《Meyer’s Critical and Exegetical Commentary Galatians》(Heinrich Meyer) Commentator

ἐπὶ πολλῶν] as referring to many individuals, in such a manner that He intends and desires to express a plurality of persons. On ἐπί, upon, that is, in reference to, with the genitive along with verbs of speaking, see Heindorf, ad Plat. Charm, p. 62; Bernhardy, p. 248; Ast. Lex. Plat. I. p. 767.

ὅς ἐστι χριστός] which σπέρμα, denoting a single individual, is Christ. The feebly attested reading ὅ is a mistaken grammatical alteration; for how often does the gender of the relative correspond by attraction to the predicative substantive! See Kühner, II. p. 505. χριστός is the personal Christ Jesus, not, as some, following Irenaeus (Haer. v. 32. 2) and Augustine (ad iii. 29, Opp. IV. p. 384), have explained it: Christ and His church (Beza, Gomarus, Crell, Drusius, Hammond, Locke, and others; also Tholuck, Olshausen, Philippi l.c., Hofmann), or the church alone (Calvin, Clericus, Bengel, Ernesti, Döderlein, Nösselt, and others). Such a mystical sense of χριστός must necessarily have been suggested by the context (as in 1 Corinthians 12:12); here, however, the very contrast between πολλῶν and ἑνός is decidedly against it. See also Galatians 3:19; Galatians 3:22; Galatians 3:24; Galatians 3:27-28. Galatians 3:29 also is against, and not in favour of, this explanation; because the inference of this verse depends on the very fact that Christ Himself is the σπέρ΄α τοῦ ἀβρ. (see on Galatians 3:29). The whole explanation is a very superfluous device, the mistaken ingenuity of which (especially in the case of Tholuck and Hofmann) appears in striking contrast to the clear literal tenor of the passage.⁽¹³⁷⁾ It is not, however, Christ in His pre-human existence, in so far as He according to the Spirit already bore sway in the patriarchs (1 Corinthians 10:1 ff.), who is here referred to, because it is only as the λόγος ἔνσαρκος that He can be the descendant of Abraham (Matthew 1:1; Romans 1:3). Comp. Galatians 3:19.

Verse 17

Galatians 3:17. Result of Galatians 3:15-16, emphatically introduced by τοῦτο δὲ λέγω, but this which follows (see on 1 Corinthians 1:12) I say as the conclusion drawn from what is adduced in Galatians 3:15-16 : A covenant which has been previously made valid (ratified) by God, the law … does not annul. What covenant is here intended, is well known from the connection, namely, the covenant made by God with Abraham, through His giving to him, and to his σπέρμα included along with him, the promises in Genesis 12:3; Genesis 18:18 (Genesis 3:8), Genesis 13:15, Genesis 17:8 (Genesis 3:16). The κύρωσις (comp. on Galatians 3:15) is not any separate act following the institution of the covenant, but was implied in the very promises given: through them the covenant became valid. The προ in προκεκυρ. is correlative with the subsequent μετα, and therefore signifies: previously, ere the law existed.

ὁ μετὰ τετρακόσια κ. τ. λ.] cannot be intended to denote a comparatively short time (Koppe), which is not suggested by the context; but its purport is: The law, which came into existence so long a time after, cannot render invalid a covenant, which had been validly instituted so long previously by God and consequently had already subsisted so long. “Magnitudo intervalli auget promissionis auctoritatem,” Bengel. According to Hofmann, the statement of this length of time is intended to imply that the law was something new and different, which could not he held as an element forming part of the promise. But this was obvious of itself from the contrast between promise and law occupying the whole context, and, moreover, would not be dependent on a longer or shorter interval. With regard to the number 430, Paul gets it from Exodus 12:40 (in Genesis 15:13 and Acts 7:6 the round number 400 is used); but in adopting it he does not take into account that this number specifies merely the duration of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt. Consequently the number here, taken by itself, contains a chronological inaccuracy; but Paul follows the statement of the LXX., which differs from the original text—the text of the LXX. being well known to and current among his readers—without entering further into this point of chronology, which was foreign to his aim. In Exodus 12:40 the LXX. has ἡ δὲ κατοίκησις τῶν υἱῶν ἰσρ. ἣν κατῷκησαν ἐν γῇ αἰγ. καὶ ἐν γῇ χαναάν (the words κ. ἐ. γ. χ. are wanting in the Hebrew), ἔτη τετρακόσια τριάκοντα. This text of the LXX. was based upon a different reckoning of the time—a reckoning which is found in the Samaritan text and in Joseph. Antt. ii. 15. 3. See Tychsen, Exc. X. p. 148. The interval between God’s promise to Abraham and the migration of Jacob to Egypt—an interval omitted in the 430 years—cannot indeed be exactly determined, but may be reckoned at about 200 years; so that, if Paul had wished to give on his own part a definition of the time, he would not have exceeded bounds with 600 years instead of 430. The attempts to bring the 430 years in our passage into agreement with the 430 years in Exodus 12:40 are frustrated by the unequivocal tenor of both passages.⁽¹³⁸⁾

γεγονώς] is not said ad postponendam legem, (see, on the contrary, John 1:17), as Bengel thinks (“non dicit data, quasi lex fuisset, antequam data sit”); for every law only comes into existence as law with the act of legislation.

On ἀκυροῖ, invalidates, overthrows, comp. Matthew 15:6; Mark 7:13; 3 Esr. 6:32; Diod. Sic. xvi. 24; Dion. H. vi. 78; and ἄκυρον ποιεῖν, in more frequent use among Greek authors.

εἰς τὸ καταργ. τὴν ἐπαγγ.] Aim of the ἀκυροῖ: in order to do away the promise (by which the διαθήκη was completed), to render it ineffective and devoid of result. Comp. Romans 4:14. “Redditur autem inanis, si vis conferendae haereditatis ab ea ad legem transfertur,” Bengel. Observe once more the personification of the law.

Verse 18

Galatians 3:18. “I am right in denying, that through the law the διαθήκη passes out of force and the promise is to cease.” The proof depends on the relation of contrast between law and promise, whereby the working of the one excludes the like working of the other. For if the possession of the Messianic salvation proceeds from the law, which must have been the case if God’s covenant with Abraham had lost its validity by means of the law, then this possession comes no longer from promise,—a case which, although necessary on that supposition, cannot occur, as is evident from the precedent of Abraham, to whom salvation was given by God through promise. The mode of conclusion adopted in Romans 4:14 is similar.

ἐκ νόμου] so that the law is the institution which causes this result (in the way of following its commandments). Comp. on ἐν νόμῳ, Galatians 3:11.

ἡ κληρονομία] the possession, נַחֲלָה, refers in the theocratic-historical sense of the O.T. to the land of Canaan and its several portions (Deuteronomy 4:21 ; Joshua 13:23); but in its N.T. sense, the conception of the κληρονομία is elevated to the idea of its Messianic fulfilment (Matthew 5:5), so that the kingdom of the Messiah and the whole of its fulness of salvation and glory are understood thereby (1 Corinthians 6:9; Galatians 5:21; Ephesians 5:5; Acts 20:32, et al.). Comp. on Romans 4:13; Ephesians 1:11. So also here; and Paul uses this word (not ἡ σωτηρία, ἡ ζωή, or the like) because he has previously (see on Galatians 3:16) referred to passages in which the κληρονομία (that is, according to this Christian idealizing of the O.T. historical sense: the kingdom of the Messiah) is promised.

οὐκέτι] The one relation, if it exists, cancels the other. It is (in opposition to Koppe) the logical (not historical) no longer. Comp. Romans 7:17; Romans 11:6.

διʼ ἐπαγγελίας] by means of promise, so that in his case the possession of the Messianic salvation is the fulfilment (by way of grace) of a promise, and not the possible result (by way of reward) of rendering prescribed services, and the like, which fall under the idea of the νόμος.

