Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Bravo Lab China da

No Expansion – Peaceful Rise

China will maintain peace with its neighbors for the sake of its economy

Hellyer 9 (Marcus, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Australian Defence College, Is the Expansion of Chinese Military Capability a Threat to the Stability of the Western Pacific, http://www.defence.gov.au/jetwc/docs/publications%202010/Publctns_050310_IstheExpansionofChinese.pdf)

China under the Communist Party has not been a pacifist power and has been willing to use force even beyond its borders.10 Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that China is developing its military power in order to use it against its neighbours with the potential exception of Taiwan noted earlier. China has been very active in presenting a peaceful image of itself to the world. President Hu Jintao has used the term ‘harmonious world’ to describe China’s model of international relations and Zheng Bijian developed the term ‘peaceful rise’ to describe China’s development.11 The latest Chinese defence White Paper adopts this terminology stating that ‘China is unswervingly taking the road of peaceful development…endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.12 While Chinese statements should not be taken at face value, they should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. There is considerable incentive for China to avoid conflict that would interfere with its continued economic growth. The need to maintain the international conditions necessary for economic growth has become a central goal of Chinese foreign policy. China has shown itself quite willing to peacefully resolve – or at least manage – disputes with its maritime neighbours. Indeed, its focus on avoiding conflict to permit development predates Hu Jintao and motivated its moderate behaviour over the South China Seas territorial disputes with ASEAN members in the 1990s. China acceded to the ASEAN code of conduct for the South China Sea and has embarked on joint resource development projects there with ASEAN members.14 Similarly, while China’s territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea have not been fully resolved, the two countries have declared East China Sea a sea of ‘peace, stability and cooperation’ and reached agreement on the joint development of gas fields.15 China has taken considerable efforts to demonstrate that it is a good international citizen, for example in approving and participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Increasingly, China has come to realise that it needs to contribute to the maintenance of the peace and stability that serves China’s interests so well.

No Risk of PRC Hegemony

There is no risk of China challenging the US in Asia, too many neighbors oppose Chinese nationalism and will counterbalance, and economic and diplomatic factors prevent conflict
Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf)

Heading the list of limitations and weaknesses of China’s rise in Asia is strong Chinese nationalism; this seriously complicates Chinese relations with Japan and Taiwan, and causes significant difficulties with South Korea, Singapore, and India, among others. Chinese territorial claims are a serious concern in the East China Sea, a major drag on improving relations with India, and an underlying concern in Southeast Asia. China’s authoritarian political system is unattractive to many, though certainly not all, of China’s neighbors. Chinese economic and diplomatic strengths also reflect significant limitations and complications. More than half of Chinese trade with Asia and the world is processing trade, which leads to double and triple counting as a product crosses borders, sometimes several times, before completion and (often) export from China to the United States and Europe. The value added by China in this trade is frequently low, and the trade depends heavily on US and European consumers. The majority of the trade is carried out by foreign invested enterprises in China. Reflecting theses realities, Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2005 said that China is “a major trading country” but has not yet become “a major trading power.” Chinese economic competitiveness means that Asian manufacturers often cannot compete directly with China. In response, Asian entrepreneurs increasingly invest in and integrate their businesses with China, but Asian workers cannot move to China and often suffer. Investment in Asian economies declines and Chinese investment and foreign assistance in Asia remain small and do not offset these negative implications. China’s “win-win diplomacy” focuses on common ground, which receives great positive publicity but does little to resolve differences or deal with issues. With few exceptions, China does not do hard things; it carefully avoids major international commitments or risks.

AT: Economic Retaliation

China cannot use economic retaliation strategies against the U.S., any effective response would constrain China’s economy as well.

Thompson 10 (Drew, Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at Nixon Center, “China’s temper tantrum ” The National Interest, February 2, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22832) MKB

Following the White House’s low-key Friday afternoon announcement that it had notified Congress of its intent to sell a weapons package to Taiwan, China responded with a level of outrage that was predictable and expected. The mainland’s English and Chinese media blasted the decision, labeling Washington as “arrogant” and claiming that the decision would do “serious harm” to the U.S.-China relationship. China’s anger is palpable and it is tinged with frustration at being unable to coerce Washington, but any assertion that the decision to sell arms to Taiwan will somehow wreck the overall U.S.-China relationship is wrong. It is unlikely that either side has yet or will soon miscalculate and send the U.S.-China relationship into a complete tailspin. The American sale of short-range, defensive weapons and even the decision to notify Congress on a quiet Friday afternoon indicate that the United States is seeking to avoid provoking Beijing. The package itself, containing antimissile batteries and helicopters that China also wants to acquire leaves out the most “offensive” weapons that Taiwan seeks—F-16’s with ground attack capabilities and diesel-electric submarines—further indicating American restraint. China, having recently demonstrated its own antiballistic missile capabilities, has a hard time arguing against the sale of Patriot batteries, which are politically attractive to the Taiwanese people who live in the cross hairs of 1,400 PLA missiles pointing at them. China is particularly frustrated with its limited options to effectively coerce the United States to stop providing for Taiwan’s defense. As expected, Beijing announced a cessation to military-to-military contacts with the Washington. But this will likely have little impact, as it is apparent that mil-mil relations were not meeting the expectations of Pentagon officials and flag officers in the services. In the brief intervals when mil-mil relations were in full swing, they did little to shed light on Chinese military decision-making or other aspects of transparency. Mil-mil talks also failed to make progress on U.S. priorities, such as an agreement to prevent collisions at sea between U.S. and Chinese vessels known as an “incidents at sea agreement,” something the United States successfully negotiated with the Soviets in 1972 at the height of the Cold War. Additional Chinese threats (made mostly by nongovernment analysts) that China will no longer help America on “its” issues, such as North Korea, Iran, or climate change because America will not bend on “their” issues of Taiwan and Tibet, are also a sign of frustration. Getting the DPRK back to the nuclear negotiating table has proven beyond Beijing’s ability thus far, and China’s response to U.S. and European proposals to increase pressure through sanctions on a truculent Iran have not met international expectations. Many climate-change experts feel that China snubbed the United States in Copenhagen this December, despite agreeing to the outcomes at the very end, leaving some in the U.S. government to question’s China’s commitment to taking meaningful responsibility for curtailing future CO2 emissions. By selling arms to Taiwan, what “cooperation” is the United States really giving up? Nonproliferation and climate change are not bilateral issues but global and regional ones. China can not refuse to cooperate in these areas without becoming diplomatically isolated from the rest of the world. China’s threat to sanction American companies who provide arms to Taiwan is a new wrinkle to China’s response, but one that will likely have little impact. First of all, China has long opposed the use of sanctions in principle, particularly sanctions unilaterally declared outside of the UN Security Council. It is unlikely China will raise the issue in the Security Council and risk having a debate about something it considers a domestic issue becoming part of the UN’s agenda. For the individual companies involved by and large, their bread is buttered by the Pentagon, not some hope that China represents a large future market for their high-tech products. For companies like United Technologies and Boeing, which have significant investments in and trade with China, they might be more vulnerable to Chinese threats. But Beijing has to tread a fine line and not scare away the international business community upon which China’s economy still depends. Threats and sanctions will possibly dampen global enthusiasm for future investments in China, particularly conglomerates that fear being coerced to provide sensitive technologies to the country. Refusing to buy Boeing civilian aircraft leaves the Chinese government vulnerable to a virtual monopoly by Airbus. Shuttering China-based factories owned by different divisions of conglomerates involved in the arms sales hurts Chinese workers. China has few palatable options for economic coercion; even selling large quantities of U.S. Treasury bills would have negative consequences for the Chinese economy.