From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

Singapore Airlines and Changi Airport
Any enterprise that promised growth and employment we had to nurture. I
suspected that the Malaysians wanted to break up Singapore’s joint airline with
Malaysia called Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA). The Tunku told the press
in September 1968 that he was unhappy with Singapore’s retention of all the
foreign exchange earnings of MSA, the failure to establish engineering and other
facilities in Kuala Lumpur, and the preponderance of Singaporeans over
Malaysians on the staff.
I replied through the press that the agreement between the two governments
specifically required the airline to be operated “on the basis of sound commercial
principles”, that the foreign exchange earned was distributed in profits in
accordance with the shares held, and that the facilities and staff reflected the
company’s origin, namely Singapore. The real dispute was over flights to
uneconomic Malaysian destinations, which we would not agree to unless the
losses were borne by Malaysia.
This open quarrel came at a crucial time, when Britain’s commitment to the
defence of Malaysia was coming to an end, and the Australian and New Zealand
positions were undecided. Ghazali Shafie wrote to me about the dispute. He was
an able if flamboyant permanent secretary of the Malaysian foreign ministry
who had good access to the Tunku and Razak and had helped solve many
difficulties when I was negotiating merger with them. I replied that the airline
problem in itself was not all that important. But if we kept on bickering we
would endanger our security because in the next 12 to 24 months the British,
Australians and New Zealanders would be deciding on their post-1971 defence
position. I suggested that he help get the two governments on a new approach,
one of quiet, common-sense accommodation. That would encourage the British,
Australians and New Zealanders to continue some commitment after 1971.
Ghazali did help to moderate the public altercation. The airline carried on with a
new chairman acceptable to both sides. But it was clear the Tunku wanted to
split MSA and have their own airline to fly to their state capitals, so I agreed to
help them build up workshops at Kuala Lumpur airport and to train their workers
to repair the Fokker Friendship aircraft used on domestic routes.
I took a personal interest in MSA. I knew the Malaysians wanted to bypass
Singapore wherever possible after the break-up of this joint airline. With only
Paya Lebar International Airport and the three RAF airfields at Changi, Tengah
and Seletar, all on our small island republic, we had nowhere to go except
international. I had earlier told the airline’s management to build up international

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destinations. I regularly met our man in MSA, Lim Chin Beng, then the director
of administration and customer services. A steady, reliable man with a good
grasp of the airline industry, he was promoted to managing director in 1971. He
too knew that the Malaysians wanted to break off and leave us without any
flights to Malaysia except to Kuala Lumpur. He worked hard to get more landing
rights on potentially profitable international routes. In the meantime he had to
keep up the morale of the pilots and workers and their confidence in the future of
a Singapore-owned and Singapore-based airline. The chairman and managing
director of the company faced perpetual pressures from both the Malaysians and
us, which only ended when the airline split up in October 1972 into Singapore
Airlines (SIA) and Malaysia Airline System (MAS). We agreed that MAS would
take over all the internal routes and SIA all the external routes.
We got landing rights to Hong Kong in 1966, Tokyo and Sydney in 1967,
Jakarta and Bangkok in 1968. The most important destination was London but
the British were reluctant to give us landing rights. In August 1970, before
leaving for the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka, I asked Ngiam Tong Dow,
permanent secretary (communications), about the state of negotiations with the
British for landing rights in London. When he said it was very difficult, I told
him to let NTUC Secretary-General Devan Nair know this. I had earlier agreed
to Devan’s proposal that if the British negotiators were difficult, he would get
the unions at the airport to apply pressure by going slow on servicing British
aircraft. As soon as the NTUC mounted a go-slow on BOAC aircraft at Paya
Lebar, the British high commissioner, Arthur de la Mare, came to see me at my
office. I asked him to get his government to be reasonable. A British airline
could land in Singapore but a Singapore airline was denied landing rights in
London. Within weeks, we obtained landing rights in London, and flew on one
of the main trunk routes of the world: London-Singapore-Sydney. This opening
enabled Singapore Airlines to go international. The fact that Edward Heath was
then prime minister could have made it easier.
At a dinner in July 1972, with all union leaders and top management present,
and before SIA was launched, I spelt out the need for a Singapore airline to be
competitive and self-supporting; it would close down if it incurred losses. We
could not afford to run an airline just to show the flag like other countries did.
Right from the beginning, management and union clearly understood that their
survival depended on being profitable. Cooperation between union and
management helped SIA succeed.
Freed from constant bickering, SIA concentrated on its international routes

