of them were taking ownership of the problem.”
At the time, it was not easy for consumers to get solar panels on their houses. You had to be very
proactive, acquiring the panels and finding someone else to install them. The consumer paid up front and
had to make an educated guess as to whether or not his or her house even got enough sunshine to make the
ordeal worthwhile. On top of all this, people were reluctant to buy panels, knowing that the next year’s
models would be more efficient.
The Rives decided to make buying into the solar proposition much simpler and formed a company
called SolarCity in 2006. Unlike other companies, they would not manufacture their own solar panels.
Instead they would buy them and then do just about everything else in-house. They built software for
analyzing a customer’s current energy bill and the position of their house and the amount of sunlight it
typically received to determine if solar made sense for the property. They built up their own teams to
install the solar panels. And they created a financing system in which the customer did not need to pay
anything up front for the panels. The consumer leased the panels over a number of years at a fixed monthly
rate. Consumers got a lower bill overall, they were no longer subject to the constantly rising rates of
typical utilities, and, if they sold their house, they could pass the contract to the new owner. At the end of
the lease, the homeowner could also upgrade to new, more efficient panels. Musk had helped his cousins
come up with this structure and become the company’s chairman and its largest shareholder, owning about
a third of SolarCity.
Six years later, SolarCity had become the largest installer of solar panels in the country. The company
had lived up to its initial goals and made installing the panels painless. Rivals were rushing to mimic its
business model. SolarCity had benefited along the way from a collapse in the price of solar panels, which
occurred after Chinese panel manufacturers flooded the market with product. It had also expanded its
business from consumers to businesses with companies like Intel, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart signing up for
large installations. In 2012, SolarCity went public and its shares soared higher in the months that
followed. By 2014, SolarCity was valued at close to $7 billion.
During the entire period of SolarCity’s growth, Silicon Valley had dumped huge amounts of money
into green technology companies with mostly disastrous results. There were the automotive flubs like
Fisker and Better Place, and Solyndra, the solar cell maker that conservatives loved to hold up as a
cautionary tale of government spending and cronyism run amok. Some of the most famous venture
capitalists in history, like John Doerr and Vinod Khosla, were ripped apart by the local and national press
for their failed green investments. The story was almost always the same. People had thrown money at
green technology because it seemed like the right thing to do, not because it made business sense. From
new kinds of energy storage systems to electric cars and solar panels, the technology never quite lived up
to its billing and required too much government funding and too many incentives to create a viable market.
Much of this criticism was fair. It’s just that there was this Elon Musk guy hanging around who seemed to
have figured something out that everyone else had missed. “We had a blanket rule against investing in
clean-tech companies for about a decade,” said Peter Thiel, the PayPal cofounder and venture capitalist at
Founders Fund. “On the macro level, we were right because clean tech as a sector was quite bad. But on
the micro level, it looks like Elon has the two most successful clean-tech companies in the U.S. We would
rather explain his success as being a fluke. There’s the whole
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