Spotlight on Uzbekistan
153
However the lingering suspicion remains that, as Kristian Lasslett argues, while ‘modest
accommodations have also been made to civil society by the Mirziyoyev government this appears to
be driven more by reputational concerns that impact on investor/business confidence, rather than a
conversion to liberal politics.’ Mirziyoyev’s desire to project a pro-business image, his connections to
leading business people and nascent privatisation efforts have created new opportunities for
politically connected individuals. He has also used this business elite influence to help solidify his
power base against pressures from the old security elite. So how Uzbekistan addresses this emerging
challenge will be critical to the overall success of the reform process. If the next few years merely see
a reshuffling of political and economic power to new elites, under the cover of rhetoric about the
reforms, it will create new structural problems and ultimately undermine how the ‘new’ Uzbekistan
is seen around the world.
Corruption, criminalising gay people and forced labour (despite real progress on the latter) are still
major drags on Uzbekistan’s international image. The new freedoms, particularly in terms of
freedom of speech have created a space for ‘constructive criticism’, where government delivery and
the performance of officials and legislation can broadly be criticised. However, the ability of powerful
figures to apply informal pressure or action in the civil courts remains and certain topics including
harsh criticism of the President is still off limits. Under this approach of ‘managed freedom’ the
Government may be more responsive but it is not accountable, other than to the limits imposed by
public opinion in a country still slowly emerging from the heavy hand of Karimov.
The response to recent crises, both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Sardoba Dam collapse, have
highlighted the successes and failings of the new system. Decisive initial activity which helped control
the virus spread and evacuate those displaced by the flood; a flurry of slightly disjointed regulatory
and financial measures (though Uzbekistan is far from alone in this) were put in place that helped
provide some economic stabilisation; extraordinary new powers (particularly on freedom of
movement and assembly) have been used more responsibly than they would have been under
Karimov but with still some abuse at the local level; a reticence to be open to past failings (in the
case of Sardoba); and innovations such as the Sakhovat va Komak (‘Generosity and Assistance’) fund
that have delivered important benefits to the worst affected by the crisis but have facilitated old
habits around enforced or pressured participation in this national effort. In the difficult times ahead
the Government will need to take further steps to make itself more accountable to the public and
more effective in its operation to minimise the risk of social unrest as the country tries to put the
economy back on track whilst absorbing large numbers of workers returning from Russia.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: