Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

4.3. 
Fundamental moral disagreement 
Some have assumed that all moral disagreement is in fact due to those reasons (e.g. 
Boyd, 1988), while others maintain that there are cases of moral disagreement 
between two people who are equally rational, and equally well informed about the 
non-moral facts and understand each othersʼ claims (fundamental moral 
disagreement). Whether that is indeed the case seems to be a rather complex 
question and I will not attempt to give an answer here. However, 
even if 
we 
accepted the conclusion about the metaphysics of morals, it does not have 
straightforward implications for the possibility of moral actions and moral concern 
even in the case of fundamental moral disagreement. Why is that? It is because we 
cannot automatically get from the metaphysics of morals to the conclusion about 
moral knowledge and about what we should do. Let me just give one example of 
this – there are alternative metaphysical positions that have the potential to deal 
with the objections raised. It is possible, for example, to accept error theory and end 
up with moral fictionalism, where our make-believing in morality can be 
prudentially advisable (Joyce, 2005). Alternatively, moral non-cognitivists may 
seek to explain how the feelings, attitudes or prescriptions expressed in moral 
claims can be justified (see Hare (1981), Gibbard (1990) and Blackburn (1998) for 
theories of moral justification compatible with non-cognitivism). Those views can 
account for the apparent fundamental moral disagreement while leaving moral 
enhancement (via MB or moral education) as a viable notion. 
Although the most common, metaphysical arguments are not the only ones 
developed on the basis of the observation that moral disagreement exists. For 
example, McGrath (2007) defended an epistemological version of this argument. 

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Epistemological arguments from disagreement seek to undermine moral knowledge 
by showing that regardless of the metaphysics of moral facts, we can reasonably 
expect to have much less moral knowledge that we previously thought. Consider 
the following passage from Sidgwickʼs 
The Methods of Ethics
: 
‘[I]f I find any of my judgments, intuitive or inferential, in 
direct conflict with a judgment of some other mind, there 
must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to 
suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective 
comparison between the two judgments necessarily reduces 
me temporarily to a state of neutrality.’ (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 
342). 
McGrath (2007) develops a parallel argument that applies not to certainty, but 
rather to moral knowledge. When moral beliefs are subject to disagreement and 
Sidgwickʼs condition is satisfied (that is, if one has no more reason to suspect that 
the other person is mistaken than that it is oneself who erred), one is not holding 
knowledge about the contested issue; and that is the case even if the belief happens 
to be true. In fact, McGrath (2007) develops a stronger version of this claim by 
arguing that all controversial moral issues (such contentious matters in applied 
ethics and culture) fulfil Sidgwickʼs condition; let us accept this last claim for the 
purposes of the argument. What consequences does it have for the project of using 
MB for making morally better agents? 
The consequences are far from straightforward. In those cases it does not follow 
that we should abandon, prohibit or find MB an untenable proposition – and that 
applies to both moral education and other non-traditional means of enhancement. 
Firstly, in cases that apparently satisfy Sidgwickʼs condition we may still have 
some problems with justifying why exactly it is rational for us to trust othersʼ moral 
intuitions as much as we trust ours, and why, as a consequence, we should abandon 
our belief (Wedgwood, 2010). But let us assume that some version of Sidgwickʼs 
proposal applies and so in many cases of controversy it is rational for us to abandon 
our beliefs. 

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Non-traditional MB is unlikely to be specific enough to change the moral appraisal 
of any particular controversial issue. It is more likely to slightly modify some 
propensities to react, perceive and behave by increasing impulse control, empathy, 
trust or reducing fear responses and so on. Naturally, we can still disagree about 
issues such as whether a higher level of trust is conducive to moral outcomes. 
However, if we accept Sidgwickʼs (1907) advice to hold our judgements we are still 
left with the question ʻso what should we do now?ʼ Let us say that we disagree 
about whether Jane should increase, decrease or maintain her empathic ability (we 
fundamentally disagree about all three possibilities). What behaviour would 
constitute holding our judgement on this issue? Some may say that we should leave 
things as they are. But there is no reason why we should privilege the 
status quo 
option over other possibilities, given that there is disagreement also about the 
status 
quo
. Thus, moral disagreement is problematic as a support for leaving things as 
they are. We are still faced with the question ʻwhat should we do next?ʼ The answer 
could be that it is only rational for us to have 
no moral views 
at all on the 
contentious matter and use other reasons to decide on the course of action. 
It is important to remember that we have developed political means of dealing with 
moral disagreement and sometimes find disagreement to be a constructive force 
necessary for change. In liberal societies moral education is often about developing 
the ability of persons to be autonomous moral agents, providing them the 
possibility of gaining reasoning skills and exposure to moral problems to aid this 
development. We tend to protect the freedom of people to disagree with commonly 
held views. We also have political frameworks that aid us in dealing with moral 
disagreement and often seek the state to be as neutral about issues of morality as it 
is possible. We tend to protect the private sphere – the freedom of parents to raise 
their children as they see fit is interfered with only in cases of clear parental failure; 
we struggle to protect freedom of conscience, and so on. We accept that people 
have different ideas about what a good life is about and value the ability of 
individuals to act consistently with their idea of the good life and morality, and, 
generally speaking, restrain this possibility only when we have strong justification 
for doing so. Even given the doubts that an agent may have about what is right, we 
are likely to find the adoption of a moral stance (for example, as opposed to 
narrowly self-interested stance) to be valuable. 

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One could argue that the possibility of MB in this liberal framework would be 
likely to deepen the disagreement – which could be seen as undesirable prudentially 
or morally speaking. We may therefore have good reasons to make people less 
bothered about morality in cases when disagreement arises (this would be a solution 
consistent with the view that it is rational for us to abandon our belief in certain 
cases of disagreement). Interestingly, an argument for making people suspend their 
judgment and not act motivated by moral reasons under these particular 
circumstances is an argument for a certain kind of enhancement. If one supported 
this argument using 
moral 
reasons this would be an argument for a specific kind of 
moral enhancement understood as making people more moral. If the rationale is 
prudential, we have a case for prudentially beneficial intervention into our moral 
sphere.