particulars within it, in a single system of relationships. To that order
all actions and all institutions must be referred as their end. It is
spontaneously realized in all created things save man. The proper motions of
the heavenly bodies can be determined by observation because in them there
is no imperfection. But when one comes to consider men, the divine and
natural intention has been disturbed by the Fall. The proper order of human
society cannot therefore be determined by observation simply, because men
are imperfect. To know that order we must consult natural reason, and with
even more certainty, the law of God revealed in the scriptures. For Bodin
therefore, as he himself observed at the beginning, the science of politics
must be founded in a philosophy of the state indicating ends.
Moreover a moral imperative is implied since men, knowing by revelation and
the light of natural reason what the divine intention is, are bound in
conscience to endeavour to realize it.
In fact Bodin's political thought was rooted in a body of dogma, the law of
God. It should perhaps be observed in passing that he appears to mean the
Old Testament Scriptures alone. There is no single citation from the New
Testament throughout the work, and a reference to the trial of Christ is
only there to illustrate the powers of Roman provincial governors. Bodin had
read Calvin, and forcibly approved his condemnation of rebellion, yet he
never mentions Romans xiii on which it was based [II, v].
From these premises it is not surprising to find that Bodin was at one with
Calvin and the earlier reformers in seeing the state as originating in the
Fall. The disorder and violence of the times he lived in converted what had
been a traditional doctrine into a living belief. The state is necessary
because men are wicked. But whereas Calvin adhered to the old view that the
sin was the sin of rebellion against "the commands of God, for Bodin it was
the sin of injustice against one's fellow men. He reverts several times to
the theme that the state originated in violence [I, vi and IV, i]. Sometimes
he represents it as the consequence of a passion for dominion, of which
Nimrod was the first exemplar. At others he ascribes it to an instinct of
mutual association as a means of protection against such acts of violence
[III, vii]. But in either case, it is the same evils which threaten men, the
destruction of their liberty and the seizure of their possessions.
This shift of emphasis to be observed when one passes from Calvin to Bodin
is significant of a newly developing doctrine of rights inherent in the
individual, and prior to the state. In the second half of the sixteenth
century the old conception of the primitive state of innocence was
undergoing important modification. The liberty that men enjoyed in that
primitive natural society was assumed not to have been lost -- as Calvin
thought it had been lost -- but to be inalienable, and its preservation the
foundation of all legitimate political authority. Such views were being
expressed by François Hotman in his Franco-Gallia of 1573, and a short while
after the publication of the Six books of the Commonwealth in the Vindiciae
contra tyrannos of 1579. Bodin never used such phrases as 'natural rights',
or 'inherent rights'. But he assumed all through two rights in the
individual sanctioned by divine and natural law, liberty and property.
For once his treatment of the subject of liberty was fragmentary, perhaps
because his preoccupation with order led him to approach the state
throughout from the point of view of the authority of the ruler, rather than
that of the rights of the subject. But his main conception is clear. He
defined natural liberty as perfect freedom to live as one pleases, subject
only to the rule of reason [I, iii]. This is qualified when a man becomes a
citizen by the obligation to obey the ruler. But he did not, as did Hotman
and the author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos, hold that such an
obligation is compatible with freedom only when the citizen consents to law
and government. He would not allow that consent plays any part whatsoever in
the obligation to obey. Since, as will appear later, the prince and the law
through which he speaks are subject to divine and natural law, for Bodin the
ultimate sanction of the individual's liberty, and the guarantee that the
necessary restrictions on it in a political society shall be reasonable, is
not consent, but the imprescriptibility of divine and natural law.
His treatment of the subject of property is incidental to his defence of the
family, and his desire to preserve its integrity. This he saw could only be
done by preserving the integrity of its property, threatened by rights of
alienation and the depredations of the tax-collector. He therefore, long
before either Grotius or Locke, defended private property as sanctioned by
divine and natural law, and deduced that the ruler has no right to tax at
will [I, viii]. He never asked however, as Grotius and Locke asked, how
these rights were distinguished and delimited in the first instance. He
simply assumed that the existing state of affairs was sanctioned by the
tenth commandment. As a civilian, writing of a society in which property
usually meant inherited real estate, he may have assumed as obvious that the
rights of individual families went back to an original occupation of res
nullius. But however they arose, these rights he regarded as so sacred that
the property of the subject cannot be taken from him without his consent,
save by legal escheat or confiscation. Presumably he meant that the consent
of the Estates was necessary to the imposition of any new tax.
The establishment of the principle that there are certain imprescriptible
rights in the individual provided him with the means of distinguishing the
rightly ordered state from that which is not so. Tyrannical government is
one under which the liberty and property of the subject are arbitrarily
invaded, a legitimate government one where the ruler or rulers respect and
guarantee them [II, ii]. If then he agreed with Calvin that the state
originated in sin, he did not agree with him that in consequence it is
merely a machinery for the punishment of sin. He followed up his account of
the wickedness of the first rulers by observing that in the face of the
threat of enslavement, men were drawn together to form a society whose
purpose was the preservation of rights [III, vii]. A true state is therefore
a droit gouvernement.
It is clear from his discussion of the term droit that he meant nothing less
by it than the whole good of man. He repeats the accepted formula that the
body should be disciplined to virtuous activity, and virtuous activity
directed to the apprehension of eternal truth. Aquinas would have agreed.
But Bodin added that contemplation, or the development of those qualities of
mind whereby men distinguish good and evil, true and false, pious and
impious, is not only the sovereign good of the individual, but also the true
end of the state, for he explicitly identified the two. The importance of
this modification can hardly be exaggerated, for it brings not only natural
virtue, but religion within the sphere of politics [I, i]. He does not
however enlarge upon the implications, nor ever discuss the Church as such.
But it is clear that he did not mean that the state has an obligation to
establish 'true religion', or that it is for the prince to set up an
organized Church and compel conformity to it. This is clear from his
treatment of the subject of heresy [IV, vii]. He objected to persecution as
only too likely to produce a general scepticism about religion. This he
thought a disaster of the first importance, for in his opinion any system of
beliefs is to be preferred to none. Religion, because it induces reverence
and obedience, is the foundation of the commonwealth, and it largely rests
with the prince whether it flourishes or not. What the prince must do is to
establish conditions under which religion in the general sense is
encouraged. Only by toleration of all forms can genuine piety be promoted,
and only the prince can implement a policy of toleration. When therefore
Bodin makes droit the end of the state, he does not mean, as Aristotle did,
that the state is the means to the good life because political activity is
the highest exercise of virtue. He meant that the state alone can maintain
those conditions under which subjects can individually live virtuous,
thoughtful, and pious lives. The best state, he says, is the one in which
the greatest number of citizens live such lives.
Bodin was at the same time fully aware of the fact that in this imperfect
world all states fall short of this ideal in varying degrees, and pursue
not the highest good, but some particular good only, Sparta courage and
devotion, Rome justice. As he says, the state must first secure the lives of
its citizens before it can consider how they should live virtuously, and the
energies of most states are absorbed in the initial effort of survival. In
fact, in the ensuing books of the Six books of the Commonwealth the
discussion is largely confined to this immediate problem of
self-preservation. But as he said in his opening chapter, he did not intend
to take Plato as his model and describe an ideal impossible of realization.
Like Aristotle, he was looking for the best in the possible, and he was
fully aware that as things were, states fell far below the level of what in
favourable circumstances they might become. Having defined the ideal, or
ultimate goal, his practical intention involved concentrating on what can in
fact be achieved.
When he comes to consider the essential structure of the state, he follows
Aristotle in holding that the family group, and not the individual, is the
unit out of which the commonwealth is made up [I, ii]. He agreed that the
family is a natural society held together by the authority of the husband
over the wife, the father over his children and the master over his
servants, all sharing a common means of subsistence. But what he emphasized
was its moral and political rather than its economic significance,
complaining that Aristotle neglected this aspect of it. He discussed it from
the point of view of the father, and the father in his role of ruler rather
than in his role of organizer of the common life. This was because, as is
clear from all that he has to say about both the origin of the state, and
the causes of its destruction, he was convinced that what men chiefly need
is discipline to correct their factious and rebellious spirits. Therefore,
he wanted to see the authority of the father not only preserved, but
strengthened even to the extent of the power of life and death over his
dependants, for he saw in that power the only means of training the young in
the habit of obedience necessary to be acquired if they were later to
exhibit that submission to the ruler proper in a subject [I, iv]. Good
citizens are made in the nursery. It is thus its political importance that
impels him to defend the authority of parents.
Starting from these ideas of sin and its correction, it is not surprising
that he should have seen the state in terms of power [I, viii]. Its
distinguishing mark is puissance souveraine, a sovereign power. It is
necessarily perpetual and absolute, for any person or persons, within the
community or outside it, who can impose any time limits, or restrictions on
its competence, must be the true sovereign, and the apparent sovereign only
an agent. His admission of lois royales, or fundamental laws of the French
monarchy, does not really compromise these statements. The salic law is a
rule restricting, not the exercise of sovereignty, but the choice of the
person who may exercise it. The denial of the right to alienate royal domain
was an application of the principle of Roman law that the one thing a
sovereign cannot do is to destroy his own sovereignty, and this, Bodin
thought, the impoverishment of the Crown would bring about.
On the other hand the use of the term 'absolute' did not necessarily imply
that sovereign power was underived, since jurists were familiar with the
Roman theory that the imperium is inherent in the community, and conferred
by it on the ruler. But Bodin, though trained in the civil law, rejected
this part of it. He did so almost certainly because the doctrine of the
popular origin of political authority was already being associated by
Huguenot writers such as Hotman, with doctrines of the right of resistance.
It was very likely this association which led Bodin to deny that consent to
government was any part of natural liberty, or that the obligation to obey
depended on such consent being given. Bodin's ideas on the origin of
political authority derive not from the civil law but from the Hebrew
Scriptures. All power is of God [I, viii]. All right to command is therefore
essentially independent of the consent of the commanded. The artificial
society of the commonwealth should be modelled on the natural society of the
family, and no father is appointed by his children to rule over them.
The unqualified right to command is therefore the distinguishing mark of the
ruler. This characterization of the sovereign in terms of power is one of
Bodin's most original conceptions, and marks the break with the traditional
view of the king, enshrined in coronation oaths in use everywhere, that he
was in virtue of his office essentially the embodiment of justice, and his
primary function was to judge his subjects. Such a conception of monarchy
was still that commonly held. Louis XII, busy with projects for the
codification of law, spoke of himself as 'débiteur de justice à nos sujets'.
The same view was taken by so eminent a contemporary of Bodin's as the
Chancellor, Michel de L'Hôpital, whose politique views on the French
monarchy, expounded in his great speech to the Estates in 1560, were in
other ways very much the same as Bodin's. Kings were first instituted, he
told them, for the sake of justice, and this remains the essential attribute
of the kingly office, as is shown by the representation of the king on the
great seal, seated on his throne in the act of judgement.[3] Bodin, while
agreeing that all jurisdiction derived from the king, did not even include
the exercise of jurisdiction among the attributes of sovereignty, much less
make it the distinctive mark, since the king exercises this right
indirectly, by delegation [IV, vi]. For him the peculiar and essential mark
of sovereignty is the right to make law; it is its unique attribute, for it
is the normal means by which the sovereign indicates his commands. Law then
is simply the command of the sovereign. This voluntarist conception is
underlined by the distinction he makes between law -- that which is
commanded -- and right -- that which is equitable. Only the first proceeds
from the sovereign.
If law is command simply it includes, as Bodin saw, all activities of the
sovereign. There are however certain matters which the sovereign must attend
to himself in virtue of his office and not delegate to the subject, as he
delegates rights of jurisdiction, and these powers Bodin calls the
attributes of sovereignty. First there is included what Locke called the
federative power, or sole right of making war and peace, and concluding
alliances. Second there is the right to authorize all appointments to public
office, whatever the actual procedure in use. Again, as the source of all
rights of jurisdiction, the sovereign is the final resort of appeal for all
his subjects and in all causes. Finally he has the exclusive right to demand
unqualified oaths of submission, for the relations of the subject to his
sovereign are unique in that all his other obligations, as vassal of his
lord, for instance, are subject to the prior obligation to his sovereign.
These rights are inseparable from sovereignty, for the alienation or
delegation of any one of them destroys the sovereign.
From these premises Bodin was able to reach that conclusion that he was
convinced must be established if any order was to be maintained anywhere.
There is no right whatsoever in the subject of rebellion against the
sovereign he had no part in instituting or of disobedience to the law he had
no part in making [II, v]. So long as the king had been regarded as the
embodiment of justice, the obligation to obey was conditional on the justice
of the command. But once the king was conceived of as an absolute and
independent power, the usual grounds of resistance were denied. At the same
time Bodin wanted to establish a positive obligation to unconditional
obedience. He did so by postulating that political authority was of divine
institution. Natural and divine law oblige a man to obey the ruler set over
him by God. Much as he might condemn tyranny, he would not allow that the
cruellest of tyrants and the most unjust of laws may be resisted. The virtue
of the citizen is the virtue of obedience.
