Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

1.2.3.
 
Moral Enhancement as a beneficial change in the sphere of morality 
As mentioned above, the word ‘moral’ in ‘moral enhancement’ can have a 
descriptive function and refer, for example, to a certain aspect of our cognition. A 
cognitive approach to moral enhancement would therefore be based on an 
assessment of cognitive functions and regions implicated in moral reasoning, 
decision-making, acting and so forth. Further, such an approach would include an 
investigation of how these functions are affected by, for example, mood, emotion, 
sleep deprivation, risk assessment, being in hurry, etc. (Blumental, 2005),
and how 
they can be biomedically modulated. On that view, whether an intervention is a 
moral enhancement depends, first, on whether it affects relevant cognitive 
processes and behaviours. Secondly, it depends on whether the modification of 
function counts as an enhancement of the kind we are after.
The question of how narrowly or widely to draw the ‘moral sphere’ should be 
addressed. Harris (2011, see also subsequent articles) has noted that what makes 
morality specifically moral is an all-things-considered judgement from a moral 
perspective. He argues that, as a result, pursuing cognitive enhancement by 
biomedical or traditional means is the best way of pursuing moral enhancement. 
Others might talk about the importance of empathy (e.g. Hume 1751;
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Persson and 
Savulescu, 2008), and/or emotions such as disgust and elevation (e.g. Haidt, 2012) 
for morality.
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Although Hume (1751) refers to ‘sympathy,’ he refers to a concept we currently label 
‘empathy’ (Smith, 2011).

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In this section it is not necessary to take a stance on what is sufficient and necessary 
for morality or moral judgement. Even if we concede to Harris that moral 
judgement properly so called necessarily involves deliberation from a moral stance, 
we can still be concerned about the effects of interventions that affect cognitive and 
affective capacities that feed into and are related to moral agency. For example, 
indiscriminately decreasing the capacity to react with anger might decrease the 
disposition for unjustified violent action as well the ability to be enraged at injustice 
and act on it. Whether or not injustice angers us can still be relevant for our moral 
agency, even if we accept that what makes the act moral or immoral is not that it 
results from anger, but rather relates to the appropriate justification based on moral 
reasons and reasoning.
This approach is consistent with the psychological and neuroscientific view of what 
psychologists call ‘moral emotions,’ without committing ourselves to meta-ethical 
positions such as emotivism (Stevenson, 1937; Ayer, 1937) or to intuitionism 
(Haidt, 2001). The downside of such a wide and loose use of the ‘moral’ is that it 
risks clouding the debate. But there is also an advantage to drawing the ‘moral 
sphere’ widely. This wider use of ‘moral’ allows us to look at a range of 
interventions that affect the underpinnings of moral agency and reflect on whether 
the intervention is beneficial for moral agency specifically. 
The proposed way of using ‘moral’ is perhaps not the most intuitive. We might 
assume that moral enhancement makes people better moral agents. However, it is a 
way analogical to the use of the term ‘cognitive enhancement.’ Cognitive 
enhancement is often understood as a beneficial change to our cognitive capacities 
(e.g. Harris, 2007). This does not mean that every cognitive enhancer would make 
for wiser, more knowledgeable or better thinking agents. To a large extent, whether 
something is a cognitive enhancement is contingent on what kind of skill or 
cognitive capacity the agent needs enhanced and to what end the enhanced capacity 
is used. Increasing sustained and focused attention may be a great cognitive 
enhancement for those who need to focus on similar tasks for hours. But the same 
drug may ‘inspire’ hours of cleaning, as is sometimes reported by students using 
Ritalin or Adderall (Vrecko 2013). If the enhanced cognitive capacities are used to 
acquire false beliefs, we may end up with agents who are no wiser than before. The 

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same intervention can also bring more harm than good if what is needed is flexible, 
wider attention, as is the case at some stages of a creative process or when 
reflecting on wider implications of a thought or idea. Thus, where ‘cognitive 
enhancement’ is usually used in a sense that implies a possible benefit of a certain 
kind, it is open to questioning about whether this particular cognitive enhancer is 
truly resulting in better deliberative capacities, knowledge or prudential benefit. It 
makes sense to apply an analogical understanding to moral enhancement.
The assessment of whether or not an enhancement is ‘beneficial’ can be done from 
the perspective of morality, but may also be based on a prudential evaluation. The 
next section further explores the interplay of various ways in which an enhancing 
intervention might be beneficial.