zero-sum game. The growth of production is seen to create opportunities for higher incomes.
Classical neoclassical authors using the neoliberal reasoning strategy in a tenancy context include Skoufias (1995) and Bliss and Stern (1982). In each case, economic growth is crucially seen to promote opportunities for farmers to become better off. In Table 2 I denote these authors as using two moral reasoning strategies, because the second one (the Pareto optimality moral reasoning strategy) is separable from the neoliberal growth assumptions.
A human capabilities approach, focused on a wide range of social and personal outcomes, sometimes focusing on felt empowerment.
This approach always assumes open systems exist, so society can change - even in the area of customs. This approach is also weakly associated with the gender and development school of feminism, which re-evaluates and re-appreciates the people presently oppressed and tries to ensure that their voices are heard. Aspects of achieving human capabilities are both good-in-themselves and also sometimes good as a means to other ends.
My first exemplar of the human capabilities reasoning strategy is Sen, who has made a gradual transition from neoclassical economist to a broader human development orientation. In Table 2 (Row 2) I cite his works which introduce the human capability reasoning explicitly (1979, 1980, 1993) as well as recent work which still has many neoclassical characteristics^viii but is also aimed explicitly at improving human capabilities both as ends in themselves (functionings) and as means to further development (Sen, 1996: 1-8). Interestingly, the Marxist Ramachandran has used concepts of real harm and the alleviation of human suffering throughout his work (1990, 1996). The feminist Jackson also appears to be influenced by human capability assertions although she would not agree with the universalist ‘list’ variant associated with Nussbaum (1999). Jackson’s explicit rejection of excessively universalistic moralizing is consistent with Sen’s positional objectivity and thus gives us a stimulating example of the human capabilities reasoning strategy in operation.
A compression of income approach, usually focussing on land redistribution or income redistribution.
This approach can aim to change control over water and other natural resources as scarcities grow; it aims for structural equality; it may foster taxation. (Here we have some structuralists, the marxists, and Epstein (1973). Sen (1979) also bridges into this approach, as evidenced also by the empirical work of Dréze and Sen (1995, 1997).
A good example of this is Epstein (1973), who openly advocated higher taxes on India’s larger farmers. The redistribution of land has also been a compression-oriented policy in India for 55 years. Sengupta and Gazdar (1996) give a review of these policies in West Bengal (1996: 136-162), pointing out that the redistribution of land can cause a redistribution of income but not necessarily a very large one. Agarwal (2003) advocated giving women access to land, including via land rental as well as increased personal access to inherited land. Such proposals are interesting and often controversial.
A strategy of transformation via praxis, characteristic of Indian Marxists, which has three components.
First, it diagnoses the changing class structure of a country in its context, then raises consciousness of class and crisis by disseminating a concrete grounded political economy interpretation, and finally (thirdly) it expects agents to be able to integrate these discoveries into their own praxis (transformative action). The social struggle for improvements in living conditions is envisaged mainly as a class struggle (Bhaduri, 1983a). The articulation of feudal, pre-capitalist, capitalist and/or other modes of production are exposed by experts for the good of all (e.g. Ramachandran, 1996: 224; 300-325).
A social equality approach which aims for pluralism and mutual respect among sub-cultures, with recognition of difference (exemplified by Jackson’s anthropological detail; Jackson, 2003).
This approach requires a temporary muting of the academic voice and is most attuned to lay normativities and difference. This approach is exemplified by Jackson (2003) who uses anthropological detail to argue that a risk of harm is attached to the compression moral reasoning.
A subjectivist Pareto-criterion based approach following the usual strategy of orthodox economics.
Here, any improvement strategy offered by lay actors is potentially valuable as long as no one is harmed by it, and no farm or state or region or household loses out as a result. Feelings of harm rest in the individual subjectivity, and models of equilibria tend to assume that Pareto-optimality depends on not harming subjects in hypothetical experiments that use permutations of a model (not of reality). Pareto-optimality logic rests upon avoiding harm, and otherwise can be inserted into a variety of models, explanations, counterfactual thought experiments and comparisons.
These six strategies all use counterfactuals to conduct thought experiments based on real historical situations and/or empirical data. Sen is an interesting example who has used a wide range of these reasoning techniques over the years. He makes interesting but cautious comparisons of India with China, and of Kerala with other parts of India, for instance. Sen appears to be pluralist at the level of theory, as well as innovative and thoughtful in constructing moral arguments.
A typical statement of purpose indicates that the moral reasoning is based on knowledge not only of a particular case, but also knowledge of comparable cases:
The purpose of this study is not to study the specific features of Kerala’s experience only in order to try and establish Kerala’s exclusiveness; it is to try and draw out lessons from Kerala’s experience for the rest of India and, perhaps, for other developing countries. (Ramachandran, 1996, in Drèze and Sen, eds. 1996: 207-8).
All the six strategies deserve a more thorough review than was possible here. I now want to point out two contradictions found in this literature. Firstly, some neoclassical economists have switched from neoliberal reasoning to other reasoning strategies, notably human capabilities approaches (Stiglitz, 2002a) while continuing to advocate fundamentally atomistic and universalistic modelling methods. Secondly, the Marxists and feminists can come into serious conflict over policy advocacy if sweeping policy changes are advocated.
Stiglitz himself has pointed out some dangers of Pareto-optimality reasoning in his article on social justice (2002a: 25). Stiglitz suggests here that technocrats’ use of Pareto-style reasoning technocrats can actually mask real harm to groups of workers (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Pareto-optimality reasoning is widely used, is often applied with detailed nuances, and often comes in a complex package along with multifaceted explanatory arguments. Classic illustrations of the subjectivism found in traditional Pareto-optimality arguments are the reports by Srinivasan (1989, and with Bell in 1989) on bonded labour.
The movement toward human capabilities reasoning has been part of a broad and widely supported shift from economic-growth to human-development centred strategies for public policy. The dotted line in Table 2 (row 2) reminds us that there has also been a widespread consensus that NIE scholars often recognise or use insights from NCE and vice versa. In a sense this dual shift could lead toward bridging the normative gap with Marxists and feminists, since the aim of achieving valued human capabilities is a common over-arching aim of all schools (it is rather hard to oppose). Bhaduri (1983) illustrates some common ground between Marxist and NIE theoretical frameworks (Olsen, 2006). Similarly, the assumption that rights in private property must be protected creates common ground between Agarwal (2003) and the NCE and NIE schools. Much has been ignored in my review of moral reasoning strategies so far, notably the role of states and religions. It is interesting to see empirical work emerging that uses the human capabilities reasoning explicitly (Ramachandran, 1996).
I move now to the second contradiction. If a researcher takes up only the Pareto-optimality strategy and therefore hesitates to attack any entrenched structural inequality, then their hesitancy can create a relatively weak moral agenda. Agarwal – a feminist Marxist in several ways - took a much stronger structuralist position and suggested a reallocation of land to women through various means (2003). Later, Agarwal also expressed anger about Jackson’s expression of the dangers of Agarwal’s lack of cultural sensitivity. Agarwal accused Jackson of conservatism and an attempt to protect traditional values (see Agarwal, 2003b) once Jackson had expressed doubts about Agarwal’s proposals. But Agarwal made reference to a particular place in India where land reallocation had already taken place. Thus both authors might agree, if they were brought face to face, that specific policy proposals suit particular local and cultural contexts, and are not so sweeping as to be deemed ‘universal’.
This combination of the possibility of universal ‘goods’ and culturally relative values reflects precisely Nussbaum’s argument (2000), and is consistent with Putnam’s overall view (2002). The reason for an apparent conflict is that the social equality approach can appear to appease the causes of economic and cultural inequality. Agarwal (2003b) wished to attack the weakness of using merely a subjectivist reasoning strategy and to advocate much stronger compression-of-land policies. Jackson (2004) rebutted the accusation of conservatism and instead wished to urge that social equality be prioritized so that differentiated sub-groups in society can shape their own lives locally. This is why I have listed the social equality viewpoint separately. It has different priorities and it lowers the dominance of economic influences with an argument. According to Jackson’s viewpoint, also seen in other feminist writings (see Jeffrey, 2001; Rai, 1995), local specificities force researchers to avoid universalistic statements and sweeping advocacy (Menon, 2002). It is rather rare to see the anti-univeralist feminists raising particularities that are economic, rather than social; Kapadia (1995) at several points illustrates the local specificity of socio-economic formations based upon particular histories and concrete family-caste connections. Kapadia and Jackson, as well as Agarwal, have conducted extensive local fieldwork and cannot be accused of excessive universalism. Thus, the two moral reasoning strategies have come into conflict but are, in practice, probably compatible when brought to bear on a concrete and specific ethical situation.
If attention is given to a range of moral reasoning approaches, perhaps combining three of them, then a serious discussion of norms and purposes, and of means and ends, can be reached. In this serious discussion lay accounts of 'the good' can be brought together with expert overview and some abstract account of a desirable trajectory.
The moral reasoning strategies are listed above at a very high level of abstraction. No resolution of the tensions between them can be found at such a high level. One might question Pareto Optimality in general, but still wish to avoid harm from any change in a particular area of life. But the answer to whether a change is deemed good would depend on the specific types of harm, to whom, and what offer of changed circumstances might then be made available to them (hence I ignored utilitarianism which is very universalist). Since in general changed policies imply changed opportunities, the no-harm condition cannot in general be assumed to apply. Our knowledge of harm is rooted in past conditions; it will be hard to predict the harm or well-being in the new conditions. We can know only of a tendency toward harm.
Secondly to list these strategies is not to resolve any specific problem. My aim is to list a set of strategies that can be used by other researchers and subjected to scrutiny in specific research projects. The discovery that neoliberal strategies usually assume an open economic system is revealing (it suggests that realists are right to urge economists to use open- and not closed-system models to represent the economy). The paper has succeeded in this aim but leaves further work to be done.
5. Conclusion
The paper has clarified some of the issues in a moral economy research agenda. I showed that although the different schools of thought are ontologically not easy to combine, there are still insights about social norms that are worth noticing in all four schools. Some ontological work is needed to develop an interdisciplinary economics with structure-agency dialectics, sensitive to the non-money economy and its dynamics, as well as to the market economy. Dow (2004) suggests that a structured pluralism would attend to major social structures whilst using a multi-disciplinary explanatory framework.
I would argue that micro fieldwork and policy-related enquiry should and can complement the more philosophical and abstract meta-enquiry that is usually known as moral philosophy. Economists from the orthodox schools would do well to respond to Sayer’s suggestion that lay normativity needs more attention than philosophers have given it.
Three criticisms of the framework offered here should be dealt with before ending the paper.
Firstly, it can be argued that the framework is too complex and wide-ranging to be viable. The danger, however, of narrower mono-disciplinary studies is that they cannot judge well the effect on the whole of any change in a part.
Secondly, it could be argued that the Indian women’s tenancy issue has not been resolved. The role of a social scientist is not to resolve such an issue. They can take a position but their normative position must be conditional, conjunctural, and temporary, in the sense that it is held subject to new knowledge. The main task, though, is to identify how the proposals arising from authors like Agarwal and Genicot open up new research questions, and to decide which of these is most pressing.
Thirdly, the stance of a scholar’s value-neutrality could still be justified by making assertions about a strong division of labour in the social sciences. Many scholars oppose such a division of labour because it allows monodisciplinarity to support unwise policy advocacy (Allen and Thomas, eds., 2000, Ch. 1), and because it can dehumanise and isolate the researcher (Gasper, 2004). Unrealistic research is likely to result. In this paper I have opened up paths of pluralism – one via the bridging of schools of thought, and a second through working on making complex moral reasoning strategies coherent and consistent. Overall the possibilities for non-value-neutral development economics are vast.

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