scientific worldview that omits the existence of consciousness, some observers come to the conclusion that it's just an
illusion.
Jaron Lanier, the virtual-reality pioneer, takes issue (in the third of his six objections to what he calls "cybernetic
totalism" in his treatise "One Half a Manifesto") with those who maintain "that subjective experience either doesn't
exist, or is unimportant because it is some sort of ambient or peripheral effect."
11
As I pointed out, there is no device or
system we can postulate that could definitively detect subjectivity (conscious experience) associated with an entity.
Any such purported device would have philosophical assumptions built into it. Although I disagree with much of
Lanier's treatise (see the "Criticism from Software" section in chapter 9), I concur with him on this issue and can even
imagine (and empathize with!) his feelings of frustration at the dictums of "cybernetic totalists" such as myself (not
that I accept this characterization).
12
Like Lanier I even accept the subjective experience of those who maintain that
there is no such thing as subjective experience.
Precisely because we cannot resolve issues of consciousness entirely through objective measurement and analysis
(science), a critical role exists for philosophy. Consciousness is the most important ontological question. After all, if
we truly imagine a world in which there is no subjective experience (a world in which there is swirling stuff but no
conscious entity to experience it), that world may as well not exist. In some philosophical traditions, both Eastern
(certain schools of Buddhist thought, for example), and Western (specifically, observer-based interpretations of
quantum mechanics), that is exactly how such a world is regarded.
R
AY
:
We can debate what sorts of entities are or can be conscious. We can argue about whether consciousness is an
emergent property or caused by some specific mechanism, biological or otherwise. But there's another mystery
associated with consciousness, perhaps the most important one.
M
OLLY
2004:
Okay, I'm all ears.
R
AY
:
Well, even if we assume that all humans who seem to be conscious in fact are, why is my consciousness
associated with this particular person, me? Why am I conscious of this particular person who read Tom Swift
Jr. books as a child, got involved with inventions, writes books about the future, and so on? Every morning that
I wake up, I have the experiences of this specific person. Why wasn't I Alanis Morissette or someone else?
S
IGMUND
F
REUD
:
Hmm, so you'd like to be Alanis Morissette?
R
AY
:
That's an interesting proposition, but that's not my point.
M
OLLY
2004:
What is your point? I don't understand.
R
AY
:
Why am I conscious of the experiences and decisions of this particular person?
M
OLLY
2004:
Because, silly, that's who you are.
S
IGMUND
:
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