parties concerned, and conformable to the matters in dispute. ...
As w e have shown, true protection is given where a prince freely
undertakes to defend another without recompense of any kind.
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Nevertheless for the better securing of these treaties of protection or
commendation, it is customary to offer a pension to the protector or
advocate, in the hope that the protector, being bound not only by his
oath, but by the payments received, will be more ready to succour his
adherent when need arises. It is true that the ancients never followed
such a proceeding. But now that honour is w eighed against profit,
protection is sold for money. This is why a Salvian of Marseilles[14]
complains that when the weak seek the protection of the strong, they
have to part with all they have to secure it. One knows what enormous
sums the people of Lucca, Parma, and Siena, and many other towns,
disbursed for their protection.[15] Often enough the pension is paid not
so much to secure oneself against one's enemies, as against the
protector himself. This happened after the battle of Pavia. All the
rulers of Italy turned their attention to the Spaniards, and in order to
buy themselves off from the threat of invasion, put themselves under
their protection. ...
Treaties of protection expose the protected party to much greater risks
than any other kind of alliance, and therefore it is important that the
guarantees should be most carefully considered. For lack of such, how
often has one not seen an obligation to protect transformed into
sovereign rights. He feels safe indeed who commits the sheep to the care
of the wolf. It is therefore in the first instance important that
treaties of protection should be limited in time, even in the case of
aristocracies and popular states where the ruler never dies. For this
reason when Geneva put itself under the protection of Berne, the
citizens did not wish to bind themselves for more than thirty years. The
treaty expired in 1558, when Geneva proposed an alliance with Berne on
equal terms. This was only concluded w ith great difficulty, and only
after a crisis in which the city was nearly brought into subjection
through the machinations of certain citizens who paid the penalty with
their lives ... But the best guarantee for the protected party is to
prevent, if possible, the seizure of the fortresses of their towns by
the troops of the protector and the introduction of his garrisons into
them. The words of the Tribune Brutus to the nobles and people of Rome
should never be forgotten, that the only protection that the weak have
against the strong whom they fear, is that the latter should not be able
to harm them even if they wish to, for the desire to do harm is never
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lacking in ambitious men who have power to inflict it. On these grounds
the Scots were wise when in the treaty which they made in 1559 with the
Queen of England, to secure her protection, they stipulated that the
hostages surrendered should be changed every six months, and that no
fortress should be constructed in Scotland without the consent of the
Scots themselves. ...[16]
Many think that it is safest for a prince to adopt a policy of
neutrality, and so keep out of other people's wars. The principal
argument in support of this view is that whereas loss and expense is
shared in common, the fruits of victory all accrue to the ruler on whose
behalf the quarrel is sustained, added to w hich one must declare oneself
the enemy of princes who have in no way offended one's interests. But he
who remains neutral often finds means to reconcile enemies, and so
remains himself everyone's friend, and receives honours and rewards at
the hands of both parties. If all princes were aligned against one
another in hostile camps, who could compose their differences' And
again, what better w ay is there of maintaining one's state in all its
strength than to stand aside while one's neighbours ruin one another? In
truth, the greatness of a prince largely depends on the decline and fall
of his neighbours, and his strength is measured by other people's
weakness. ...
But the arguments on the other side appear stronger. First of all, in
matters of state one ought always to be either the stronger, or of the
stronger party. There are few exceptions to this rule, whether one is
considering a single commonwealth, or a number of princes. Otherwise one
falls a prey to the whim of the victor ... Without looking further
afield, we have the example of the Florentines. Having abandoned their
alliance with the French royal house, but at the same time refusing to
join the league of the Pope, the Emperor, the Kings of England and of
Spain, they almost immediately felt the evil effects of their
neutrality. Someone may object that it was not open to them to join the
League. That is true. But it was not open to them either to abandon
their obligations to an ally at will, as they did[17] ... One cannot
take up a neutral position if one owes assistance to one of the parties
under some treaty. The only way of remaining neutral without going in
fear of the victor is to secure the consent of the other parties to such
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a course of action. In fact the duchies of Lorraine, Burgundy, and Savoy
maintained their independence so long as they followed a policy of
neutrality. But as soon as the Duke of Savoy took sides with the
Spaniards, the French drove him from his principality.[18] But there is
a great difference in being neutral because the friend of neither party,
and neutral because the ally of both. The latter situation is much the
safer, since one is secure from attack by the victors, and if any
treaties are agreed upon by the contending parties, one is included by
both sides.
If neutrality is to be commended in such a case, it is even more
laudable in a great prince who surpasses all others in power and
dignity. To him falls the honour of being judge and arbiter, for it
always happens that the quarrels between princes are composed by some
common friend, especially by those who stand above all the others in
greatness. In former times many popes, who rightly understood their
office, made it their business to reconcile Christian princes and
thereby win honour and respect, and favours and protection for their own
person and for their office. But those who took sides with one or other
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