So much does Bodin insist on power as the distinguishing mark of the state
that he comes very near to saying that it is the existence of a sovereign
that constitutes a state. He defines the state in terms of its government,
'a rightly ordered government', and citizenship in terms of subjection, for
it is not any rights which he may enjoy that make a man a citizen, but his
subjection to a sovereign power [I, vi]. The identity of a state therefore
depends on the identity of its sovereign [IV, i]. Every revolution, whether
sudden or gradual, which results in the seat of sovereignty being changed
involves the foundation of a new state, though laws and institutions remain
without alteration. This happened when the slow growth of the power of the
Princes converted Germany from a monarchy to an aristocracy. But no
revolution in laws and institutions, such as the setting up of Lutheran
churches in the Scandinavian states, creates a new commonwealth, if
sovereignty remains in the same place. Bodin could not go quite so far as
Hobbes and define the commonwealth as a number of individuals united solely
by their individual subjection to a common power, for he thought of men as
naturally sociable, and any association of men as based on mutual amity even
more than on justice [III, vii]. But sharing Hobbes's acute fear of anarchy,
he was possessed by the same conviction that the recognition of an absolute
sovereign power was the only bulwark against it. Where there is no such
power, there can be no political society.
This insistence that effective power was the mark of the state does not mean
however that Bodin was the exponent of power politics in the same sense that
Machiavelli was. Nor could he have said with Hobbes that there is no
distinction of right and wrong, just and unjust, until a sovereign makes
laws creating such distinctions. As has already been shown, he included the
idea of right, as well as of power, in his definition of the state. Though
he distinguished law and equity, it was because of the difference in
provenance. The one proceeds from the sovereign and the other from God. But
in a rightly ordered society there should be no opposition between them; law
should conform to equity. Starting as he did from the conception of an
absolute moral order, he was necessarily emphatic that if the sovereign is
absolute in relation to the subject, he is not so in relation to God. To
God, as the author of his authority, he is in all things answerable. The
sovereign is not therefore a law unto himself, but the instrument of divine
law, bound to make his laws conform to its principles [I, viii]. From the
point of view of the oppressed subject, this qualification of the absolute
authority of the ruler would seem to be of no practical importance, since no
human agent might appoint himself the executor of divine justice. But it was
a qualification very generally accepted as of the first importance in the
sixteenth century. In the next century it was writers such as Bossuet, or
James I and Filmer, rather than Hobbes, who were Bodin's spiritual heirs in
this respect.
Bodin however did not intend that the moral sanctions governing the exercise
of sovereign power should be unreal. His insistence that the prince must act
as the instrument of divine and natural law led him to make considerable
qualifications of practical import in the absolutism of a monarch who
governs as he should. It is sometimes said that Bodin's ideal was
constitutional monarchy, because he advocated the summoning of Estates. It
is not so much Estates however which he thought of as tempering the improper
exercise of absolute power, for he thought their function purely
consultative, but rather the unvarying rule of law based on equity.
This comes out very clearly when in book III he proceeds to analyse the
essential structure of government, as a counterpart to his analysis of the
essential structure of the state. The inclusion of the term 'rightly ordered
government' in his definition of the commonwealth required such an
investigation. For government to be efficiently, still more for it to be
justly, conducted, three things are necessary, counsel, execution, and
assent. The commonwealth should therefore be provided with a 'senate' or
council with a constitutional right to advise the sovereign, a magistracy
with legal rights of jurisdiction, and Estates which provide a means of
communication between subjects and sovereign. A council and Estates are not
however a necessary part of the government of the commonwealth. It is highly
expedient, but not necessary, for the sovereign to act upon advice. He can
act on his own unassisted judgement, and may choose to do so [III, i].
Again, the sovereign need not invite representations from his subjects, nor
consult with them in matters of public interest. But again, it is highly
expedient for him to do so. Emphatically as he rejected the doctrine that
law and government derives from the community, he was fully aware of the
practical value of consent in securing obedience. Estates provide the
sovereign with the opportunity both of informing himself of grievances, and
securing approval for proposed remedies. Such consultation is, however, a
matter of policy and not obligation [I, viii and III, vii].
But the case of the magistrates is different. They are indispensable to the
government of the commonwealth, for though the sovereign is the fountain of
justice, he necessarily delegates the exercise of powers of jurisdiction.
The law is his command, but it is not physically possible for him to enforce
it personally throughout his dominions, or hear all the suits of all his
subjects, without the magistrate as intermediary. It is on the magistrate
rather than on the sovereign that the regular functioning of the
commonwealth depends. Neither the will of the sovereign, nor the law, can
come into operation until the magistrate gives it effect, or as Bodin says,
brings it to life [III, v]. He implies that the magistrate has therefore a
share in sovereign power, though a strictly subordinate one, for he is bound
in obedience to his sovereign, and holds office during pleasure. But because
of its indispensability to the functioning of a state, the office pertains
to the commonwealth and not to the sovereign, who only has the right of the
provision of persons; and when the magistrate is given discretionary powers,
and is not bound to apply the letter of the law automatically, he does so in
right of his office, and not simply as the agent of the sovereign. He
therefore shares the sovereign's responsibility to divine and natural law,
and is bound by the principles of equity in all his independent actions.
