The globalised world
129
the build-up of a middle class: all conditions that are favourable to political partici-
pation and democracy, where this exists and is not spoiled by populism. Another
huge advantage of globalisation is that growing interdependence tends to foster
peaceful relationships among states, as it replaces hegemony or imperial dominance.
It is true that the degree of interdependence existing during the
belle époque did not
prevent the First World War from erupting, but this time
interdependence seems to
work hand-in-hand with the deterrence created not only by the nuclear balance of
terror, but by the fear of highly destructive conventional warfare as well.
On the problematic side, we meet first the
losers of globalisation: all those who
have lost their jobs or seen their income dwindle as a side effect of it. Peasants from
the traditional agriculture of poor countries or older skilled and unskilled workers
from wealthy countries’ factories that have been shut down because of the compe-
tition from energetically developing countries are only the best known representa-
tives. For these losers, the trouble is the new political powerlessness of the nation
state that would have previously addressed social crises by
industrial protectionism
or generous social policies; these are now ruled out either by the sharper interna-
tional competition and/or regulations barring state intervention in the economic
life. Besides, what used to be the first tool of redistribution inside a country, fis-
cal policy, is now severely limited by the free transborder flow of capital, which is
pumped out of countries as soon as they try to fund social policies compensating
globalisation by imposing more taxes on businesses and the wealthy. Keynesian
deficit spending for social purposes is made difficult if not impossible; the attitude
towards budget deficit and public debt depends in part
on the economic doctrine
or ideology followed by the nation’s government. Lastly, inside countries’ income
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, in other words the gap between the
very rich and the very poor, has gone up with globalisation, which has in the core
capitalist countries unleashed protest movements eager to delegitimise a social and
political system privileging – as they say – the uppermost 1% against the 99% of the
people. While social conflicts
are healthy for democracy, the feeling – particularly in
the youth – of being marginalised and politically powerless against the dragons of
globalised financial games is not.
Not to forget are the future, indeed imminent effects of the globalisation of
health care, due to both the penetration of pharmaceutical corporations into devel-
oping countries and the work of international institutions such as the World Health
Organization. This has hugely and rapidly extended life expectancy almost every-
where, which along with other factors will further
expand world population, thus
creating possible food and water shortages and increasing global warming: one
more global problem that politics-as-usual is poorly equipped to address.
In terms of the human condition, the balance is, on the whole, likely to tip
in favour of globalisation because of the enormous and swift job it did in lifting
hundreds of millions out of poverty, something that could have not been oth-
erwise achieved. The price paid by the losers we
have mentioned was high and
could have been softened if less ideological radicalism had been deployed by the
neoliberal supporters of globalisation and the governments had put in place timely
130 World politics and the future of politics
compensatory policies such as retraining measures for the workforce. But these
considerations or speculations do not address the true problem: can globalisation
be politically governed?
b.
Political globalisation means two different things: which political structures have
been globalised, and if and how the globalised world can be politically governed.
Globalisation has so far regarded democracy, human rights and terrorism. After
the fall of the Soviet regime and the dismemberment
of the Communist empire,
liberal democracy has remained the only model of polity with universal appeal
around the world. Alternative claims are raised, as in China, but – as we have seen
in Chapter 5 – none with the same degree of acceptance and legitimacy as the
democracy of Western origin. It is true that this circumstance says nothing on the
real democratic quality of the present regimes that
label themselves democratic,
nor on democracy’s ability to govern the globalised world. What is stunning, is that
after the demise of the European regimes that in the Middle Ages all claimed to be
Christian, neither Europe nor the world had ever known such a degree of alleged
homogeneity. The consequences of this circumstance on political allegiance and
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