κεχάρισται] sc. τὴν κληρονομίαν donavit (Vulgate), bestowed by way of gift (the contrast to ὀφείλημα, Romans 4:4; Romans 4:16), namely, as a future possession to be realized at the time of the παρουσία (Matthew 8:11). On χαρίζεσθαι τινί τι, comp. Romans 8:32; 1 Corinthians 2:12; Philippians 1:29; Philippians 2:9; Acts 27:24; Xen. Cyrop. 8:6. 22; Polyb. xvi. 24. 9. Without supplying anything, Schott and Matthias render: to Abraham God has, through promise, been gracious. Comp. Holsten: He has bestowed a favour on him. But the supplying of τὴν κληρονομίαν harmonizes best with the immediate context and the logical relation of the two divisions of the verse, the second of which forms the propositio minor, and therefore, like the major, must speak of the κληρονομία.⁽¹³⁹⁾ Caspari (in d. Strassb. Beitr. 1854, p. 206 ff.), following classical usage, but not that of the N.T., has wrongly taken κεχάρισται in a passive sense, so that God is conceived as the inheritance. This is in opposition to the context, and also against the view of the N.T. generally, according to which the κληρονομία proceeds from God (Romans 8:17), and is not God Himself, but eternal life (Galatians 3:21; Titus 3:7; Matthew 19:29, et al.), the kingdom of the Messiah (Galatians 5:21; 1 Corinthians 6:9; 1 Corinthians 15:50; James 2:5), and its salvation (Romans 1:16) and dominion (Romans 4:13 f.; Matthew 5:5; 2 Timothy 2:12).

Verse 19

Galatians 3:19.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ After Paul has shown in Galatians 3:15-18 that the law does not abolish the far earlier covenant of promise, he might very naturally be met by the inquiry, “According to this view, then, what sort of end is left to be served by the law in connection with the history of salvation?” Hence he himself raises this question and answers it.

τί οὖν ὁ νόμος] sc. ἐστι: how does it stand therefore (if it is the case that the law does not abolish the covenant of promise) with the law? A general question, in which, to judge from the answer that follows, the apostle had in view the purpose for which God gave the law. On the neuter τί, with a nominative following, comp. 1 Corinthians 3:5 (in the correct reading): τί οὖν ἐστιν ἀπολλώς; and see Stallbaum, ad Gorg. p. 501 E Bernhardy, p. 336 f. Following J. Cappellus, Schott (also Matthies, though undecidedly, Jatho and Wieseler) takes τί for διὰ τί; very unnecessarily, however, and in opposition to the constant use of the τί οὖν so frequently recurring in Paul’s writings (Romans 3:1; Romans 4:1, et al.; comp. Galatians 4:15).

τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη] for the sake of transgressions it was added; that is, in order that the transgressions of the law might be brought out as real, it was, after the covenant of promise was already in existence, superadded to the latter ( παρεισῆλθεν, Romans 5:20). The law namely, because it gives occasion to the potency of sin in man to bring about in him all evil desire (Romans 7:5; Romans 7:8), and nevertheless is too weak as a counter-power to oppose this sinful development (Romans 8:3), is the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (1 Corinthians 15:56; and see Romans 7:7 ff.); but sin—which, although existing since Adam (Romans 5:13), is yet increased by that provocation of the law—has only come to assume the definite character of παράβασις in virtue of the existence of the law and its relation thereto (Romans 4:15). The same purpose of the law is expressed in Romans 5:20, but without the stricter definition of sin as παράβασις. Accordingly, τῶν παραβ. χάριν is not (with Wetstein) to be rationalized to this effect: “Lex sine dubio eo consilio lata est, ut servaretur, ὑπακοῆς χάριν; vitio tamen hominum evenit, ut peccata multiplicarentur.” This is in itself correct (comp. Romans 7:12), but is irrelevant here, where the point in question is the position of the law in connection with the divine plan of salvation, the final aim of which is redemption. The real idea of the apostle is, that the emergence of sins—namely, in the penal, wrath-deserving (Romans 4:15), moral form of transgressions—which the law brought about, was designed by God (who must indeed have foreseen this effect) when He gave the law, and designed in fact as a mediate end in reference to the future redemption; for the evil was to become truly great, that it might nevertheless be outdone by grace (Romans 5:20). The result, which the law, according to experience, has on the whole effected, and by which it has proved itself the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (comp. also 2 Corinthians 3:6), could not be otherwise than the aim of God. Comp. Ritschl, p. 74 f.; Baur, neutest. Theol. p. 140 f.; Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Holsten, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Matthias (who, however, assumes the intentional appearance of an ambiguity), Stölting, and others; also Lipsius, Rechtfertigungsl. p. 75; Lechler, apost. Zeit. p. 110. Luther (1519) strikingly remarks: “Ut remissio propter salutem, ita praevaricatio propter remissionem, ita lex propter transgressionem.” Observe, further, the article before παραβ., which summarily comprehends, as having really that character, the transgressions arising and existing since the giving of the law; comp. Holsten, z. Ev. d. Paul, u. Petr. p. 297. Others⁽¹⁴¹⁾ consider that by τῶν παραβ. χάριν the recognition of sins is expressed as the aim of the law. So Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Calovius, Wolf, Schoettgen, Michaelis, Windischmann, and others; also Winer (“ut manifestam redderet atque ita argueret illam, quam Judaei peccando sibi contrahebant, culpam”). But (1) this idea could not have been expressed by the mere τῶν παραβ. χάριν; for although χάριν is not always exclusively used in its original sense, for the sake of, in favour of, but may also be taken simply as on account of,⁽¹⁴²⁾ still, in order to be intelligible, Paul must have written τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν as signifying: in order to bring sins to recognition as transgressions. And (2) the point of the recognition of sin was entirely foreign to this passage; for in τῶν παραβ. χάριν Paul desires to call attention to the fact that the law, according to the divine plan, was intended to produce exactly the objective, actual (not merely the subjective) opposite of the δικαιοσύνη (comp. Galatians 3:21-22). On account of this connection also the interpretation of many expositors, ad coercendas transgressiones, is wholly to be rejected, because opposed to the context. So Jerome, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Grotius, Zachariae, Semler, Morus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Paulus, Rückert, Olshausen, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Baur, Ewald (“in order to punish them more strictly”); also Messner, Lehre d. Ap. p. 222, and Hauck, comp. Buhl; several, such as Grotius and Rückert, think that the inclination to Egyptian idolatry is chiefly referred to. This view is decidedly disposed of by the expression παραβάσεων, since παραβάσεις as such could only come into existence with the law (Romans 4:15); previously there were sins, but no transgressions,—a view with which Romans 5:14 does not conflict, because the matter in question there is the transgression of a quite definite, positive command of God. The two last interpretations are combined by Flatt and Schott, as also by Reiche, following older expositors (comp. also Matthies),—a course inconsistent with hermeneutical principles in general, and here in fact involving an amalgamation of two erroneous views.

προσετέθη] it was added, is not inconsistent with what was said in Galatians 3:15, οὐδεὶς … ἐπιδιατάσσεται, because in the latter general proposition under οὐδείς third persons are thought of. The law, moreover, was not given as ἐπιδιαθήκη (see on Galatians 3:15), but as another institution, which, far from being a novella to the διαθήκη, was only to be a temporary intermediate measure in the divine plan of salvation, to minister to the final fulfilment of the promise. See the sequel, and comp. Romans 5:20; Romans 10:4.

ἄχρις οὔ ἔλθη τὸ σπέρ΄α κ. τ. λ.] terminus ad quem of the merely provisional duration of this added institute. But these words are neither to be connected, in disregard of their position, with διαταγείς (Hofmann), nor to be placed in a parenthesis; for the construction is not interrupted. As to ἄχρις οὔ ἔλθῃ, usque dum venerit, comp. on Romans 11:25. According to the general usage of the N.T. (Buttmann, neut. Gr. p. 198), the subjunctive, and not the optative (Matthiae, p. 1158), is used. Paul has not put ἄν, because there was no idea in his mind of any circumstances which could have hindered the event. See Stallbaum, ad Phaed. p. 62 C Hermann, de part. ἄν, p. 110 ff.; Hartung, Partikell. II. p. 291 ff. Comp. on 1 Corinthians 11:26.

τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπήγγ.] that is, Christ, whose advent, according to Galatians 3:16, necessarily brought with it the fulfilment of the promise. The dative, however, does not stand for εἰς ὅν (Winer, Usteri), but just as in Galatians 3:16 : to whom the promise was made.

ἐπήγγελται] not promiserat (Vulgate, Bengel, Flatt, Hofmann), comp. Romans 4:21, Hebrews 12:26; but promissio facta est (2 Maccabees 4:27), because thus it is not requisite to supply θεός, and the expression corresponds very naturally with ἐῤῥέθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι in Galatians 3:16. Hence also it is superfluous to supply ἡ κληρονο΄ία (Ewald).

διαταγεὶς διʼ ἀγγέλων ἐν χ. ΄εσ.] the mode in which ὁ νόμος προσετέθη, or the form of this act: having been ordained through angels, etc. On διατάσσειν νόμον, comp. Hesiod, ἔργ. 274. The simple τάσσειν νό΄ον is more frequently used, as in Plat. Legg. p. 863 D. It means to ordain a law, that is, to issue it for obedience, not to arrange it for publication (Stölting), so that the angels would be described here as the diaskeuastai of the law,—an idea which has no support anywhere, and would run counter to the view of the directly divine origin of the law (Exodus 31:18; Exodus 32:16; Deuteronomy 9:10). As to the use of the aorist participle in the language of narration, see Hermann, ad Viger. p. 774; Bernhardy, p. 383. The tradition that the divine promulgation of the law took place amidst the ministry of angels, is first found in the LXX., Deuteronomy 33:2 (not in the original text); then in Hebrews 2:2, Acts 7:38; Acts 7:53, Joseph. Antt. xv. 5. 3, and in the Rabbins, and also in the Samaritan theology. Comp. on Acts 7:53; Delitzsch, on Hebrews 2:2. Because the tradition itself and its antiquity are thus beyond doubt, and there is no warrant for supposing that Paul did not know it or was not likely to adopt it (as, indeed, he adopted other traditional teachings, 1 Corinthians 10:4, 2 Corinthians 12:2), it is a mere mistaken evasion to explain διά as inter or coram (Calovius, Loesner, Morus), which would have ultimately to be referred to the idea “by the mediation of” (as 2 Timothy 2:2). The same remark applies to the view which looks upon the ἀγγέλων even as men, like Moses and Aaron (Zeger, and revived by Cassel, d. Mittler e. exeg. Versuch, 1855); Chrysostom left it optional to understand it either of priests or of angels. As to the monstrous amplifications which this tradition of the agency of the angels underwent at the hands of the later Rabbins, see Eisenmenger, entdecktes Judenth. I. p. 309 f. Paul does not look upon the angels as authors of the law (as held by Schulthess, Voigtländer in Keil and Tzschirner’s Anal. IV. p. 139 ff., and Huth, Commentat. Altenb. 1854),—a point which is certain from the whole view taken in biblical history of the law generally as divine (see the apostle’s own designation of the law as νόμος θεοῦ, Romans 7:22; Romans 7:25), and as γραφή (vers. 10, 13, Galatians 4:21 f., et al.), and here especially is all the more decidedly indicated by the use of the διά (and not ὑπό), for every reader in fact conceived of the angels as ministering spirits of God (comp. LXX. Deuteronomy 33:2 : ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἄγγελοι μετʼ αὐτοῦ), who accompanied the Lord appearing in majesty; and consequently no one could attach any other sense to διά than “ministerio angelorum,” which is clear as the meaning in Hebrews 2:2 from διὰ τοῦ κυρίου in Galatians 3:3.

