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Atlantic
Atlantic
Ocean
Ocean
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
IRELAND
IRELAND
SWEDEN
SWEDEN
NORWAY
NORWAY
FINLAND
FINLAND
GERMANY
GERMANY
SWITZERLAND
SWITZERLAND
ITALY
ITALY
BOSNIA AND
BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
HERZEGOVINA
MONTENEGRO
MONTENEGRO
SERBIA
SERBIA
CROATIA
CROATIA
SLOVENIA
SLOVENIA
ALBANIA
ALBANIA MACEDONIA
MACEDONIA
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
ROMANIA
HUNGARY
HUNGARY
AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA
CZECH
CZECH
REPUBLIC
REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA
SLOVAKIA
POLAND
POLAND
UNITED
UNITED
KINGDOM
KINGDOM
FRANCE
FRANCE
THE
THE
NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
BELGIUM
DENMARK
DENMARK
SPAIN
SPAIN
Atlantic
Ocean
IRELAND
SWEDEN
NORWAY
FINLAND
GERMANY
SWITZERLAND
ITALY
BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
MONTENEGRO
SERBIA
CROATIA
SLOVENIA
ALBANIA MACEDONIA
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
HUNGARY
AUSTRIA
CZECH
REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA
POLAND
UNITED
KINGDOM
FRANCE
THE
NETHERLANDS
SPAIN
BELGIUM
DENMARK
PORTUGAL
Atlantic Europe
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
Scandinavian Europe
Four Europes
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t h e n e x t 1 0 0 y e a r s
dominance. The conclusion of World War II found Germany shattered, di
vided and occupied, controlled by Soviets in the east, and England, France,
and the United States in the west.
West Germany was indispensable to the United States and its NATO al
liance because of the confrontation with the Soviets. Creating a German
army, obviously, posed a problem. If the origins of the two world wars were
in the growth of German power, and Germany was encouraged to be pow
erful again, what was to prevent a third European war? The answer rested in
the integration of the German army into NATO—essentially putting it un
der American command in the field. But the broader answer lay in the inte
gration of Germany into Europe as a whole.
During the 1950s, when NATO was created, the European Economic
Community was also conceived. The European Union, which emerged
from it, is a schizophrenic entity. Its primary purpose is the creation of an
integrated European economy, while leaving sovereignty in the hands of in
dividual nations. Simultaneously, it is seen as the preface to a federation of
European countries, in which a central European government, with a par
liament and professional civil service, would govern a federal Europe where
national sovereignty was limited to local matters, and defense and foreign
policy rested with the whole.
Europe has not achieved this goal. It has created a free- trade zone and a
European currency, which some members of the free- trade zone use and
others do not. It has failed to create a political constitution, however, leav
ing individual nations sovereign—and therefore never has produced a
united defense or foreign policy. Defense policy, to the extent it is coordi
nated, is in the hands of NATO, and not all members of NATO are mem
bers of the EU (notably the United States). With the collapse of the Soviet
empire, individual countries in Eastern Europe were admitted to the EU
and NATO.
In short, post–Cold War Europe is in benign chaos. It is impossible to
unravel the extraordinarily complex and ambiguous institutional relation
ships that have been created. Given the history of Europe, such confusion
would normally lead to war. But Europe, excepting the former Yugoslavia,
has no energy for war, no appetite for instability, and certainly no desire for
conflict. Europe’s psychological transformation has been extraordinary.
77
t h e n e w f a u lt l i n e s
Where, prior to 1945, slaughter and warfare had been regular pastimes for
centuries, after 1945 even the conceptual chaos of European institutions
could not generate conflict beyond rhetoric.
Underneath the surface of the EU, the old European nationalisms con
tinue to assert themselves, albeit sluggishly. This can be seen in economic
negotiations within the EU. The French, for example, assert the right to
protect their farmers from excessive competition, or the right not to honor
treaties controlling their deficits. Therefore, in a geopolitical context, Eu
rope has not become a unified transnational entity.
For these reasons, talking of Europe as if it were a single entity like the
United States, or China, is illusory. It is a collection of nation- states, still
shell- shocked by World War II, the Cold War, and the loss of empire. These
nation- states are highly insular and determine their geopolitical actions ac
cording to their individual interests. Primary interactions are not between
Europe and the rest of the world, but among European nations. In this
sense, Europe behaves far more like Latin America than like a great power.
In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina spend a great deal of time thinking
about each other, knowing that their effect on the globe is limited.
Russia is the immediate strategic threat to Europe. Russia is interested
not in conquering Europe, but in reasserting its control over the former So
viet Union. From the Russian point of view, this is both a reasonable at
tempt to establish some minimal sphere of influence and essentially a
defensive measure. However, it is a defensive measure that will immediately
affect the three Baltic states, which are now integrated into European insti
tutions.
Obviously the Eastern Europeans want to prevent a Russian resurgence.
The real question is what the rest of Europe might do—and especially, what
Germany might do. The Germans are now in a comfortable position with a
buffer between them and the Russians, free to focus on their internal eco
nomic and social problems. In addition, the heritage of World War II
weighs heavily on the Germans. They will not want to act alone, but as part
of a unified Europe.
Germany’s position is unpredictable. It is a nation that has learned, given
its geopolitical position, that it is enormously dangerous to assert its na
tional interest. In 1914 and 1939, Germany attempted to act decisively in
78
t h e n e x t 1 0 0 y e a r s
response to geopolitical threats, and each time its efforts ended catastrophi
cally. The German analysis is that engaging in politico- military maneuvers
outside of a broad coalition exposes Germany to tremendous danger. At
lantic Europe sees Germany as a buffer against Russia and will see any threat
in the Baltics as being irrelevant to their interests. Therefore, they will not
join the coalition Germany needs to face the Russians. So the most likely
outcome will be German inaction, limited American involvement, and a
gradual return of Russian power into the borderland between Europe and
Russia.
But there is another scenario. In this scenario Germany will recognize
the imminent danger to Poland in Russian domination of the Baltics. See
ing Poland as a necessary part of German national security, it will thus exer
cise a forward policy, designed to protect Poland by protecting the Baltics.
Germany will move to dominate the Baltic basin. Since the Russians will
not simply abandon the field, the Germans will find themselves in an ex
tended confrontation with the Russians, competing for influence in Poland
and in the Carpathian region.
Germany will find itself, of necessity, both split off from its aggressive
past and from the rest of Europe. While the rest of Europe will try to avoid
involvement, the Germans will be engaged in traditional power politics. As
they do that, their effective as well as potential power will soar and their psy
chology will shift. Suddenly, a united Germany will be asserting itself again.
What starts defensively will evolve in unexpected ways.
This is not the most likely scenario. However, the situation might galva
nize Germany back into its traditional role of looking at Russia as a major
threat, and looking at Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe as a part of its
sphere of influence and as protection against the Russians. This depends
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