Financial Crises and the Subprime Meltdown
221
crises, along with the deterioration in banks balance sheets, worsened adverse
selection and moral hazard problems and made the economies ripe for a serious
financial emergency.
At this point, full-blown speculative attacks developed in the foreign exchange
market, plunging these countries into a full-scale crisis. With the Colosio assassi-
nation, the Chiapas uprising, and the growing weakness in the banking sector, the
Mexican peso came under attack. Even though the Mexican central bank inter-
vened in the foreign exchange market and raised interest rates sharply, it was
unable to stem the attack and was forced to devalue the peso on December 20,
1994. In the case of Thailand, concerns about the large current account deficit and
weakness in the Thai financial system, culminating with the failure of a major
finance company, Finance One, led to a successful speculative attack. The Thai
central bank was forced to allow the baht to depreciate in July 1997. Soon there-
after, speculative attacks developed against the other countries in the region, lead-
ing to the collapse of the Philippine peso, the Indonesian rupiah, the Malaysian
ringgit, and the South Korean won. In Argentina, a full-scale bank panic began in
October November 2001. This, along with realization that the government was
going to default on its debt, also led to a speculative attack on the Argentine peso,
resulting in its collapse on January 6, 2002.
The institutional structure of debt markets in Mexico and East Asia now inter-
acted with the currency devaluations to propel the economies into full-fledged
financial crises. Because so many firms in these countries had debt denominated
in foreign currencies like the U.S. dollar and the yen, depreciation of their cur-
rencies resulted in increases in their indebtedness in domestic currency terms,
even though the value of their assets remained unchanged. When the peso lost
half its value by March 1995 and the Thai, Philippine, Malaysian, and South Korean
currencies lost between one-third and one-half of their value by the beginning of
1998, firms balance sheets took a big negative hit, causing dramatic exacerbation
of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This negative shock was espe-
cially severe for Indonesia and Argentina, which saw the value of their currencies
fall by more than 70%, resulting in insolvency for firms with substantial amounts
of debt denominated in foreign currencies.
The collapse of currencies also led to a rise in actual and expected inflation in
these countries. Market interest rates rose sky-high (to around 100% in Mexico and
Argentina). The resulting increase in interest payments caused reductions in
household and firm cash flows. A feature of debt markets in emerging-market
countries, like those in Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina, is that debt contracts have
very short durations, typically less than one month. Thus the rise in short-term
interest rates in these countries made the effect on cash flow, and hence on bal-
ance sheets, substantial. As our asymmetric information analysis suggests, this
deterioration in households and firms balance sheets increased adverse selection
and moral hazard problems in the credit markets, making domestic and foreign
lenders even less willing to lend.
Consistent with the theory of financial crises outlined in this chapter, the sharp
decline in lending in the countries discussed contributed to the collapse of eco-
nomic activity, with real GDP growth falling sharply. Further economic deteriora-
tion occurred because the collapse in economic activity and the deterioration in
the cash flow and balance sheets of both firms and households worsened bank-
ing crises. Many firms and households were no longer able to pay off their debts,
resulting in substantial losses for banks. Even more problematic for banks were
222
PA R T I I I
Financial Institutions
their many short-term liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. The sharp
increase in the value of these liabilities after domestic currency devaluation led to
further deterioration in bank balance sheets. Under these circumstances, the bank-
ing systems would have collapsed in the absence of a government safety net
as
occurred in the United States during the Great Depression. With the assistance of
the International Monetary Fund, these countries were in some cases able to pro-
tect depositors and avoid a bank panic. However, given the loss of bank capital
and the need for the government to intervene to prop up the banks, the banks
ability to lend was nevertheless sharply curtailed. As we have seen, a banking cri-
sis of this type hinders the ability of the banks to lend and also makes adverse
selection and moral hazard problems worse in financial markets, because banks
are less capable of playing their traditional financial intermediation role. The bank-
ing crisis, along with other factors that increased adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems in the credit markets of Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina, explains
the collapse of lending, and hence economic activity, in the aftermath of the crises.
Following their crises, Mexico began to recover in 1996, while the crisis coun-
tries in East Asia tentatively began to recover in 1999, with stronger recovery later.
Argentina was still in a severe depression in 2003, but subsequently the economy
bounced back. In all these countries, the economic hardship caused by the finan-
cial crises was tremendous. Unemployment rose sharply, poverty increased sub-
stantially, and even the local social fabric was stretched thin. For example, after
their financial crises, Mexico City and Buenos Aires became crime-ridden, while
Indonesia experienced waves of ethnic violence.
1. A financial crisis occurs when a disruption in the
financial system causes an increase in asymmetric
information that makes adverse selection and moral
hazard problems far more severe, thereby rendering
financial markets incapable of channelling funds to
households and firms with productive investment
opportunities, and causing a sharp contraction in
economic activity. Six categories of factors play an
important role in financial crises: asset market effects
on balance sheets, deterioration in financial institu-
tions balance sheets, banking crisis, increases in
uncertainty, increases in interest rates, and govern-
ment fiscal imbalances.
2. There are several possible ways that financial crises
can start in advanced countries like Canada and the
United States: mismanagement of financial liberaliza-
tion and innovation, asset-price booms and busts,
spikes in interest rates, or a general increase in
uncertainty when there are failures of major financial
institutions. The result is substantial worsening of
adverse selection and moral hazard problems that
leads to contraction of lending and decline in eco-
nomic activity. The worsening business conditions
and deterioration in bank balance sheets then trig-
gers the second stage of crisis, the simultaneous fail-
ure of many banking institutions: a banking crisis.
The resulting decline in the number of banks causes
a loss of their information capital, leading to a further
decline in lending and a downward spiral in the
economy. In some instances, the resulting economic
downturn leads to a sharp decline in prices, which
increases the real liabilities of firms and therefore
lowers their net worth, leading to debt deflation. The
decline in firms net worth worsens adverse selection
and moral hazard problems so that lending, invest-
ment spending, and aggregate economic activity
remain depressed for a long time.
3. The financial crisis of 2007 2008 in the United States
that led to a number of banking crises throughout
the world was triggered by mismanagement of finan-
cial innovations involving subprime residential mort-
gages and the bursting of a housing-price bubble.
4. Financial crises in emerging-market countries develop
along two basic paths: one involving the mismanage-
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