CHAPTER FIVE
●
GROWTH MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AND URBAN DESIGN
101
ordinances for adoption by municipalities in the
region. However, the governor’s active support for
regional Smart Growth legislation did not serve
him well at the polls. In the 2002 election, he was
defeated by an opponent who has been markedly less
enthusiastic and supportive of these policies.
The most notable American
successes of collabora-
tive planning and attention to design at this metro-
politan level are Portland and Minneapolis-St. Paul.
In the former, an ‘urban growth boundary’ approxi-
mates to an English ‘green belt’ of preserved rural
land around the urbanized area: a regional authority
guides planning decisions and the urban area is well
served by public transit. The regional model is more
advanced in the Twin Cities. Here a Metropolitan
Council has planning authority for sewer, transit and
land use over a seven-county area, and guides growth
in a more orderly and economical manner than if the
process was left to the normal conditions of market
forces and competitive municipalities. The state legis-
lature beefed up a conventional
planning agency with
a budget of $40 million to a regional authority with
real power and an annual budget of $600 million
(Katz, 2003: p. 48). Most crucially, the Twin Cities
have a tax sharing arrangement, whereby 40 per cent
of the property tax revenues from commercial and
industrial development are distributed across the met-
ropolitan region. This goes a long way toward offset-
ting the competition for new development and its
tax revenues that motivates most conventional local
government in America.
Like British towns, individual cities in America
usually have some form of urban design guidelines,
either included within zoning legislation or as a free-
standing advisory document.
Sometimes such poli-
cies and guidelines are progressive, and demonstrate a
deep care and concern for a city’s urban environment.
Other times they are nearly nonexistent, or honored
mainly in the breach. Mostly, they fall in between.
The city of Charlotte, for example, has in recent years
enacted design provisions that place emphasis on the
creation of a good pedestrian environment at street
level in the downtown core. Among other things,
these provisions require a certain amount of street-
level retail space to be provided in new downtown
development, and ban the construction of overstreet
walkways that link the internal environments of
office towers and deprive the street of much needed
activity.
Despite these regulations, in 2001 the city
council approved a mid-air tunnel connecting the
city’s newest skyscraper to its neighbor with almost
no discussion of the consequences, and waived the
street level retail requirement in a nearby large
development by one of the city’s powerhouse banks.
Yet within a few blocks of these failures and oversights,
Charlotte has developed its exemplary HOPE VI
affordable housing project, embodying good urban
design principles and built with decent architecture,
following plans from outside consultants, Urban
Design Associates (UDA) from Pittsburgh, and local
architects FMK and David Furman (see Figure 2.14).
Often urban design quality is left to the develop-
ment industry to enact
for its own market-driven
benefit. Sometimes the results are outstanding, such
as the Rouse Corporation’s reconstruction of the his-
toric Faneuil Hall and Quincy Marketplace in
Boston (see Figure 5.1). Other times the results fall
short of excellence but still attain a high standard,
such as the Birkdale Village development described
in the previous chapter. But usually the results are
disappointing, amounting to little more than frag-
ments of pedestrian space with benches and decora-
tive lighting between retail stores surrounded by huge
asphalt car parks (see Figure 5.2). In cases like this,
urban design is a mere fig leaf decorating the naked-
ness of the development team’s imagination.
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