inculcate discipline
and obedience to orders from superiors.
The Israelis emphasised military skills and high motivation. Smartness on parade
and military tattoo the SAF never learnt from the “Mexicans”. Whatever
smartness the SAF had came from British officers in charge of 1 and 2 SIR in
their early years.
Once the Israeli officers led by Ellazari had started work and he had us
hooked, Kidron demanded a quid pro quo, that Singapore recognise Israel
officially and exchange ambassadors. He was persistent in pressing for this. I
told Keng Swee that this was a non-starter. We would anger the Malay Muslims
in Singapore and Malaysia whose sympathies were with their Muslim brothers,
the Palestinians and the Arabs. We could not agree to do this even if the Israelis
decided to withdraw. When they knew that it was a non-starter, Tel Aviv sent a
message that they understood our position and they would be helpful, but that
they hoped we would eventually allow them an embassy in Singapore.
When the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War broke out in June 1967, we were
relieved the Israelis were not defeated or our SAF would have lost confidence in
their Israeli instructors. When the UN General Assembly was debating the
resolution to condemn Israel, Rajaratnam, our foreign minister and an Afro-
Asian champion, was all for it. Keng Swee saw me to press Raja to direct our
UN delegate not to vote in favour of the resolution or the Israelis would leave.
As I could not attend the cabinet meeting, I stated my position in a note. We
had to stand up for the right of small nations to exist. Freedom of navigation of
all international highways, like the Straits of Tiran and the Straits of Malacca,
was vital and the UN should play a role in preserving peace or resolving the
problem after hostilities. I added that I did not believe the Israeli advisers would
leave even if we were to vote for the Afro-Asian resolution. I was in favour of
abstaining in the vote. The cabinet agreed with my view. We abstained and the
Israelis did not leave. However, now that the Israeli presence in Singapore was
well-known, we allowed them a diplomatic mission. They wanted an embassy.
We decided to allow them a trade representative office first, in October 1968.
The following May, after Malay Muslims in Singapore and the region had
become accustomed to an Israeli presence, we allowed them to upgrade it to an
embassy.
Our reservists had to be ever ready for combat. We changed their title in
January 1994 from “reservists” to “operationally ready NS men” to emphasise
their combat readiness. For a few weeks each year, they do in-camp training in
their same units to build up camaraderie. Once every few years, they are sent to
Taiwan, Thailand, Brunei or Australia for brigade-level field exercises or
battalion-level live firing exercises. Annual in-camp training is taken seriously
by everyone, including employers who have to lose the services of their
executives and men for a few weeks each year.
To be effective, the SAF has to mobilise and involve the whole society in
defence activities. So school principals, teachers, parents, employers and
community leaders are brought into a supporting network under a concept called
“Total Defence”. This keeps morale high.
National service has had a profound impact on Singapore society over the
last 30 years. It has become a rite of passage for our young men and a part of our
way of life that has helped to unify our people. They learn to live and work
closely with each other, regardless of race, language or religion. Food taboos of
Muslims and Hindus are respected, as are all religious rites, from Buddhist,
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh to Christian and Zoroastrian. Whether your father is a
minister, banker, professional, labourer, taxi-driver or hawker, your military
standing depends on your performance.
To have both brains and brawn, Keng Swee and I started to induct some of
our ablest students into the SAF in 1971. We selected some of the best officer
cadets each year for SAF overseas scholarships to study at Oxbridge and other
universities in Britain where they did a full academic course in the humanities,
sciences, engineering or the professions. During their student years they received
full pay as lieutenants, besides a scholarship that paid for all fees, board and
lodging and other needs abroad. They had to sign a bond to serve for eight years
after graduation. But within that period, they would be sent to America or
Britain on two, often three courses: first, specialist training whether in artillery,
armour or signals; in mid-career, staff and command in America or Britain; and
finally a course in public or business administration at a top American university
such as Harvard or Stanford.
At the end of eight years, they could opt to stay in the SAF, transfer to the
public service as administrative officers, the top grade of civil servants, join a
statutory board, or leave for the private sector. They would do their annual
national service training of two to three weeks. Through this scheme, which I
proposed and Keng Swee refined, we recruited some of our best students into the
SAF. Without a yearly intake of about ten of our best students, the SAF would
have the military hardware but without the brain power to use them to best
advantage.
The quality of the early batches was reassuring. By 1995 four former SAF
scholars, having risen to senior positions, entered politics and later became
cabinet ministers: my son, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong, Brigadier
General George Yeo, Lieutenant-Colonel Lim Hng Kiang and Rear-Admiral Teo
Chee Hean.
Singapore’s limited size was a severe constraint. As our build-up expanded,
we needed training areas overseas to deploy a brigade, and later a division. I
made a breakthrough in 1975 when President Chiang Ching-kuo allowed our
infantry, armour and artillery to train in Taiwan. We also held combined arms
exercises in Taiwan with Siegfried Schulz, a retired general of the Federal
Republic of Germany, who accompanied our senior officers on “staff rides” to
teach them the finer points of field manoeuvres.
President Marcos and the US Defence Department allowed the Republic of
Singapore Air Force to use US training facilities at Clark Air Base in the late
1970s. When the Americans left Clark in the 1990s, we moved our training to a
US Air Force base in Arizona and to Australia. We had to find unconventional
solutions to our problems.
A country’s defence capability has to be continually upgraded as new
technology, especially information technology, is incorporated into weapon
systems. This requires a sound economy that can afford to pay for new weaponry
and a highly educated and trained people who can integrate the various arms into
one system and operate them efficiently and effectively.
A credible defence capability helps to lower the risk of rash political acts.
Whenever they were displeased with us Malaysian leaders regularly uttered
threats in the press to cut off our water supply.
In 1990, when I stepped down as prime minister,
Military Technology
, an
international defence journal, wrote, “In 1965, when Singapore became an
independent nation, it had virtually nothing in the way of armed forces to defend
itself. By 1990, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) had grown into a respected
and professional force operating modern defence systems that was capable of
defending the territorial integrity and independence of the state.” Since then, the
SAF’s capability and readiness have continued to be rated highly by defence
journals including
Jane
’s and
Asia Pacific Defence Reporter
.
Such an outcome was far from my thoughts in April 1966 when I flew to
London hoping for assurance from Prime Minister Harold Wilson that British
forces would remain in Singapore for some years.
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