12 What is politics?
Second, it includes on the side of those
ruled some possible degree of voluntary
compliance with the preferences of the power holders. This excludes that a regime
mostly consisting of the use or threat of force can be sensibly regarded as a form of
political power. Forced dependence on arbitrary rule should be called
domination
17
rather than power; in the extreme case we have to do with state terrorism. In many
European countries the Nazi occupation regime (1939 or later–1944 or 1945) was
sheer domination by state terrorism and could not be said to be endowed with
political power; so was Japanese rule in many of the occupied territories.
Compliance can be motivated by full or half-hearted convictions or else by an
overall assessment that compliance is, for
reasons of prudence, better than opposi-
tion or rebellion. Underlying it is some sharing of ideas and beliefs between the
rulers and the ruled ones, or, in other words, a commonality of culture. Unlike
in the famous, rather deterministic dictum by Karl Marx (1813–1883) and Frie-
drich Engels (1820–1995),
18
this phenomenon is well-taken in Antonio Gramsci’s
(1891–1937) notion of hegemony, seen as the ability of
the ruling class or group
to influence and reorient the ideas heeded by the people, who are thus inclined to
consent to the existing regime.
Third, political power is
universal, in the sense that its orders are valid against
all and everybody (
erga omnes in Roman law) within a given unity. This is another
differentiation from force, which can have full sway only on those on whom it is
actually applied or have to fear its imminent use.
The (legal, but also effective) universality of political
power as far as exerted in
the state is made possible by its pyramidal or top-down structure, which in the early
modern European state was imposed after the ‘intermediate bodies’ (clergy, nobility,
towns and guilds with special jurisdictions and feudal privileges) were deprived of
any independence and brought under the central political authority.
* * *
Political power, in combination with influence, operates mainly in two areas:
•
it makes substantive
decisions, allocating goods and recognising identities, and
•
it determines which issues will be taken to public
debate and decision making,
which will be left out or postponed: this is the
agenda-setting power in democ-
racies scattered among government, media and other power centres such as
trade unions and industrial associations.
Agenda-setting is no less important than decision-making power, sometimes even
more so, as it can prevent crucial issues such as emerging faults in a country’s financial
architecture or climate change from being addressed in the policy-making process.
The openly political (in Parliament) agenda-setting process is obviously intertwined
with the cultural background (values, worldviews) of a people and its elites. Ideas and
beliefs matter in domestic as well as foreign policy more than it appears in the media.
The
instruments of political power, as well as influence, are incentives and sanctions,
or positive and negative incentives. Many things can be used as incentives in one
Politics and power
13
way or another: money for politicians or their constituencies or clans, political friend-
ship or enmity, positions to be attributed, allocation of prestige or infamy and more.
The
modus operandi of political power, but
far less of influence, are manifold, but
the basic patterns are two:
•
compellence or in extreme cases coercion: A makes B do things (or stop doing
things) B would not otherwise do (or stop doing). This happens only margin-
ally by physical force; economic or psychological pressure are often enough, as
well as persuasion.
The same holds for
•
deterrence (A makes B keep doing or omitting to do certain things B would
otherwise stop or start doing). The
best known case, nuclear deterrence, is just a
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: