6
were exhausted in 2010. The decline has been broad-based, extending across a variety of
categories include education and infrastructure spending. The weakness is largely traceable to
very limited
growth in local tax revenues, particularly property taxes (Harris and Shadunsky,
2013). In that sense, it is a further reflection of the costs of the collapse of the residential housing
market. In mid-2013, the real value of S&L spending was still not back to the level of 2007:4.
The situation is unlikely to change greatly in the near future. Property values are beginning to
rise,
but at a gradual pace, and grants to the states will be slowed by sequestration and other
limitations on federal spending.
Construction.
The downturn on the housing market has come to an end, but it appears
that the recovery will be gradual. New single family housing starts reached an inflated peak of
over 2 million units in 2005 and fell to 554 thousand by 2009 with the crisis and recession. By
June of 2013 this figure had risen to around 900 thousand, but the
pace of recovery has been
slow and it will take many years to get back even to normal levels of single family construction.
The problems of homeowners whose debt exceeded their home values has been a
dominant part of the failure to generate a recovery in residential construction As demonstrated in
Figure 4, this problem persists to the present, with almost 24 percent of all home mortgages still
underwater as of June 2013 and rates over 40 percent in some metropolitan areas. And, of
course, those homeowners who are not underwater on their mortgages
have still experienced a
substantial decline in the value of their wealth held in real estate. The government has not been
able to design a program that would fundamentally alter the financial situation for a large
proportion of those homeowners with negative equity, and the normal legal processes of
foreclosure and bankruptcy have progressed very slowly.
4
Vacant
housing units, while they have come down in recent months, remain at
historically high levels (Figure 5). In past recessions, construction would fall short of the pace of
household formations and a falling vacancy rate would ultimately provide the basis for recovery.
However, in the current cycle the elimination of excess
units has been very slow, presumably
because low rates of job creation and distressed housing finance continue to discourage the
formation of new households.
4
The
multiple
dimensions
of
the
housing
crisis
created
a
dynamic
with
strong
negative
feedback
effects
as
delinquent
mortgages
pushed
homeowners
into
foreclosure
and
distressed
sales
that
added
to
the
downward
pressure
on
home
prices,
raising
the
negative
equity
of
others.
7
The collapse of nonresidential construction was concentrated in office buildings, retailing
and lodging. These were areas of significant overbuilding during
the years leading up to the
recession, and they are particularly sensitive to the availability of credit. Many shopping centers
have high vacancy rates and some have gone bankrupt or been sold off. Developers are less
likely to build new retail facilities if they can buy up existing ones cheaply. On the credit side,
banks tightened standards on commercial real estate lending throughout 2009 and 2010, delaying
a significant easing of credit until late 2011. An unusually high level
of business uncertainty in
the first few years of the recovery also contributed to an aversion to projects whose returns
stretch over multiple years.
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