10
Leaders
The
Economist
September 5th 2020
1
I
n the tech
industry the rupture between China and America
continues to grow. Will Uncle Sam force a sale of TikTok, a Chi-
nese-run app popular in the West (see Business section)? Can
Huawei survive the embargo? Is Apple shifting its supply chains
from China? Yet in one part of the global economy the pattern is
of superpower engagement, not estrangement: high finance.
BlackRock, a giant asset manager, has got the nod to set up a Chi-
nese fund business. Vanguard, a rival, is shifting its Asian head-
quarters to Shanghai. JPMorgan Chase may spend $1bn to buy
control of its Chinese money-management venture (see Finance
section). Foreign fund managers bought nearly $200bn of main-
land Chinese shares and bonds in the past year. Far from short-
term greed, Wall Street’s taste for China reflects
a long-term bet that finance’s centre of gravity
will shift east. And unlike in tech, both sides
think they can capture the benefits of inter-
action without taking too much risk.
Western, and in particular American, capital
markets still reign supreme on most measures.
Derivatives are often traded in Chicago; curren-
cies in London. American firms dominate the
league tables in asset management and investment banking. The
White House has sought to weaponise America’s pre-eminence,
by pushing Chinese firms to delist their shares from New York,
for example. But if anything the trade war has shown the growing
muscle of China in finance. A big wave of
ipo
s is taking place in
Hong Kong, often done by firms keen for an alternative to New
York. China’s prowess in fintech will soon be centre-stage with
the listing of Ant Group, which may be the world’s largest
ipo
ever. And then there is the surprising rush of Wall Street firms
and other foreign investors into mainland China.
They have been knocking on the door for 30 years with little
success. Now they are betting that China is serious about wel-
coming foreign finance. With its current-account surplus set to
fall over time, or even fall into deficit, it needs to attract more for-
eign capital. The terms of access have improved. China is at last
allowing Western firms to take control of their mainland opera-
tions and has made it easier for fund managers to buy and sell
mainland securities. The potential prize is vast: a new source of
fees for Wall Street banks, and for fund managers a huge uni-
verse of potential customers and companies to invest in.
There are risks. China could bend the rules to protect local
banks and brokers. Corruption is a hazard: in 2016 JPMorgan
Chase was fined by American regulators for giving jobs to well-
connected Chinese “princelings”. Worries over human-rights
abuses may intensify. And navigating America’s
sanctions regime will be tricky—global banks
active in Hong Kong, such as
hsbc
, are already
under pressure to cut off some Chinese officials
there. Yet American financial firms’ exposure to
China is low enough that they have little to lose.
The tech industry is dangerously dependent on
China: Apple assembles many of its devices
there. By contrast, the top five Wall Street banks
have only 1.6% of their assets exposed to China and Hong Kong.
China’s ability to attract Wall Street firms during a bitter trade
war shows the clout its capital markets have. But to become a fi-
nancial superpower it would need to create its own global fi-
nance and payments infrastructure and make the yuan more
freely convertible. The leading Chinese firms have a tiny pres-
ence abroad (just 5% of revenues for Ant) and most of China’s
trade is invoiced in dollars, making it vulnerable to American
sanctions. Building an alternative to America’s global monetary
network is a huge task that will take years and require China’s
control-obsessed officials to loosen their grip further. Still, the
trade war has given China a big incentive to take the next step.
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