Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

GMT index of political independence for transition economies (1996) 

 

G1 G2 B3 B4 B5 R6 R7 C8 C9 

Index 

Belarus 

* * *    *      4 

Bulgaria 

*  *    * * *  5 

Croatia 

* * * *    * * *    7 

Czech 

Republic 

** * * * * * * *    9 

Georgia 

** 

* * *  *  *  7 

Hungary 

 *    *  * *  4 

Kyrgystan 

** 

   *   *  4 

Latvia 

* * * * *    * *    7 

Poland

10

 

** 

* *  * *  *  7 

Romania 

 *  *  * * *  5 

Russia 

**  *  *    * * 6 

Slovak 

Republic 

 *  * * * * *  6 

Slovenia 

** * * *    * * *    8 

Ukraine 

*  *    *      3 

Source: See Appendix 

Notes: 

G1: Governor not appointed by the government (*) and not appointed by the Parliament only (**) 

G2: Governor appointed for more than 5 years 

B3: none of the Board appointed by the government 

B4: Board appointed for more than 5 years 

B5: Provisions for Governor's dismissal non-political only 

R6: no mandatory government representative in the Board 

R7: government/parliament approval of monetary policy is not required 

C8: statutory responsibility to pursue monetary stability 

C9: presence of legal provision supporting Bank in conflicts with the government 

 

The index of political independence, to avoid arbitrariness, is a sum of the 

elements in the table. Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovenia have the most 

                                              

10

 In Eijffinger and van Keulen (1995) the “G1” variable for Poland (Governor not appointed by 

the government) was given no asterisk. 

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