From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

2. Building an Army from Scratch
When Parliament was due to open in December 1965, four months after our
separation from Malaysia, Brigadier Syed Mohamed bin Syed Ahmad Alsagoff,
who was in charge of a Malaysian brigade stationed in Singapore, called on me
and insisted that his motorcycle outriders escort me to Parliament. Alsagoff was
a stout, heavy-built Arab Muslim with a moustache, a Singaporean by birth who
had joined the Malayan Armed Forces. To my amazement he acted as if he was
the commander-in-chief of the army in Singapore, ready at any time to take over
control of the island. At that time the First and Second Singapore Infantry
Regiments (1 and 2 SIR) of about 1,000 men each were under Malaysian
command. The Malaysian government had placed 700 Malaysians in 1 and 2
SIR, and posted out 300 Singaporean soldiers to various Malaysian units.
I weighed up the situation and concluded that the Tunku wanted to remind us
and the foreign diplomats who would be present that Malaysia was still in charge
in Singapore. If I told him off for his presumptuousness, Alsagoff would report
this back to his superiors in Kuala Lumpur and they would take other steps to
show me who wielded real power in Singapore. I decided it was best to
acquiesce. So for the ceremonial opening of the first Parliament of the Republic
of Singapore, Malaysian army outriders “escorted” me from my office in City
Hall to Parliament House.
Not long after this problem, at 4:00 pm on Tuesday, 1 February 1966, Keng
Swee suddenly came to my office at City Hall with the troubling news that
rioting had broken out at an army training depot at Shenton Way, next to the
Singapore Polytechnic. When he learnt to his astonishment that 80 per cent of
recent recruits to all units were Malays, Keng Swee had given instructions that
all recruitment and training should cease and the position be frozen. The army
commander misinterpreted this and, on his own initiative, had instructed the
Chinese major to discharge all Malay recruits. The major assembled everyone in
the parade square, asked the non-Malays to fall out and told the Malays that they
were dismissed. For a few minutes the Malays were dumbfounded at this

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discrimination. When they had recovered from the shock, bedlam broke out as
they attacked the non-Malays with poles, sticks and aerated water bottles, burnt
two motorcycles, damaged a scooter and overturned a van. A police patrol car
responding to an emergency call drove into a barrage of bottles and could not get
past the overturned van. A fire-engine that arrived later was similarly attacked.
A huge crowd gathered along Shenton Way to watch. Polytechnic students
left their classes for a bird’s-eye view of the mêlée from the balconies and
rooftop. At about 2:45 pm, the riot squad arrived in their vans and lobbed tear-
gas canisters into the crowd. Then specially trained riot police moved in,
captured the rioters, bundled them into police vans and took them across the road
to the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) building. They were held at the
CID quadrangle pending instructions on whether to charge them and refuse bail,
or to let them off on bail.
Keng Swee feared that if they were allowed to go they would start a riot
between Malays and Chinese when they got home to Geylang Serai and other
Malay areas and spread the story of how they had been dismissed. I immediately
called the British high commissioner, John Robb, to my office. I asked him to
alert the British military commander in case inter-communal riots got out of
hand as the Singapore police and army were still nearly all Malays who would
sympathise with the rioters. I told him that I intended to go to the CID building
to sort out the problem myself. If it was possible to defuse it, I would let them go
home, otherwise they might have to be charged and held on remand. In that case
some 365 families would miss their sons that night and rumours would spread
throughout Singapore of the Malays being oppressed.
John Robb said he would report the matter but was careful to point out that
British forces could not interfere in an internal security problem. I said the
commander-in-chief or the officer in charge of the British garrison should ensure
that British troops were ready to prevent rioters from becoming uncontrollable
and turning against the white families, as they had in the religious riot involving
a Dutch girl in 1950.
I tested out my approach on Othman Wok, the minister for social affairs, and
had him accompany Keng Swee and me to meet the men at the CID. At the
quadrangle, speaking to them in Malay through a hand-held battery-powered
loudhailer, I said that the major had misunderstood his orders, which were to
take on only Singapore citizens. He mistakenly thought this meant no Malays
were to be recruited whereas Malays who were Singapore citizens were eligible.
Ten of them identified as ringleaders of the riots would be detained and charged

