Lecture 6 The vocabulary of n language as a System (continued)

Tasks and Exercises

Exercise І.

Read the following two passages and discuss the difference between the two points of view on synonymy.

Jacobson R. Selected Writings. - P. 656 : In any language instances may occur where two words are synonyms i. e. semantically coinciding with each other while differing in their phonemic constitution (though cases of total semantic coincidence and unrestricted permutability within the same code are most uncommon, and often close semantic approximation is mistaken by students for a complete identity), It is obvious that as a rule a distinctive feature in any language serves to differentiate words (or their grammatical constituents) which are semantically distinct, and, above all. language has no other way to convey a semantic difference than through the distinctive features. (Mednikova E. M. Seminars in English Lexicology. - M., 1978. - p. 649).

Lyons John. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. - P. 447; "Total Synonymy" and "Complete Synonymy". - P. 448:

It is a widely-held view that there are few, if any, "real" synonyms in natural languages. To quote Ullmann, it is almost a truism that total synonymy is an extremely rare occurrence, a luxury that language can ill afford. As argued by Ullmann this view rests upon two quite distinct criteria: only those words can be described as synonymous which can replace each other in any given context without the slightest change either in cognitive or emotive import. The two conditions for total synonymy are therefore: (1) interchangeability in all contexts and (II) identity in both cognitive and emotive import. We will discuss the validity of the distinction between "cognitive" and "emotive" sense presently. For the moment we take it for granted.

The condition of interchangeability in all contexts reflects the common assumption that words are never synonymous in any context unless they can occur (and have the same sense) in all contexts. We have already referred to and rejected this assumption. Like all sense-relation synonymy is context dependent: we will return to this point The main objection to the definition of synonymy proposed by Ullmann (and others) is that it combines two radically different criteria and prejudges the question of their interdependence. It will be helpful to introduce a terminological distinction at this point. Granted the validity of the distinction between "cognitive" and "'emotive" sense, we may use the term complete synonymy for equivalence of both cognitive and emotive sense; and we may restrict the term total synonymy to those synonyms (whether complete or not)

which are interchangeable in all contexts. This scheme of classification allows for four possible kinds of synonyms (assuming that only two values are attributed to each of the variables):

(1) complete and total synonymy: (2) complete, but not total; (3) incomplete, but total; (4) incomplete, and not total.

(2) It is complete and total synonymy that most semanticists have in mind when they talk of "real'' (or "absolute") synonymy. It is undoubtedly true that there are very few such synonyms in language. And little purpose is served by defining a notion of 'absolute1 synonymy which is based on the assumption that complete equivalence and total interchangeability are necessarily connected. Once we accept that they are not, and at the same time abandon the traditional view that synonymy is a matter of the identity of two independently determined 'senses', the whole question becomes much more straightforward. /Mednikova E. M., op. cit. - p. 64-65/.