ἐν χειρὶ ΄εσίτου⁽¹⁴³⁾] For Moses received the tables of the law from God, and carried them down to the people. Thus in the legislation he was the middle person between the Giver of the law and its recipients; with the tables in his hand, he was God’s envoy to Israel, acting between the two parties. On account of this historical circumstance (Exodus 31:18; Exodus 32:15), ἐν χειρί is to be understood not merely as a vivid mode of designating the mediation ( בְּיַד ), but quite literally: comp. Exodus 32:15; Leviticus 26:46. In the N.T. the designation of Moses as μεσίτης forms the basis of the expression in Hebrews 8:6; Hebrews 9:15; Hebrews 12:24; and on the subject itself, comp. Acts 7:38. This designation does not occur in the O.T. or in the Apocrypha; but by the Rabbins Moses is called mediator סרסור, אמצעי, also שליח . See Schoettgen, Hor. p. 738 f.; Wetstein, p. 224. Comp. Philo, de vita Mos. II. p. 678 f. A and on the matter itself, Deuteronomy 5:5; also Joseph. Antt. iii. 5. 3. The better known and the more celebrated Moses was as mediator of the law (comp. Aboth R. Nath. i. 1, “Legem, quam Deus Israelitis dedit, non nisi per manus Mosis dedit”), the more decidedly must we reject every interpretation in which the ΄εσίτης—not more precisely defined by Paul, but presumed to have its historical reference universally familiar—is not referred to Moses. This applies not only to the view of most of the Fathers (Origen, Athanasius, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact; so also Beza, Lyra, Erasmus, Calvin, Pareus, Calovius, and others), who, following 1 Timothy 2:5, Hebrews 8:6; Hebrews 9:15; Hebrews 12:24, take the Mediator to be Christ,⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ but also to Schmieder’s view (nova interpr. Galatians 3:19-20, Numburg. 1826), that an angel is intended—the angel of the law, who, according to Jewish theology, had the special duty of teaching Moses the law. Certainly the Rabbins speak of an angel of the law (he was called Jefifia; see Jalkut Rubeni, f. 107. 3); but this part of their teaching cannot be shown to have existed in the time of the apostles, nor can it find a biblical basis in the passages quoted by Schmieder (Exodus 19:19 f., Exodus 20:18, Exodus 33:11; Numbers 12:5-8; Deuteronomy 5:4 f.; also Exodus 33:18-23; Exodus 40:35; Deuteronomy 33:2; Psalms 68:18; Acts 7:53; Malachi 3:1). See also, in opposition to Schmieder,⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ especially Lücke in the Stud. u. Krit. p. 97 f.

The object for which Paul has added διαταγεὶς … μεσίτου, is not to convey the impression of an inferior, subordinate position held by the law in comparison with that of the gospel or that of the promise, inasmuch as the former was ordained not directly by God, but through angels and a mediator⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ (Luther, Elsner, Wolf, Estius, Semler, Rosenmüller, Tychsen, Flatt, Rückert, Usteri, de Wette, Baur, Ewald, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Hauck, and others; comp. also Olshausen, and Lipsius, Rechtfertigungsl. p. 77; Vogel in the Stud. u. Krit. 1865, p. 530), but to enable the reader to realize the glory of the law in the dignity and formal solemnity of its ordination. So Calvin and others, including Winer, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, Wieseler, Matthias; comp. Weiss, bibl. Theol p. 284. It may be decisively urged in favour of the latter view, (1) that, if the mention of the angels was intended to suggest a lower relation in comparison with a higher, this higher relation must have been distinctly expressed (as in Hebrews 2:2), or at least must have been quite definitely discoverable from the immediate context (by the addition of a μόνον perhaps, or the like). Regarded in themselves, the appearance of angels and the agency of angels (comp. also Galatians 1:8) are always conceived as something majestic and glorifying,⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ even in respect to Christ (Matthew 24:31; Matthew 25:31; John 1:25; 1 Timothy 3:16, et al.), and especially in respect to the law (LXX. Deuteronomy 33:2; Acts 7:38; Acts 7:53), the bestowal of which was one of the high divine distinctions of Israel (Romans 9:4). Just as little can it be said (2) that ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου is a depreciatory statement, for in fact the gospel also is given ἐν