So Bodin sums up his account of the government of the commonwealth, 'a state
cannot fail to prosper where the sovereign retains those rights proper to
his majesty, the senate preserves its authority, the magistrates exercise
their legitimate powers, and justice runs its ordinary course'. For a prince
to govern in any other manner is for him to risk becoming a tyrant.
Perhaps an even more serious check on the arbitrary exercise of absolute
power was the obligation of the sovereign to keep his 'covenants' with his
subjects. Bodin deduces this obligation from the subjection of the prince to
divine and natural law. By a 'covenant' he means any law which is the
outcome of an agreement between the sovereign and his subjects. He gives as
illustration the promises of redress of grievances, given to the Cortes by
the Spanish kings on various occasions, in return for a grant of taxation.
All such agreements he thought binding, and he distinguished them from the
laws which proceed from the sole will of the prince and so can be abrogated
by him at pleasure [I, viii]. Moreover his insistence that the prince may
not tax without consent provides occasions tor the making of such covenants,
as his example of the Spanish kings shows.
It is clear then that in a rightly ordered commonwealth, governed according
to the principles of divine and natural law, there is necessarily an
absolute power, but it should not function as an arbitrary one. Much as he
learned from Machiavelli, he did not share his faith in the unfettered rule
of men of ability. His ideal was a state in which, as Harrington would have
said, there is the regiment of laws and not the regiment of men.
At the same time, though in the rightly ordered commonwealth there is the
rule of law, divine, natural, and positive, a political society does not
cease to be a true commonwealth if these conditions are violated. It is
still a true commonwealth if it is characterized by a sovereign power. This
becomes clear when Bodin turns from the consideration of the state to
states, or the various forms in which the state can be embodied. Until the
Italians started comparing the workings of despotisms and popular
governments as they knew them in Italy, no one since ancient times had
thought of analysing the forms that the state can take. It is true that in
the later middle ages knowledge of the Politics familiarized scholars with
Aristotle's six pure types. But since the speculations thus provoked had no
roots in the practical politics of those times, nothing of importance was
added to what Aristotle had to say. The Italians on the other hand confined
themselves to the two types they knew, and did not attempt an exhaustive
analysis of all possible forms. What is remarkable about Bodin's handling of
the theme is that it is both exhaustive and freshly observed. He took the
greatest care to find as exact a description as possible of the actual
situation and therefore, based as it was on individual observation, there
was nothing merely derivative in his account.
He started by reducing Aristotle's six types to three, monarchy, aristocracy
and democracy. because, as he saw, if the existence of a sovereign power is
the mark of a state, this is a matter of fact, and provides no criterion for
distinguishing good and bad states. All that can be distinguished in fact is
the location of sovereign power. With his eye on the actualities of the
situation, he defined aristocracy not as the rule of the few, but the rule
of a minority group, and democracy not as the rule of the many, but the rule
of a majority of the whole body. The mixed constitution, so much admired by
most of Aristotle's readers, especially in the sixteenth century, he
rejected as impossible of existence. That which is absolute cannot be
divided. An absolute power must be unique or it is no power at all [II, i].
Right as he might be in this respect, he would seem to have been sacrificing
one great advantage. Constitutions, especially European constitutions, were
very various. The supposition of mixed constitutions provided a formula for
differentiating a great number of permutations and combinations. Bodin
however solved the problem in another way. In the first place he made a
distinction in the way sovereign power is exercised. Each type can operate
tyrannically as a mere exercise of arbitrary power, regardless of the claims
of justice or the rights of the subject. Or it can operate despotically as
the rightful exercise of an arbitrary power over subjects conquered in a
just war. Or it can operate legitimately in accordance with the principles
of divine and natural law, safeguarding the inherent rights of subjects.
Bodin appears here to be doing what he had just said could not be done,
distinguishing states by a standard of value and not simply by a matter of
fact. It is not only that the terms 'tyrannical' and 'legitimate' imply
condemnation in the one case and approval in the other. In the one the
principles of divine and natural law, which are the mark of the rightly
ordered government, are observed, and in the other they are not. Bodin would
probably have answered that he is not here classing states according to the
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