Microsoft Word 2007 ichrie conference Proceedings Final-Final 06-06-07. doc

 
Impulse buying as a cognitive state of tension 
The psychological benefits acquired from impulse buying are not without costs. Such psychological costs 
are reflected in the cognitive tension consumers typically experience when engaging in impulse buying. Lewin’s 
(1951) field theory posits that a state of tension will emerge whenever a psychological need arises. Although 
impulse buying does not involve deliberate planning, it does imply some awakening of a need or desire (Bagozzi & 
Dholakia, 1999). Accordingly, a state of tension is evoked when positive and negative forces pointing toward or 
away from a psychological need (Lewin, 1951). In the context of impulse buying, such a cognitive state of tension 
is likely to be caused by two opposing forces: desire for self-indulgence and desire for self-control.
The cognitive tension between desire for self-indulgence and desire for self-control is rooted in the way 
how two basic human thought processes are believed to encourage/discourage impulsive behavior (Freud, 1911; 
Hilgard, 1962). While primary mental processes encourage spontaneous and impulsive behavior, secondary thought 
processes pull in the opposite direction and gear toward a more rational and socialized approach. According to 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988), there are two selves of a decision maker: the “doer” and the “planner”. While the doer is 
more impulsive and prone to temptations, the planner is more forward-looking and budgeting for future purchases 
(Cheema & Soman, 2006). The doer represents a primary mental process that is susceptible to fall prey to desire for 
self-indulgence. However, a conflict between immediate gratification and long-term consequences of consumption 
gives rise to the need for self-control (Cheema & Soman, 2006). As a result, desire for self-control manifests itself 
as a threshold that has to be overcome by incurring a “psychological cost” to break preset rules (Shefrin & Thaler, 
1988). Thompson, Zanna and Griffin (1995) label such cognitive tension between conflicting desires as 
cognitive 
ambivalence.