World, 87–95, CEMAM Reports. Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar
University Press, 2002).
by Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah (b. 1960). Its name
faith (Q 5:56; 58:22). The modern Lebanese Hiz-
May 2000. The party is committed to the eventual
. However,
size its Lebanese and nationalist identity.
Since the end of the country’s civil war in 1989,
Hizbullah has participated in elections, assuming
a prominent position in Lebanese politics while
maintaining an armed presence in the south near
Lebanon’s border with i
srael
. While the move-
ment claims its roots in the period prior to the
i
ranian
r
evolUtion
oF
1978–1979, it is generally
acknowledged that Hizbullah coalesced as a fight-
ing force only with organizational and military
aid from Iran’s postrevolutionary government.
Other factors leading to its emergence include the
historical underrepresentation of Shii Muslims in
Lebanese politics as well as their economic and
social marginalization, both of which contributed
to a general mobilization of Shia throughout the
1950s and 1960s. In 1974, the Shii cleric imam
Musa al-Sadr founded the populist Shii Move-
ment of the Deprived and a year later its military
wing, Amal. In the wake of al-Sadr’s mysterious
disappearance in 1978 and the increasingly dis-
credited secular Arab nationalist ideologies with
which Amal and its new leader, Nabih Berri, were
associated, Hizbullah’s religious message gained
salience. In the early 1980s, ex-members of Amal
such as Nasrallah and Hizbullah’s first secretary
general, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, joined forces
with clerics and other supporters of the Iranian
Revolution to create an umbrella organization
to defend Shii interests. On February 16, 1985,
Hizbullah published an open letter announcing
its ideological and social visions and marking its
transition from a secret resistance movement to an
open political one.
Today, Hizbullah maintains close ties with Iran
and s
yria
, holds roughly 10 percent of the seats
in the Lebanese national parliament, and con-
trols many municipalities in southern Lebanon
and the Bekaa Valley. Additionally, it provides a
wide variety of social services for its constituent
communities, including job training, education,
and medical care. It also owns a satellite channel
called al-Manar (the Beacon), over which it broad-
casts a variety of religious, political, and entertain-
ment programs.
Since May 2000, disputes over prisoners, land
mines, and the Shebaa Farms have continued to fuel
low-grade conflict and frequent incursions by both
Israel and Hizbullah along the Israeli-Lebanese bor-
der, or “blue line.” In July 2006, the conflict inten-
sified once again against a backdrop of increasing
tensions between the U
nited
s
tates
, Syria, and
Iran over implementation of UN Resolution 1559
and Iranian nuclear activities. Much of Lebanon’s
infrastructure was destroyed by Israeli air attacks,
and heavy casualties were incurred on both sides.
Ensuing diplomatic efforts focused on integrating
Hizbullah’s military wing into Lebanon’s national
forces and promoting a sustainable long-term peace
agreement. Despite that conflict and efforts by the
U.S. government to marginalize Hizbullah, notably
through its designation as a terrorist organization,
the party is likely to figure prominently in Lebanese
politics for many years to come.
See also a
rab
-i
sraeli
conFlicts
; s
hiism
;
terrorism
.
Michelle Zimney
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