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by the police, but the rest could go home. They were not to spread rumours when
they got home. If any one of those allowed to go home was subsequently
identified as a rioter he would also be charged. I added that all those who were
Singapore citizens had to report back to camp the following day for normal
training. Only citizens were eligible and those who were not had to seek
employment in Malaysia. The prospect of jobs brought applause and cheers. I
had to make a decision on the spot; the least risky option was to hold and punish
a few ringleaders but allow the majority to go home. I hoped they would behave
themselves because of the prospect of jobs.
At a press briefing, I asked the reporters to report the matter tactfully,
especially in the Malay paper. When I read the newspapers the next morning, I
heaved a sigh of relief. Fourteen men were charged with rioting but the attorney-
general later decided that it was best to withdraw the charges. This was a sharp
reminder to the government that we had to deal with matters of race with the
utmost sensitivity.
We had another anxious time in November 1967 when Chinese-Malay
clashes broke out in Penang and Butterworth, a town on the peninsula opposite
Penang island. The racial situation had deteriorated rapidly in Malaysia after
Singapore’s separation. Chinese anger and resentment were mounting against
their government’s Malay-language policy. It was sufficiently alarming for us to
form a ministerial committee, with Goh Keng Swee as chairman and top
officials from the police and the army as members, to make contingency plans in
case racial riots broke out in peninsular Malaysia and spilled over to Singapore.
Tan Siew Sin, the Malaysian finance minister, had unwisely decided after the
British pound was devalued that even for small change there would have to be an
adjustment between the old coins issued by the British colonial government,
which had been devalued by about 14 per cent, and the new Malaysian coins.
This led to sporadic hartals (stoppage of work in protest), which in turn led to
racial clashes. Chinese from rural areas were moving into the towns and we
feared that if widespread racial conflicts broke out, the Malaysian armed forces
would have difficulty dealing with trouble in many towns.
Concern that these riots could involve Singapore forced us to build up our
armour quickly. In January 1968 we decided to buy French-made AMX-13 light
tanks that the Israelis were selling at discounted prices because they were
upgrading their armour. Thirty refurbished tanks arrived by June 1969 and
another 42 in September 1969. We also bought 170 four-wheeled V200
armoured vehicles.

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The British had made no offer to help us build an army as they had done with
the Malayans in the 1950s. They had worked behind the scenes to get a fair deal
for Singapore in Malaysia and incurred the displeasure of the Malaysians. Now
they had to deal with a Malaysia more than a little unhappy with them. And
because the Malaysians had sponsored us for membership both to the
Commonwealth and the United Nations, the British must have guessed that the
Malaysians would also want to be our military instructors, if for no other reason
than to make sure we were not taught more than they knew about defence.
We had to get back our two regiments and restore their Singapore identity to
ensure their loyalty. Goh Keng Swee, then finance minister, had offered to be
defence minister immediately at independence. He was willing to build an army
from scratch, although all he knew of military matters was learnt as a corporal in
the British-led Singapore Volunteer Corps until it surrendered in February 1942.
I told him to get going. Keng Swee contacted Mordecai Kidron, the Israeli
ambassador in Bangkok, for help. A few days after separation on 9 August,
Kidron flew in from Bangkok to offer assistance in military training, and Keng
Swee brought him to see me. Kidron had approached me several times in 1962–
63 to ask for an Israeli consulate in Singapore. He had assured me the Tunku had
agreed and that we need not wait until Malaysia was established. I replied that if
the Tunku had agreed, there should be no trouble in setting it up after Malaysia
was formed, but if I did so before that, I would create an issue that would excite
the Malay Muslim grassroots and upset my plans for merger. He was
disappointed. As I had expected, when Malaysia came about, the Tunku could
not and did not allow an Israeli consulate.
I listened to Kidron’s proposal on military training but told Keng Swee to put
them on hold until Lal Bahadur Shastri, the prime minister of India, and
President Nasser of Egypt replied to my letters seeking their urgent help to build
up our armed forces.
I had written to Shastri for a military adviser to help us build up five
battalions. Two days later, Shastri replied sending “sincere good wishes for the
happiness and prosperity of the people of Singapore” but did not mention my
request. Nasser, in his reply, extended recognition to Singapore as an
independent and sovereign state, but he too did not refer to my request for a
naval adviser to build up our coastal defence. I had half expected the Indian
government might not want to take sides against Malaysia. India was after all a
relatively close neighbour in Asia. But I was disappointed when Nasser, a good

