Commonwealth

part of the work, where he is concerned with the practice, and not with the 
theory of politics, Bodin moves away from Aristotle. For one thing the great 
difference in political conditions in ancient Greece and in his own times 
meant that there could be little correspondence in the particulars of this 
discussion. The problems were not the same. Moreover there is an urgency in 
Bodin's writing that one does not sense in the Politics. He wanted to 
remedy, not just to analyse, the evils of the times. As he says in the 
Dedication, when the ship of state is in danger of foundering, it behoves 
the very passengers to give what assistance they can, and it is in the hope 
of restoring the ancient splendour of the French monarchy that he has 
undertaken to write on the commonwealth. The theme of what is to be done and 
what avoided becomes more and more insistent as the argument proceeds, and 
altogether dominates the later books.
But as has been said, though France might be his immediate concern, he 
wanted to enlarge his enquiry so as to arrive at a universal science of 
politics. His procedure was the same as that already used in the Method, 
induction from the known relevant facts. He surveyed all the evidence about 
the way the state works, much as Aristotle conducted a preliminary enquiry 
into the constitutions of Greek city states, only he did what Aristotle did 
not do, included all this material in the main work. For Bodin the relevant 
facts were in the first instance all the information he could collect about 
the contemporary world from the dominions of the Grand Turk to the New 
World, and from Sweden to Ethiopia. His sources were those already used for 
the enquiry into universal law, the accounts of travellers and contemporary 
historians such as Leo the African and Francesco Alvarez, Paolo Giovio and 
Las Casas, Machiavelli, Guicciardini and the Venetian constitutional 
historians, Sleidan, Sigismond d'Herberstein and many others. As has been 
shown, this information he checked, supplemented and brought up to date by 
inspecting diplomatic correspondence, and talking with diplomats whenever he 
could.
In the second place the relevant evidence included, he considered, the facts 
of past history. This meant for him, as for all men of the renaissance, 
primarily the ancient world as portrayed by the Greek and Roman historians, 
and he shared the characteristic humanist admiration for its achievements. 

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But he also had a good deal to say about medieval France, and had troubled 
to consult the archives at Rheims, Beauvais and elsewhere. He knew something 
about England, and how the Empire and the Papacy had developed during the 
middle ages. As he had already explained in the Method, the study of history 
is not only the means of discovering the principles of universal law, but 
also of political wisdom. 'For acquiring prudence nothing is more important 
or more essential than history, because episodes in human life recur as in a 
circle, repeating themselves.' It is clear that he regarded history as the 
record of a series of recurrences rather than of a process of change. As 
will appear later, his cosmological system implied that the order of events 
is cyclic and not evolutionary. History therefore is a storehouse of 
immediately relevant examples, mostly of the character of cautionary tales. 
He could in consequence assume that the proper collection and collation of 
these examples would enable one not only to interpret contemporary politics, 
but also to formulate rules for the guidance of statesmen which should have 
a timeless validity, 'reliable maxims for what we should seek and what 
avoid'.
Such use of such material for the building up of the science of politics was 
not original. The resemblance to Machiavelli is too close to be fortuitous. 
Machiavelli's collected works were published in 1550, and Bodin refers to 
the Prince, the Discourses on Livy, and the History of Florence, besides 
basing a chapter [V, v] on the Art of War. In the introduction to the 
Discourses he could find the statement that history is the proper study of 
the statesman because, human nature being constant, men always behave in the 
same way, and therefore the same sequence of cause and effect is always 
repeating itself. One learns by the experience of others. In the Prince and 
the Discourses he could see Machiavelli applying this principle by regularly 
juxtaposing examples of what he was discussing taken first from ancient and 
then from contemporary history, deducing general conclusions, and so 
proceeding to frame general maxims. Bodin took over the method but vastly 
extended the scope. He thought Machiavelli's survey too restricted to allow 
of conclusions universally valid, and complained that he was very ignorant 
of many things because he had not read a sufficiency of good books, nor 
acquainted himself with any peoples but the Italians. Hence what appears to 
be Bodin's prolixity. It was a consequence of the extent of the field he 
surveyed, and, it must be admitted, his inability to condense or select.
The science of politics, like any other science, is shaped by the questions 
asked, and for which an answer is sought. Here again Machiavelli suggested 
some, though not always all the most important, questions asked. Ought 
princes to keep the terms of the treaties they made? Should they aim at 
being rather loved or feared by their subjects' Is it expedient to arm one's 
subjects and train them for war? But here the resemblance ends. It is an 
indication of the fundamental difference in values between the two men that 

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the answers are always different where morals are concerned. If Machiavelli 
holds that a prince is only bound to keep a treaty when it furthers his 
interests, Bodin says he must do so if the interests of the other party to 
the treaty are at stake [I, viii]. If Machiavelli argues that a prince 
should rely on fear to keep his subjects obedient and in awe, Bodin thinks 
that he should win their affection because friendship and not interest is 
the bond of society [IV, vi].
It is clear from these instances that for Bodin the science of politics was 
not just a study of the technique of successful government as it was for 
Machiavelli. He borrowed the method of investigation, but he strongly 
reprehended the lack of regard for moral principles, and in the Dedication 
classed Machiavelli with the apologists of the right of rebellion, as the 
writers whose doctrines had caused the ruin of commonwealths in his own day. 
He had as clear a vision as the Italian of what states are like, and of how 
men conduct themselves politically. But unlike the Italian he always 
measured them by an absolute standard of right to which they ought to 
conform. Therefore for him the examination of things as they are did not 
cover the whole enquiry necessary. An historical survey can be made to yield 
conclusions about what are politically expedient ways and means, but he did 
not think it was capable of determining the ends to which those ways and 
means should be directed. He rejected the notion that one can arrive at a 
true conception of the proper order in human affairs by considering things 
merely as they are. This comes out in his discussion of slavery [I, v]. He 
will not allow that it can be defended as a natural institution simply 
because it has always existed among men. It is the work of sin, not of 
nature, and condemned as such by Jew, Christian, and Mohammedan alike.
This is indicative of his whole approach to politics. His values are as 
traditional as was his cosmology. He thought of the natural order as 
contained within an eternal order comprehending the universe and all