Around the same time Alonzo Church, an American mathematician and philosopher, published a theorem that
examined a similar question in the context of arithmetic. Church independently came to the same conclusion as
Turing.
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Taken together, the works of Turing, Church, and Gödel were the first formal proofs that there are definite
limits
to what logic, mathematics, and computation can do.
In addition, Church and Turing also advanced, independently, an assertion that has become known as the Church-
Turing thesis. This thesis has both weak and strong interpretations. The weak interpretation is that if a problem that
can be presented to a Turing machine is not solvable by one, then it is not solvable by any machine. This conclusion
follows from Turing's demonstration that the Turing machine could model any algorithmic process. It is only a small
step from there to describe the behavior of a machine as following an algorithm.
The strong interpretation is that problems that are not solvable on a Turing machine cannot
be solved by human
thought, either. The basis of this thesis is that human thought is performed by the human brain (with some influence by
the body), that the human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy, that matter and energy follow natural laws,
that these laws are describable in mathematical terms, and that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of
precision by algorithms. Therefore there exist algorithms that can simulate human thought. The strong version of the
Church-Turing thesis postulates an essential equivalence between what a human can think or know and what is
computable.
It is important to note that although the existence of Turing's unsolvable problems is a mathematical certainty, the
Church-Turing thesis is not a mathematical proposition at all. It is, rather, a conjecture that, in various disguises, is at
the heart of some of our most profound debates in the philosophy of mind.
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The criticism of strong AI based on the Church-Turing thesis argues the following:
since there are clear
limitations to the types of problems that a computer can solve, yet humans are capable of solving these problems,
machines will never emulate the full range of human intelligence. This conclusion, however, is not warranted. Humans
are no more capable of universally solving such "unsolvable" problems than machines are. We can make educated
guesses to solutions in certain instances and can apply heuristic methods (procedures that attempt to solve problems
but that are not guaranteed to work) that succeed on occasion. But both these approaches are also algorithmically
based
processes, which means that machines are also capable of doing them. Indeed, machines can often search for
solutions with far greater speed and thoroughness than humans can.
The strong formulation of the Church-Turing thesis implies that biological brains and machines are equally
subject to the laws of physics, and therefore mathematics can model and simulate them equally. We've already
demonstrated the ability to model and simulate the function of neurons, so why not a system of a hundred billion
neurons? Such a system would display the same complexity and lack of predictability as human intelligence. Indeed,
we already have computer algorithms (for example, genetic algorithms) with results that are complex and
unpredictable and that provide intelligent solutions to problems. If anything, the Church-Turing thesis
implies that
brains and machines are essentially equivalent.
To see machines' ability to use heuristic methods, consider one of the most interesting of the unsolvable problems,
the "busy beaver" problem, formulated by Tibor Rado in 1962.
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Each Turing machine has a certain number of states
that its internal program can be in, which correspond to the number of steps in its internal program. There are a
number of different 4-state Turing machines that are possible, a certain number of 5-state machines, and so on. In the
"busy beaver" problem, given
a positive integer
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