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friend, opted out. Perhaps it was a case of Muslim solidarity with Malaysia’s
Muslim leaders.
I told Keng Swee to proceed with the Israelis, but to keep it from becoming
public knowledge for as long as possible so as not to provoke grassroots
antipathy from Malay Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore. A small group of
Israelis led by Colonel Jak Ellazari arrived in November 1965, followed by a
team of six in December. To disguise their presence, we called them
“Mexicans”. They looked swarthy enough.
We had to have a credible force to protect ourselves. I had no fear of the
Tunku changing his mind but other powerful Malay leaders, like Syed Ja’afar
Albar who so strongly opposed separation that he had resigned as secretary-
general of UMNO, might persuade Brigadier Alsagoff it was his patriotic duty to
reverse separation. The brigadier with his brigade based in Singapore could have
captured me and all my ministers without difficulty. So we maintained a quiet,
non-challenging posture, while Keng Swee as defence minister worked
feverishly to build up some defence capability.
We faced another security risk from the racial composition of our army and
police. Independent Singapore could not continue the old British practice of
having a city three-quarters Chinese policed and guarded by Malay policemen
and soldiers. The British had recruited mostly Malays born in Malaya, who
traditionally had come to Singapore to enlist. Malays liked soldiering whereas
the Chinese shunned it, a historical legacy of the predatory habits of soldiers
during the years of rebellions and warlords in China. The question was whether
the army and police would be as loyal to a government no longer British or
Malay, but one the Malays perceived as Chinese. We had to find some way to
induct more Chinese and Indians into the police and armed forces to reflect the
population mix.
Shortly after separation, at the request of the Malaysian government, we had
sent the 2nd battalion SIR to Sabah for Confrontation duties. We wanted to
demonstrate our good faith and solidarity with Malaysia even though a formal
defence treaty had not been concluded. This left their barracks, Camp Temasek,
vacant. We then agreed to a Malaysian proposal that one Malaysian regiment be
sent down to Camp Temasek. The 2nd battalion SIR was due to return from its
duties in Borneo in February 1966, and arrangements were made at staff level
for the Malaysian regiment to withdraw. The Malaysian defence minister
requested that instead of reoccupying Camp Temasek, one Singapore battalion
should be sent to the Malayan mainland to enable the Malaysian regiment to

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remain where it was. Keng Swee did not agree. We wanted both our own
battalions in Singapore. We believed the Malaysians had changed their minds
because they wanted to keep one battalion of Malaysian forces in Singapore to
control us.
The Malaysians refused to move out, so the SIR advance party had to live
under canvas at Farrer Park. Keng Swee saw me urgently to warn that if our
troops were under canvas for too long, with poor facilities for their mess and
toilets, there was the risk of a riot or a mutiny. He compared himself to a British
general in charge of troops the majority of whom were Italians. The Malaysians
could take advantage of this and, through Brigadier Alsagoff, mount a coup. He
advised me to move from my home in Oxley Road into the Istana Villa in the
Istana domain and to post Gurkha police guards around just in case. For the next
few weeks, my family and I stayed there with a company of Gurkhas on standby.
Shortly afterwards, the British vacated a camp called Khatib in the north of
Singapore, near Sembawang. We offered it to the Malaysians and they agreed in
mid-March 1966 to move out of our camp to Khatib, where they remained for 18
months before withdrawing of their own accord in November 1967.
Their unreasonableness only made us more determined to build up the
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) so that they could not intimidate us in this way.
It stiffened our resolve and made us dig our heels in.
Keng Swee, ever the intrepid fighter, had written in his paper to Defco
(Defence Council):
“It is foolish to allow ourselves to be hypnotised by the disparity in the
population ratios between Singapore and her neighbours. What counts is
the fighting strength of the armed forces, not the size of populations. …
After five years of conscription we can field an army of 150,000 by
mobilising those on the reserve service. By using older persons and
women for non-combatant duties we should eventually be able to field an
army with a combat strength of 250,000 consisting of men between the
ages of 18 and 35. The war-making potential of a small, vigorous, well-
educated and highly motivated population should never be
underestimated.”
This was an ambitious plan based on the Israeli practice of mobilising the
maximum number possible in the shortest time possible. We thought it important
for people in and outside Singapore to know that despite our small population,

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we could mobilise a large fighting force at short notice.
Ours was no easy task. We had to reorientate people’s minds to accept the
need for a people’s army and overcome their traditional dislike for soldiering.
Every Chinese parent knew the saying