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Today both nationalism and cosmopolitanism
are testing the very definition of allegiance
to one’s country.
The Journal
reports that
Kim Jong Un’s
authorized bi-
ography is out
and a Korean-
language edi-
tion has been
uploaded
to
the web. The
authors are,
u n s u r p r i s -
ingly, bullish on Mr. Kim. The
closing section (“Spinning the
World Under the Axis of Sov-
ereignty and Justice”) hails
Mr. Kim’s summits with lead-
ers including Donald Trump,
Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and
South Korea’s President Moon
Jae-in. Summing it up, the au-
thors gush that “there has
never been a time when all
the world has been this fo-
cused on our people’s great-
ness and dignity in our 5,000-
year history.”
They are not wrong. North
Korea, with a gross domestic
product estimated at less than
$26 billion and a population
of 26 million, punches well
above its weight. Kim Jong Un
doesn’t see himself as the
crackpot leader of a failed
state. He sees himself as a
winner,
the
uncontested
leader of a tiny state that by
ruthless dedication has forced
the greatest powers in the
world to deal with it as an
equal.
As another American ad-
ministration struggles with
the difficult and thankless
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Korea?
task of developing a
North Korea strat-
egy, the Biden team
needs to understand
that even severe
sanctions are un-
likely to work. For
years sanctions pro-
ponents have ar-
gued that if the U.S.
could only get full
Chinese
coopera-
tion, North Korea
would
have
no
choice but to accept
some kind of denu-
clearization process.
This is unlikely. China, an-
noyed as it often is by North
Korea’s unpredictable and dis-
ruptive approach to politics,
would never agree to sanc-
tions stringent enough to risk
destabilizing a neighboring
country. More important, the
Kims are not easily swayed by
economic pressure. In an ef-
fort to contain Covid, Pyong-
yang has voluntarily imposed
an isolation on itself far more
devastating than sanctions
ever could be. Trade with
China is down 80%. GDP is
down an estimated 10%. Grain
production is slated to fall one
million tons below the 5.5 mil-
lion tons required to feed its
populace. Major factories have
closed due to shortages of
spare parts, and blackouts are
widespread.
Despite all this, the govern-
ment is signaling its determi-
nation to stand fast until the
pandemic ends. Not for the
first time, Pyongyang is dem-
onstrating that it will impose
massive suffering on its popu-
lation to pursue its goals. Per-
haps this determination would
crack in the face of even direr
conditions, but a mass famine
did not force the regime to
abandon its nuclear program
in the 1990s. Sanctions alone,
however severe, will not bring
this country to heel.
Pyongyang doesn’t only
shrug off sticks; it turns up its
nose at carrots. For more than
a generation, Chinese leaders
have tried to persuade North
Korea to embrace the eco-
nomic policies that have made
China the second largest econ-
omy in the world. South Korea
has repeatedly offered help.
While the Kims occasionally
flirt with minor changes, they
adamantly refuse to introduce
reforms that would put North
Korea on the Asian path to
growth.
From the standpoint of the
Kim dynasty (and that is the
only perspective that matters
in North Korean politics), this
makes sense. A closed com-
mand economy dominated by
the military establishment ce-
ments the dynasty’s absolute
power. Opening the economy
would inevitably dilute the dy-
nasty’s authority by allowing
foreign investors and foreign
ideas to make their presence
felt.
The Kims, it seems clear, do
not want a flourishing civilian
economy. The militarization of
the economy and the perma-
nent scarcity of resources
concentrate power at the cen-
ter. The nuclear-weapons pro-
gram keeps the dy-
nasty
safe
from
foreign
military
pressure,
and
a
world-class system
of repression insu-
lates
the
rulers
from domestic dis-
content. The nu-
clear arsenal leads
anxious foreigners
to court the Kims,
elevating the dy-
nasty’s importance
in its own eyes and
those of its ser-
vants. And in efforts to limit
further progress in the weap-
ons program, foreigners offer
resources that enhance the re-
gime’s power to reward its
supporters.
The human costs are ap-
palling, but if your goals are
to maintain the Kim dynasty’s
total control over the country
and the total independence of
North Korea as a state, the
model demonstrably works.
The Kim dynasty’s strategy
to maintain the status quo at
home is deeply destabilizing
internationally. Between en-
hancing its nuclear arsenal,
improving its missile delivery
systems and experimenting
with unconventional weapons
ranging from cyber to bio,
North
Korea
becomes
a
steadily greater concern. And
as the situation in the Indo-
Pacific becomes more volatile,
the danger that North Korean
actions could launch a wider
war can only grow.
For all these reasons, the
Biden administration would
like to persuade or constrain
North Korea to change course.
But unless it can shake Kim
Jong Un’s conviction that his
strategy is a brilliant success,
the Biden administration, like
its predecessors, has no win-
ning cards in its hand.
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