have cells throughout Southeast Asia, and their Afghan-trained members are believed
to have served major roles in expanding the
al Qaeda
network in the region” (Huang,
2004).
The metageography of the al-Qaeda network is a combination of separate cells, many
formed with regard to territorial conflicts, but held together by an overarching ideology.
Indeed, it is necessary that groups share the same beliefs and goals of al-Qaeda in order
for a common ideology to cement the network. The Southeast Asian group Jemaah
Islamiah’s
spiritual leader, Bashir, tells his followers that the west and Zionism “have
been plotting for decades to destroy Islam and to dominate the world” (Huang, 2004).
There is also evidence that al-Qaeda has links with terrorist groups in Kashmir,
Uzbekistan, Philippines, Algeria, among others (BBC, 2004b).
The metageography of al-Qaeda has been forced to adapt in response to the
geopolitical codes of the US, and other countries, after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. The US invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban forced al-Qaeda
to construct its network metageography in an even looser form. It is now “structured in
a way that it can react very quickly to changing events on the ground.
Mobility, flexi-
bility and fluidity will be the guiding principles” (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 96). Perhaps the
term “al-Qaeda network” is increasingly a geopolitical fiction: a handy representation
to justify a global War on Terrorism when, in fact, the cells of the network are looser
than ever. Indeed, “[s]ome analysts have suggested that the word al-Qaeda is now used
to refer to a variety of groups connected by little more than shared aims, ideals and
methods” (BBC, 2004b).
It is useful to consider al-Qaeda’s metageography as a network
of territorially based
and separate cells. The “local” basis of these cells provides strength for the network in
terms of its ability to operate effectively across the globe, beyond the reach of the state
security apparatus. However, the combination of territorial and network metageogra-
phies illustrates potential problems for al-Qaeda: is bin Laden’s geopolitical code
coherent and strong enough to dominate diverse local concerns, and how susceptible are
the local groups to negotiations with their respective states
that would undermine their
commitment to a global project?
Incongruous geographies?
The larger metageographic point is that in order to counter a terrorist network, the United
States has had to conquer sovereign territory (Flint, 2003b). The methods of terror-
ism and counter-terrorism construct very different, even incongruous, geographies that
have implications for the success of counter-terrorism. States must challenge networks
by controlling sovereign territory. More than just being inefficient, this may actually be
a counter-productive counter-terrorism as it increases the presence
of US forces in other
countries. As a result, bin Laden’s
fatwa
becomes prophetic.
The primary purpose of the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban
regime was the disruption of al-Qaeda bases: a sovereign state was invaded to destroy
the nodes of a network. The operation has been only partially successful as some territory
has remained beyond the control of the US and allied security forces, namely eastern
1111
2
3
41
5
6
7
8
91
10
1
2
31111
4
5
6
7
8
9
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
30
1
2
3
4
51
6
7
8
9
40
1
2
3
4
5111
G E O P O L I T I C A L M E T A G E O G R A P H I E S
181
parts of Afghanistan and northern parts of Pakistan. Moreover, the US’s territorially
based response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 have reinforced
the rhetoric of al-
Qaeda that views the United States as conducting a global “crusade” against Muslims.
The strategy of controlling territory to combat a network has not only reinforced the
perceptions of al-Qaeda sympathizers that the US is on a global mission, but has also
relocated US troops and made them potential targets (refer back to al-Qaeda’s geo-
political code on p. 70). Figure 7.4 shows the extension of US bases into central Asia
immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The same strategy was used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq, though subsequently
President George Bush’s administration admitted there were no connections between al-
Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was portrayed
as a ruler who was using
the territorial sovereignty of Iraq to facilitate the maintenance of the al-Qaeda network.
Justification for the war rested upon the need to invade the sovereign territory of Iraq
to disrupt a network that had some, poorly defined, connection with Iraq, and may use
those connections to conduct further attacks within the sovereign territory of the United
States. Simply put, the US argued that disrupting a terrorist network required the mili-
tary invasion and occupation of sovereign territory.
However, it is also evident that the War on Terrorism is using
less territorial tactics
to counter the terrorist network of al-Qaeda. First, cooperation with other countries has
met with some success as arrests of alleged terrorists have been made in Pakistan and
Indonesia for example (see Box 7.5). Less conventional, and with greater geopolitical
implications, is the use of aterritorial weaponry to target alleged terrorists in other sover-
eign spaces. In November 2002 an unarmed US drone fired a missile at a truck in the
Yemeni countryside, killing six people identified as terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. The
ability of the United States to act within the sovereign spaces of
other countries is related
to its position as world leader. In the next section we interpret the geography of the War
on Terrorism within the cycle of world leadership.
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O G E O P O L I T I C S
182
Box 7.5 Sovereignty and counter-terrorism
On August 14, 2004 the
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