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The Tyranny of Controls
69
ity view in the academic community, but the minority is much
larger than anyone would gather from public statements to that
effect.
The press is highly dependent on government—not only as a
major source of news but in numerous other day-to-day operating
matters. Consider a striking example from Great Britain. The
London
Times,
a great newspaper, was prevented from publishing
one day several years ago by one of its unions because of a story
that it was planning to publish about the union's attempt to in-
fluence the content of the paper. Subsequently, labor disputes
closed down the paper entirely. The unions in question are able to
exercise this power because they have been granted special im-
munities by government. A national Union of Journalists in
Britain is pushing for a closed shop of journalists and threatening
to boycott papers that employ nonmembers of the union. All this
in the country that was the source of so many of our liberties.
With respect to religious freedom, Amish farmers in the United
States have had their houses and other property seized because
they refused, on religious grounds, to pay Social Security taxes—
and also to accept Social Security benefits. Church schools have
had their students cited as truants in violation of compulsory
attendance laws because their teachers did not have the requisite
slips of paper certifying to their having satisfied state requirements.
Although these examples only scratch the surface, they illus-
trate the fundamental proposition that freedom is one whole, that
anything that reduces freedom in one part of our lives is likely to
affect freedom in the other parts.
Freedom cannot be absolute. We do live in an interdependent
society. Some restrictions on our freedom are necessary to avoid
other, still worse, restrictions. However, we have gone far beyond
that point. The urgent need today is to eliminate restrictions, not
add to them.
CHAPTER 3
The Anatomy
of Crisis
The depression that started in mid-1929 was a catastrophe of
unprecedented dimensions for the United States. The dollar in-
come of the nation was cut in half before the economy hit bottom
in 1933. Total output fell by a third, and unemployment reached
the unprecedented level of 25 percent of the work force. The
depression was no less a catastrophe for the rest of the world. As
it spread to other countries, it brought lower output, higher un-
employment, hunger, and misery everywhere. In Germany the
depression helped Adolf Hitler rise to power, paving the way for
World War II. In Japan it strengthened the military clique that
was dedicated to creating a Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere.
In China it led to monetary changes that accelerated the final
hyperinflation that sealed the doom of the Chiang Kai-shek regime
and brought the communists to power.
In the realm of ideas, the depression persuaded the public that
capitalism was an unstable system destined to suffer ever more
serious crises. The public was converted to views that had already
gained increasing acceptance among the intellectuals: govern-
ment had to play a more active role; it had to intervene to offset
the instability generated by unregulated private enterprise; it had
to serve as a balance wheel to promote stability and assure secu-
rity. The change in the public's perception of the proper role of
private enterprise on the one hand and of the government on the
other proved a major catalyst for the rapid growth of government,
and particularly central government, from that day to this.
The depression also produced a far-reaching change in pro-
fessional economic opinion. The economic collapse shattered the
long-held belief, which had been strengthened during the 1920s,
that monetary policy was a potent instrument for promoting
economic stability. Opinion shifted almost to the opposite extreme,
that "money does not matter." John Maynard Keynes, one of the
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