Microsoft Word 2007 ichrie conference Proceedings Final-Final 06-06-07. doc

 
2007 Annual International CHRIE Conference & Exposition 
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strategies and business performances of super deluxe hotels in Seoul by modified prisoner’s dilemma game model. 
Tso and Law (2005) analyzed the online pricing practices of hotels in Hong Kong. They found that lowest rates for 
all hotel categories in Hong Kong were offered by internet channel. By the study of Hong Kong high tariff hotels, 
Yeung and Lau (2005) argued that diversifying a hotel’s portfolio of actions, but not too much different from the 
competitors, would help hotels to achieve higher financial performance in a competitive market. Recently, Garcia 
and Tugores (2006) proposed a two-stage duopoly game model in which hotels competed in both quality and prices. 
The success of tourism enterprise couldn’t be without supporting by relative entities carrying out 
complementary activities. For example, the theme park needs to coordinate with tour operator, accommodation, 
transportation, and other tourist facilities. With the support of their services, tourists could enable and optimize their 
visit experience (Kemperman 2000). Moreover, hotel & accommodation providers offer a product of strategic 
interest to tour operators insofar as it also determines to a great extent the cost of a package holiday (Medina-
Munoz, Medina-Munoz, and Garca-Falcon 2003). Therefore, tour operators usually exercise some control over the 
hotel & accommodation providers with which they deal (Bastakis, Buhalis, and Butler 2004; Medina-Munoz, 
Medina-Munoz, and Garca-Falcon 2003). All these businesses with their relationships form a complex tourism 
supply chain. This conception offers the opportunity to deal with total business process excellence and represents a 
new way of managing the business and relationships with other members of the supply chain (Lambert and Cooper, 
2000). 
Many approaches have been developed and applied in supply chain management. Game theory is one of 
them. Variety of game models are proposed according to different supply chain structures. The simplest supply 
chains have serial structures including two enterprises. This structure is popular in literatures due to easily 
theoretical analyses in different game models, like Nash Game (Cachon and Zipkin 1999; Huang and Li 2001), 
Stackelberg Game (Ertek and Griffin 2002; Abad and Jaggi 2003), and Bargaining Game (Ertogral and Wu 2001; 
Huang and Li 2001). The supply chains with more complex structures are required multi-stage games where more 
than one games are involved in single model. For example, in the two-echelon supply chain with tree structure, Tsay 
and Agrawal (2000) characterized competition within echelon by Nash Game, while depicted competition between 
echelons by Stackelberg Game. Using the same approach between echelons, Yang and Zhou (2006) compared three 
scenarios in which two homogeneous enterprises played Nash Game, Stackelberg Game, and cooperated 
respectively within downstream echelon. The applying game model in more complex supply chains could be 
referred to Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) and Carr and Karmarkar (2005). 
In conclusion, it can be observed from the above literature reviews that the majority of the works in tourism 
industry focus on single enterprise or sector and are short of theoretical foundation. Moreover, there is little research 
on supply chain in the context of supply chain competition. This research proposes to overcome these drawbacks to 
definitively characterize how changes in the competitive environment affect behaviors and performances of tourism 
enterprises.