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and flew further afield year by year. By 1996 it had one of the largest and most
modern Boeing and Airbus fleets in Asia, flying to nearly all continents. It was
the most profitable airline in Asia, and for its size, one of the most profitable in
the world.
Central to SIA’s growth was my decision to build Changi Airport. In
February 1972 the cabinet had accepted the recommendation of a British
aviation consultant that we build a second runway at Paya Lebar, to be
operational by 1977–78. The Serangoon River would have to be diverted for this
to be done. There were engineering problems because of the doubtful load-
bearing qualities of the soil below the riverbed, but it would entail the lowest
land acquisition costs and require the least resettlements. The report added that it
would not be possible to have two runways ready by 1977 if we moved from
Paya Lebar to a new airport on the former RAF base at Changi. Then came the
October 1973 oil crisis. Air fares increased with the price of fuel and the world
economy slowed down. I asked for a new assessment, this time by American
consultants. They recommended we keep to the planned schedule for Paya
Lebar. I was not satisfied and wanted the option of moving to Changi
reconsidered.
I had flown over Boston’s Logan Airport and been impressed that the noise
footprint of planes landing and taking off was over water. A second runway at
Paya Lebar would take aircraft right over the heart of Singapore city. A
committee of senior officials again studied the alternative of building two
runways at Changi by 1977 and recommended we stay with the Paya Lebar
second runway. But once built, we would be saddled with the noise pollution for
many years. I wanted a thorough reappraisal before giving up on Changi so I
appointed Howe Yoon Chong, the chairman of the Port of Singapore Authority
with a reputation as a bulldozer, to chair a top-level committee.
When I was in Washington in April 1975 I received a letter from Keng
Swee, who was acting prime minister in my absence. The committee believed
the first Changi runway could be ready by 1980 and the second by 1982,
whereas the second Paya Lebar runway could only be ready by 1984 because of
the need to divert the Serangoon River and compact the soil of the riverbed.
Saigon and South Vietnam had just fallen to the communists. Growth in
Southeast Asia was likely to slow down as communist insurgencies spread
throughout the region. But to base decisions on a pessimistic scenario might well
bring it about. I mulled over the problem for a couple of days. The new airport at
Changi would cost us S$1 billion. We would still need to spend another S$400

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million to expand Paya Lebar’s passenger and freight-handling facilities between
1975 and 1982. I sent Keng Swee a message to proceed.
For an airport of that size, the building period was usually ten years. We
completed Changi Airport in six. We demolished hundreds of buildings,
exhumed thousands of graves, cleared swamps and reclaimed land from the sea.
When it opened in July 1981, it was Asia’s largest airport. We wrote off over
S$800 million worth of investments in the old airport and spent S$1.5 billion on
Changi, with two runways, the second ready by 1984.
Changi is a beautiful site at the easternmost corner of the island. The
approach to the city from the east coast runs along a new 20 kilometre
expressway built on land reclaimed from the sea, with no problems of
congestion, beautiful glimpses of the sea on one side and vistas of HDB estates
and private condominiums on the other. The airport and the pleasant 20-minute
drive into the city made an excellent introduction to Singapore, the best S$1.5
billion investment we ever made. It helped Singapore become the hub airport of
the region. The competition is keen and relentless. Newer and grander airports in
Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur with state-of-the-art equipment require Changi to
be upgraded and refurbished regularly to stay competitive.
Two men played key roles in making Changi Airport a success. Howe Yoon
Chong was forceful in executing policies. He had encouraged me to move the
airport from Paya Lebar to Changi by assuring me he had a team that could do it
in time. He did, with the resources of the Port of Singapore Authority, its chief
engineer, A. Vijiaratnam, and Lim Hock San, a promising officer who
implemented the project and became director of civil aviation in 1980. When I
was invited to open Changi Airport ceremonially in 1981, I asked Yoon Chong,
then minister for defence, to go in my place. He deserved to have his name on
the plaque.
The other man who played a key role was Sim Kee Boon, the shrewdest of
our permanent secretaries. He organised the management of the airport. Building
a fine airport has been done by many wealthy countries using foreign
contractors. The challenge is in running it so that a passenger has a smooth and
swift passage through customs, immigration, baggage collection and transport
into the city. If he has to make a connecting flight, then there must be facilities
for rest, recreation and work. Changi has all these – rest and shower rooms, a
swimming pool, business and fitness centres and a science discovery and
amusement area for children. As head of the Civil Aviation Authority of
Singapore, Kee Boon made Changi into a world-class airport, winning top

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ratings in travellers’ magazines almost every year.

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