Hcss report

started to engage in negotiations
, even when sensitive issues were 
involved: in 2009, China agreed with the US to talk with representatives of the Dalai 
Lama, attended the US-hosted Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, and supported 
the UN Security Council resolution 1929, which imposed tougher sanctions on the 
Iranian regime in 2010.
85

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HCSS REPORT
37
At the same time, there have been significant events that can be assessed as 
reflecting a ‘negative’ type of diplomatic assertiveness. 2009 saw China adopting an 
assertive posture at the Copenhagen Conference on climate change, reflected in the 
“rudeness of Chinese diplomats toward President Barack Obama”.
86
When the 
delegation returned to China it was criticized for its poor performance.
87
This is a 
commonly used example that demonstrates China’s 
diplomatic, yet strongly 
assertive
behavior. In addition, China used its status to
 veto
, sometimes jointly with 
Russia, several UN Security Council resolutions: in 2007 against the Burmese military 
junta in Myanmar; against in 2008 against sanctions against the Mugabe regime in 
Zimbabwe; in October 2011 against a European-sponsored resolution threatening the 
Syrian regime with economic sanctions “if it did not immediately halt its military 
crackdown against its civilian”; and in 2012 against British-sponsored resolution to 
impose economic sanction against Syrian government for failing to carry out a peace 
plan.
88
And here again,
 territorial claims
appear as one of the most common recourse of 
China in asserting its positions diplomatically, and have been voiced increasingly in 
recent years. In 2007, China declared Sansha to be “an integral part of the province of 
Hainan”.
89
Tensions with the Philippines and Vietnam followed Chinese claims over the 
entire South China Sea in 2011 and 2012.
90
Authors often refer to the recent tensions 
with Japan over Chinese claims of the Senkaku Islands,
91
as a dispute which “nearly 
caused a war”.
92
Perspectives in the Chinese Language Domain
Generally, examples or evidence used by Chinese scholars are similar to those 
commonly found in the ‘Western’ literature. There are some precise factual elements 
that seem to fully support the ‘Western’ perception of a new form of Chinese 
assertiveness – if not enhanced assertive behaviors. But one difference lies in the 
justification of these positions by Chinese authors: which claim that they are not 
meant as a threat and that they are driven by the objective of maintaining national 
stability.
With respect to the rhetoric, Chinese authors emphasize key objectives or ‘core 
interests’. One is the importance of safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; another is the continuity of China’s economic growth and social development 
(confirming the aforementioned economic focus); a third one is the survival of China’s 
political system and national security – which was reflected in the results of the 
literature review by e.g., the vetoes to UN Security Council resolutions, the demands 

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STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014
for change, etc. Authors emphasize that as a rising power, China logically 
had
to 
transform its policy. These ‘core interests’ were launched in 2009, which explains the 
shift observed in China’s attitude since that year.
93
But while this new direction is 
frequently interpreted as ‘assertive’, in the Chinese perspective it is nothing but a 
strategy for China