myself and me in (2) could co-refer, and yet (2) would still be a recognisably poor
sentence, though (1) is not. We might instead look at some of the properties of the
di erent lexical items in (1) and (2). Lexical features pertaining to number, person, and
gender are called Φ-features. We might hypothesize that a re exive and its antecedent
must bear the same Φ-features. We could then frame a new hypothesis about re exives:
that they must be co-referential with another expression in the sentence that shares
the same Φ-feature speci cation. But again this wouldn't explain the intuited di erence
between (1) and (2). In both (1) and (2) we have two expressions that share singular,
rst-person Φ-features, one of which is a re exive. So this hypothesis falsely predicts
that speakers should intuitively judge (1) and (2) to be equally good.
An aspect of (1) that we need to capture is that myself doesn't merely co-refer with I but
is actually bound by I. Speakers must always interpret it to refer to the same individual
that I does. If, in addition to this dependency, we add the notion of c-command, we can
drastically improve upon our previous generalizations: a re exive must be bound by an
antecedent that c-commands it. I will assume, unrealistically but for ease of exposition,
that simple sentences like (1) are composed of NP-VP as in (1a):
(1a) [s [NP I][VP [V shaved][NP myself]]]
The NP I c-commands the NP myself in (1). On this analysis, in simple sentences like
(1), the object of a sentence will be c-commanded by the subject of a sentence, since the
object is contained in the subject's sister and not vice-versa, as marked in (1a). In (2)
the re exive is not bound by a c-commanding antecedent because even if myself is
interpreted as co-referential with me it is not c-commanded by me. Principle A, making
use of c-command relations, thus explains the intuited contrast between (1) and (2).
Drawing on further intuitions data, we can test Principle A, which appeals to binding
and c-command, against competitors such as the principle that a re exive must be
bound by a preceding expression. This competing explanation does not extend to further
data such as our intuitive judgements about (3).
(3) [The man I saw] shaved myself.
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In (3) the pronoun I, which is a potential antecedent for myself, precedes the re exive
but (3) is not a good sentence. As indicated by the square brackets, The man I saw is a
constituent of sentence (3), according to standard tests for constituency , and contains
I. But there is further structure to The man I saw, so I will be at a position hierarchically
below The man I saw. I doesn't c-command myself as myself is not a sister of I and there
is a node above I that does not contain the re exive. Hence, I does not c-command
myself though it does precede it. The notion we need is not precedence but c-command.
Linguists might unearth further evidence from speakers’ intuitions that overturns
Principle A. There are some apparent counterexamples to Principle A in English, such as
‘Jane saw Stuart's picture of herself’. These ‘picture re exives’ are of borderline
acceptability to English-speakers. There are further cases of contrastives like ‘Bill can't
imagine why Mary would want anyone other than himself’. Speakers’ intuitive
judgements about these apparent counterexamples are marginal: some speakers think
they are OK but nearly all speakers judge that the sentences sound better with ‘him’
than ‘himself’. Whether these sentences constitute genuine counterexamples to
Principle A depends upon their proper analyses. (See
Kayne [2002]
for further
discussion and see Boeckx
[2006]
, pp. 105–9, for a discussion of reconstruction e ects
that once seemed to violate Principle A.) But the important point is that such sentences
are marginal for everyone; for the linguist and non-linguist alike.
That's how evidence from intuitions can issue in such theoretical principles as Principle
A. Principle A is supported by the intuitions data to the extent it is the best explanation
of that data. An aim of grammatical theory is to explain these intuitive judgements of
acceptability and unacceptability, and the structural interpretations that speakers judge
sentences to have.
2.2 Acceptability and interpretability
In classifying the data, the term acceptable is used to refer to utterances that are
relatively natural and easy to comprehend without any paper-and-pen analysis.
Acceptability is a matter of degree. The unacceptable structures are relatively more
di cult though they may be grammatical for all that. Chomsky gives the following
characterization of acceptability:
[L]et us use the term ‘acceptable’ to refer to utterances that are perfectly natural
and immediately comprehensible […] Obviously acceptability will be a matter of
degree, along various dimensions […] The more acceptable sentences are those that
are more likely to be produced, more easily understood, less clumsy, and in some
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sense more natural. The unacceptable sentences one would tend to avoid and
replace by more acceptable variants, wherever possible. (
Chomsky [1965]
, pp. 10–
1)
We can use the term interpretable to refer to the fact that a string has a natural
interpretation, though it may have more than one such interpretation. Where a string is
associated with more than one structural interpretation, we have structural ambiguity.
Intuitions about acceptability and interpretability can dissociate where, for example,
speakers nd a string acceptable in principle but uninterpretable as in (4):
(4) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
Although speakers struggle to assign (4) an interpretation and nd it odd, they
recognize it is unlike (5):
(5) Ideas colourless furiously green sleep.
The string presented in (5) is ‘word salad’. Examples like (4) suggest that we can
sometimes prise apart speakers’ grammatical sensitivities from their ability to nd a
literal meaning for a string. Speakers’ intuitions about (4) suggest that while they do
not have direct awareness of its underlying structural properties, they do have an
immediate sense of whether what they are confronted with has the structure of a
sentence of their language and what that broad structure is.
Acceptability and interpretability as data sources are to be distinguished from the
theoretical notion of grammaticality, and what is generated by a grammar. Speakers
have no intuitions about what a grammar mandates, in the theoretical sense of a
grammar that concerns linguists. This is re ected in the distinction between
grammatical competence and linguistic performance. A speaker's grammatical
competence system is just one component amongst an ensemble of systems
responsible for their intuitions about acceptability and interpretability. Acceptability
elicits or classi es intuitions but it is not something that can get a full explanation from
linguistic theory as it looks to involve a range of factors beyond grammar. These
include processing factors, semantic and pragmatic factors, as well as commonsense
knowledge and contextual factors. If I say ‘I called the man who wrote the book that you
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told me about up’, this might seem rather unwieldy. But it is grammatical, where this
means that the best generative grammars assign it a structural interpretation in just the
way they do my less unwieldy utterance of ‘I called up the man who wrote the book that
you told me about’. As a set of rules, the grammar will generate a set of structures. But
how that set bears on what we do and don't nd acceptable is a highly theoretical
matter.
2.3 Other evidence
At deeper levels of explanation, where grammarians are concerned with very abstract
principles and aiming for greater generality, they are not merely checking principles o
against the observed intuitions. To do so would trivially achieve descriptive adequacy:
that the theory assigns a structural description to every sentence of the language
indicating how it is understood. But it would serve merely to recapitulate the data. The
grammarian is always concerned with the explanatory adequacy of his theory:
determining the actual grammar of the language a speaker has acquired from amongst
the possible descriptively adequate grammars. This is a more stringent condition and
confers a deeper level of justi cation. At deeper levels of explanation, theoretical virtues
like the generality and simplicity of the grammatical principles will be more to the fore.
But speakers’ intuitions will still play a guiding role in the investigation because
linguists are concerned to explore the languages that speakers are actually competent in
and not just to come up with simpler and more powerful grammars.
Though intuitions have a central evidential role in generative grammar, this does not
suggest that other forms of evidence are irrelevant in principle or in practice. A central
component of what Fodor calls The Right View of generative grammar is that there is no
proprietary body of data such that we can tell a priori what evidence might bear on
grammatical hypotheses (see
Fodor [1985]
, pp. 147–51). According to The Right View,
not only speakers’ intuitions but also facts about language use, grammar acquisition,
the neurology of speaker-hearers, ‘or, for that matter, the weather on Mars’ could, in
principle, bear on grammatical hypotheses. The alternative to The Right View of
generative grammar Fodor calls The Wrong View, according to which we can stipulate in
advance what evidence counts as relevant to grammatical theory. Fodor nds The
Wrong View implausible in light of the way that science is really conducted; to adhere to
it, Fodor claims, would be to take exception to the methodological principles that
characterize the more mature sciences.
Katz defends a species of what Fodor calls The Wrong View. For Katz, the evidence from
speakers’ linguistic intuitions has precedence over all the other sorts of evidence. Katz
labels such evidence ‘direct’, or ‘linguistic’, evidence and contrasts it with other forms
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of evidence, such as that from grammar acquisition or psychological experiment, which
only constitute ‘indirect’ or ‘psychological’ evidence. On Katz's view, a linguist may get
clues about grammar, when the ‘linguistic evidence gives out, by discovering
psychological or neurological facts about speakers’. But, according to Katz, ‘indirect
evidence depends on direct evidence for its legitimization as a relevant source of facts
and direct evidence has a prior claim over indirect evidence.’ (
Katz [1981]
, p. 71). Katz
thinks that other evidence can never compel us to revise or abandon a grammatical
hypothesis that is supported ‘on the basis of unchallenged direct evidence.’ (
Katz
[1981]
, p. 83).
In contrast, according to The Right View, there is no distinction between direct and
indirect evidence for grammatical theories. There are just di erent sources of evidence
that may be more or less useful in our current state of knowledge. In principle, an
experiment in speech perception or a piece of neurological evidence might be relevant
to working out the form of a speaker's language, just as a speaker's intuitive judgement
may be. In our current state of knowledge, evidence from intuitions is more readily
available than neurological evidence for grammatical hypotheses. But there is no
principled reason that other forms of evidence could not lead us to revise particular
hypotheses that have been supported by intuitions data.
If one is a Platonist, like Katz, then one may be unmoved by methodological morals
about general scienti c practice because one denies that linguistics is like the other
sciences that draw on empirical evidence. If linguistics is a part of mathematics or logic
concerned with abstract objects, and in these mathematical sciences one can choose
what is of interest, then one can stipulate that only a certain range of data are to be
included amongst the ‘linguistic’ data. Platonists can then focus on the mathematical
problem of formally specifying a grammar that predicts a certain range of data, such as
speakers’ intuitions. However, there is no particular reason why Platonists should
attend to just those grammatical properties of the languages speakers actually acquire.
According to The Right View, generative grammarians are interested in explaining and
predicting, inter alia, speakers’ intuitions. The di erence is that, on The Right View,
grammarians are interested in intuitions because they hypothesize, rather than
stipulate, that intuitions are revealing of the target of inquiry: the grammars speakers
acquire. On The Right View, the intuitions evidence has no privileged status. So
conceived, the grammarian wants to know what sort of grammars can be acquired and
how, how speech is understood, how language interacts with other areas of cognition,
what aphasics and schizophrenics reveal about language, what we have that animals
lack: ‘in short, all that stu that got people interested in studying languages in the rst
place’ (
Fodor [1985]
, p. 60). Fodor warns proponents of The Wrong View that while they
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are free to adopt a proprietary, or a priori, conception of the ‘linguistic’ evidence and
pursue such an inquiry, ‘all the action is at the other end of town’.
To take a schematic example of the sort of evidence that could be useful to
grammarians, consider evidence concerning speech processing and how it could be
used to help lter out the e ects of the parser that exhibits a di erent organization to
grammatical competence. Let's suppose we had two di erently structured grammars, G
and G′, that hitherto could both explain a speaker's intuitions, and a theory M of the
organization of short-term memory in human adults that has received some
independent con rmation. If the conjunction of M and G predicted that triply self-
embedded sentences are not construable by human adults, whereas the conjunction of
M and G′ predicted the contrary then we have evidence for preferring G to G′; though
they might make the same predictions about the intuitions of speaker-hearers’
independently of the evidence from short-term memory.
Linguists draw on evidence from grammar acquisition in meeting explanatory
adequacy, evidence from pragmatics in discerning what falls within the core language
faculty and what falls outside it, evidence from pathological cases and evidence from
work on the brain. (See
Pettito [2005]
, pp. 97–8, for a discussion of evidence from
cases of brain impairments that may support Chomsky's postulation of a level of
phonological representation common across hearers and signers.) But one might
wonder why, if linguists are really interested in this broad array of data, they seem to
ignore a lot of readily available psychological evidence from speech processing and
production.
The relation between evidence from speech processing and generative grammars is
delicate. To take an illustrative example, Quine once argued that the phrase boundaries
that grammarians posit are just artefacts of their theories, as he thought they would be
with formal languages, rather than a re ection of anything real (see
Quine [1972]
).
Quine claimed that for formal languages, there is no ‘right’ syntax; one can arbitrarily
pick one that generates the right theorems, and by analogy, that generative
grammarians can just pick a grammar because the only thing that is real is the set of
strings that the rules generate. Quine argued that it was wrong to assume that there is
a true answer to the question of where the phrase boundary is in strings of the form
ABC. He thought it could be between B and C or between A and B as one liked, so long as
the same strings are preserved.
But later some psychological experiments in speech processing were carried out called
the ‘click’ experiments, which led Quine to change his mind. In the click experiments
subjects were presented with sentences like (6) and (7). With the bracketed material
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included, we get di erent readings of the non-bracketed material and seem to process
the non-bracketed material di erently. (These examples are taken from
Collins [2006]
.)
(6) [Your] eagerness to win the horse is quite immature.
(7) [In its] eagerness to win the horse is quite immature.
In (6) we leave a main break in between horse and is, whilst in (7) the main break comes
after win. If click noises are placed in the same objective positions (between, say, the
and horse) in the acoustical stream as each of these sentences are uttered, subjects re-
position the clicks in di erent places to re ect the main phrase breaks. After the click
experiments were devised, Quine changed his mind about phrase boundaries and said
that they are real because the click experiments show how you could get evidence to
decide between the competing rule systems that generate them (see
Quine [1986]
).
Chomsky thinks that this is a serious misinterpretation of what the experiments
establish. As Chomsky (
[2002]
, pp. 125–7) sees it, the work on clicks serves only to test
an experiment and not to test for phrase structure. The work on clicks can test whether
clicks are displaced in a way that accords with phrase boundaries. But if the click
experiments had been out of step with phrase structure in clear cases then it would not
have suggested that phrase structure be revised to t with click displacement. It might
equally well suggest that the experiment was poorly designed as an indicator of phrase
structure. One would not, for example, hypothesize that phrase boundaries come in the
middle of a word on the basis of click displacements being heard in the middle of a
word. Chomsky thinks that it would suggest instead that the experiment is not t for
purpose because the displacements suggest the wrong structures in clear cases. We
make robust intuitive judgements that provide evidence for where the phrase
boundaries are in our language and if the click experiments do not gel with these
judgements then the grammarian may have a reason to reject the connection between
click displacement and phrase boundaries. So it is not so straightforward to determine
what is suggested about the structure of a speaker's grammatical system from
experiments that target the way we process speech.
3 The Orthodox Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Data for
Psychological Theories
3.1 How do intuitions bear on competence theories?
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Psychologists elicit intuitive responses to presented material in such diverse areas as
‘Theory of Mind’ and developmental research , reasoning , moral cognition and
throughout vision science. To focus on the visual case, just as reports of visual
impressions constitute data for theories of the visual system that processes visual
information, so, on the orthodox model, linguistic intuitions constitute data for
theories of the grammatical competence system that constrains the linguistic forms
that a speaker nds acceptable and how they can be interpreted. On this model,
intuitions data are brought to bear on a theory about a core component of speakers’
internal linguistic organization: grammatical competence. The character of a native
speaker's intuitions leads us to ask:
What must her internalized grammar be like […] for her to nd these arrangements
of words acceptable but not those; for her to be able to interpret a sentence in this
way but not in that. To arrive at speci c hypotheses about the internalized
grammar we reason counterfactually: had the grammar been di erent, had it not
respected a particular constraint then it would have been possible to hear certain
utterances di erently. (
Smith [2006]
, p. 959)
One of Devitt's charges (
[2006b]
) against this orthodox model is that there is currently
‘no account of how the rules embodied in the language faculty could provide intuitions
about syntactic facts’. In one sense, Devitt is correct. The orthodox model provides only
a very partial explanation of how grammatical competence could issue in intuitive
judgements of acceptability and interpretability. There is currently no complete
explanation of how intuitions are produced, only a partial explanation of the character
of those intuitions in terms of the structure of an underlying system of grammatical
information and systems for putting that information to use. As Chomsky (
[1986]
, p.
270) has pointed out, ‘we do not, of course, have a clear account, or any account at all,
of why certain elements of our knowledge are accessible to consciousness whereas
others are not, or of how knowledge, conscious or unconscious, is manifested in actual
behaviour.’
The structure of the competence system provides some explanation of the form and
character of the intuitions, and the performance mechanisms are intended to provide
some explanation of how the linguistic forms licensed by the competence system are
employed in speaking and understanding, and the more o -line judgements made on
the basis of our comprehension of linguistic material. But Devitt is right that there is no
complete theory of how competence and the language mechanisms issue in linguistic
intuitions. The explanation of this is that, for the reasons outlined, intuitive judgements
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of acceptability and interpretability (and indeed, conscious awareness) are not
phenomena that can get a full explanation from a theory of grammatical competence.
The broader empirical challenge is to try and understand all the di erent factors
involved in linguistic judgements, in the same way that we might try to understand the
factors that shape judgements in other areas of psychology. After all, there is currently
no account of how the computations of the visual system issue in conscious intuitive
judgements about the properties of a presented scene. So, it's not clear that there is a
special problem with language.
Speakers’ linguistic intuitions are far more discriminating than one might expect. For
instance, sentence (8) is ambiguous between a reading on which duck and swallow are
both nouns and one on which they are both verbs.
(8) I saw her duck and swallow.
Interestingly, it is two ways and not four ways ambiguous in natural language. We can
hear (8) as containing the two verbs duck and swallow. We can also hear it so that duck
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