Yerevan
Mysteries of the East
I N 1 9 0 5 , A
journalist named Luigi Villari was captivated by a small
city in the Caucasus with twenty-eight thousand inhabitants and an
abundance of Eastern charm:
[T]he vaulted passages themselves, redolent of all the mysteries of the
East, with their dark curtained shops, the crowds of Tartars clad in
long blue tunics, and the green turbans of the mullahs passing up and
down, are very attractive. In one small open room I came upon a
teacher imparting religious instruction to about a dozen little boys;
he was droning out his lesson in a sing-song, monotonous voice, sway
ing to and fro. In another den a barber was shaving a victim to his last
hair. At every turn were coffee and tea stalls, but those strange and de
licious sweetmeats of the East which I had tasted at Constantinople
and Sarajevo were not to be found. In queer galleries and tiny courts
huge ungainly camels were reposing. Then through the foul-smelling
bazar you come out suddenly on the great mosque called the Gok
Djami.
1
The city was Yerevan. At the time it had a mixed Armenian and Mus
lim population, a Russian governor, and a thoroughly Middle Eastern
atmosphere. For several centuries, Yerevan had been an outpost of the
Persian empire, and when Villari visited it had been under Russian ad-
ministration for less then eighty years. The city became the Armeni
ans’ capital almost by default. “Many Armenians regard Van as their
capital city,” wrote another traveler, William Eleroy Curtis, who came
to Yerevan five years after Villari, in 1910.
2
He was referring to the city
in Turkish Armenia to the south, but he might have added the Geor
gian capital Tiflis to the north, which had a large and wealthy Armen
ian population.
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With its straight roads and square buildings in deep red granite and
tufa, modern Yerevan feels like a Soviet town. It has turned into a fully
Armenian city, but its more-than-human scale and tidiness seem at
odds with the quirkier side of the Armenian character. Only in summer,
when people invade its parks to sit in cafés, drink coffee, and hold ani
mated conversation, is the city more domesticated. All the wide av
enues lead to the circular neoclassical Opera House. It was here in 1988
in Theater Square, dotted with the statues of composers, that the Arme
nians turned the monumental scale of the city to their advantage, using
the square as the stage for their million-strong rallies—and appropri
ately the Armenian word for glasnost, hraparakainutiun, comes from the
word for “square,” hraparak. Since 1988, however, Yerevan has been hit
by an energy crisis, war, and the drain of emigration. Its residents com
plain that a once lively city has become dull and spiritless.
One day I stepped out of the mayhem of Yerevan’s Mashtots Av
enue into a quiet courtyard to seek out a remnant of old Yerevan, the
building Villari called “the great mosque called the Gok Djami.” It was
still opposite the main bazaar, now a closed hangar in front of which
country folk were sitting and selling flat discs of unleavened bread,
tomatoes, and sheaves of tarragon. In the courtyard, at the far end of a
serene rectangular pool overhung with mulberry trees, glimmered a
sheet of tiles: the outer wall of the eighteenth-century mosque.
The architect Grigor Nalbandian led me on a tour of the site. Apart
from a couple of moustachioed Iranian workers chipping away with
chisels at blocks of stone, we were the only people around. Nalbandian
has been supervising the restoration of the mosque complex in a joint
venture of Armenia and Iran, two countries that, despite religious dif
ferences, are political allies. The mosque walls had been restored with
Armenian red brick and faced with Persian turquoise tiles. We took off
our shoes to go into the echoing interior, whose floor had just been re-
laid with Isfahan marble. It was entirely empty; the only regular wor
shippers here are the dozen or so diplomats from the Iranian Embassy.
This strange quiet oasis in the middle of Yerevan is all that remains of
the city’s Persian period.
Yerevan has ancient archaeological remains at the old city of Ere
buni, suggesting that Armenians have lived there for centuries. But be-
tween the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries Armenian cultural and re
ligious life was centered on Echmiadzin, the seat of the head of the
church, the Catholicos, ten miles to the west. Yerevan, the capital of a
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75
khanate, was basically a Muslim city that contained no large churches
but had six mosques. When the Russians conquered Eastern Armenia in
1827, there were only twenty-five thousand Armenians living in the
Yerevan region, outnumbered by a much larger Muslim population.
3
The nineteenth-century city acquired a more Armenian character as
the Russians settled thousands of new Armenian immigrants from Tur
key and Persia there, but even in the 1870s, Yerevan had only around
twelve thousand inhabitants. It was far smaller than Shusha, and Ar
menian migrant workers were far more likely to seek their fortunes in
Baku.
4
What made Yerevan the city that it now is, was another, far bigger
wave of migrants. In 1915–1918, perhaps a quarter of the Armenian
population of Turkish Anatolia fled north to eastern Armenia, escaping
the massacres and deportations by Turks and Kurds. Perhaps one mil-
lion Armenians died in the massacres, which are incomparably the
greatest tragedy of Armenian history. Armenians call them the mets egh
ern, the “great slaughter”; in English, they are customarily called the Ar
menian Genocide.
5
From 1918 to 1920, Yerevan was the capital of the
briefly independent first republic of Armenia and the main refuge for
hundreds of thousands Armenians fleeing Anatolia. In 1920, it became
the capital of Soviet Armenia. When the writer Arthur Koestler visited
Yerevan in 1932, as a Jew, he was reminded of the new Jewish settle
ments in Palestine:
The enthusiasm, the muddle, the errors and bad taste which ac
companied the fever of construction were all touching and familiar re
minders. Here, too, drab, cheap, ugly utilitarian buildings were su
perseding the charming, colourful and filthy Orient. Erivan, too, was
an informal and chaotic pioneer-town, the unfinished streets, between
half-finished buildings, a labyrinth of pipes and cables. There were as
yet so few telephones that calls were made by asking the exchange for
the name, and not the number of the subscriber. Familiar, above all,
was the Babel of languages, for a sizeable part of the population were
refugees and immigrants from Turkey, Armenia, Europe and America.
It often happened that, when I asked my way from a passer-by in halt
ing Russian, the answer was given in fluent German or French. The
town had a lively and well-informed intelligentsia whose political ori
entation, in contrast to Tiflis, was very friendly towards Russia and the
Soviet regime.
6
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Modern Armenia grew in the shadow of the great catastrophe of 1915.
To make a simplification, if twentieth-century Azerbaijan’s most urgent
task was to construct a “nation,” Armenia had a quite different chal
lenge: it had an identifiable nation that was scattered across the world
but no state. The Soviet Republic of Armenia was built to fit this role
and become a new Armenian homeland. With its Opera House, Na
tional Gallery, museum of ancient manuscripts known as the Mate
nadaran, Yerevan thus became a repository of Armenian myths and
hopes. Koestler called it “a kind of Tel Aviv, where the survivors of an-
other martyred nation gathered to construct a new home.”
7
On the early afternoon of 24 April 2000, I joined the crowds walking up
to the Genocide Memorial of Tsitsernakaberd on the western side of
Yerevan. We moved in a slow, thirty-people-wide torrent up the broad
paved path, as the anguished brass-laded music of the composer Komi
tas played over loudspeakers. Since 1967, Armenians have marked
Genocide Day on the anniversary of the day in 1915 when Armenian in
tellectuals were arrested and then murdered in Istanbul.
It was a family occasion. The crowds climbing the hill were un
solemn, chatting and taking photographs. They carried spikes of tulip
and florid bunches of lilac, their tips pointing downward. There was no
sign of the dignitaries who had laid their wreaths earlier in the day. Our
progress up the hill was slow, yet my friends were struck only by how
modest the turnout was. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, literally the
whole of the city had taken part in this ceremony. “Ten years ago this
was a big thing for all of us,” said Tigran. “You moved ten yards or so
and then stopped and waited. And then moved on. It took four or five
hours”
We reached the top of the hill. On our left was a long gray wall en-
graved with the names of the cities whose Armenian communities had
been wiped out: Kars, Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and so on. Ahead stood
the memorial: twelve vast shields of gray basalt, each standing for a vi
layat, or Turkish province, lean inward toward a central bowl, sunk in
the ground, inside of which a fire was burning. We laid our flowers on
a waist-high bank of red and white petals that was rising from the rim
of the bowl. Then we came out on to another broad flight of steps that
descended into the city. Before us, the great white cone of Mount Ararat
was spread over the entire horizon, and it seemed as though the de-
signers of the memorial had deliberately planned this view and this de-
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77
scent. The sight of Ararat has come to be another symbol of loss for Ar
menians, for it now lies out of bounds in Turkey.
Something was different in the air in Yerevan for the rest of Geno
cide Day, but it took a while for me to realize that it was the background
musical hum of the city. For this day only the radio stations, turned up
full blast in every taxi and café, had forgone their diet of tinny Russian
pop music and were playing Armenian tunes. The wail of the duduk, the
Armenian pipe, sounded out. Armenia shed its Soviet identity for a day
and assumed a much more alluring Middle Eastern garb.
The lack of big official ceremonies or public meetings on 24 April
made the commemorations more dignified, but this perhaps also re
flected the priority the modern population of Armenia put on the Geno
cide. So many other issues—from Karabakh to economic survival—had
intervened in people’s lives that it seemed that the events of 1915 had
ceased to be a collective defining principle for modern Armenians. My
friend Tigran offered another thought: Victory over Azerbaijan, he said,
had altered the previous fixed self-image of Armenians as “the noble
victim.” This time, after all, they had won, and others had lost. How can
you remain “the weeping nation” when you have inflicted a defeat on
your neighbor?
Yet for the wider Armenian world, the 1915 Genocide still largely
defines what it means to be Armenian. This is not so surprising, given
that the Armenian Diaspora, especially in the United States and France,
comprises mainly the descendants of people who fled Eastern Anatolia
after 1915. Since the 1950s, Diaspora groups have focused huge energies
and spent millions of dollars trying to make Turkey admit that it com
mitted genocide against the Armenians and other countries, to recog
nize the massacres as such.
To the surprise of many, Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Pet
rosian, deliberately chose not to make 1915 a political issue. The closure
of the Armenian-Turkish border in 1993 and the lack of diplomatic rela
tions were a result of the Karabakh dispute, rather than the quarrel over
1915. Ter-Petrosian’s successor, Robert Kocharian, also sidestepped the
“genocide” issue at first. Then, in 2000, he began lobbying around the
world for the recognition of the massacres as “genocide.” The European
Parliament and the French Senate passed resolutions calling the 1915
massacres “genocide.” The U.S. Congress was about to follow their ex-
ample when a telephone call from President Bill Clinton, worried about
the Turkish reaction, persuaded Congress to suspend the motion.
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The parliamentary resolutions in Europe enraged Turkey, which
canceled several French commercial contracts. Turkey’s version of
events is that the 1915 massacres were far smaller in scale than the Ar
menians allege and occurred during a civil war at the end of the Ot
toman Empire, in which both Turks and Armenians died. In Turkish na
tional ideology, the events thus have a very different resonance: the Ar
menians are perceived as the fifth column of the Great Powers, who
were seeking to destroy the new Turkish state in its infancy.
Amid the mutual recriminations, a few brave attempts have been
made to start a Turkish-Armenian dialogue about what really hap
pened. A Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Committee was formed in
2001 but was much criticized in both countries. In 2000, Turkish and
Armenian historians met and corresponded. They were not helped by
the fact that access to both the Ottoman archives from the period re
lating to the massacres and the archives of the Armenian Dashnak
government of 1918–1920 are restricted to a small handful of favored
scholars.
In this cacophonous atmosphere, I was impressed by the argument
of the Armenian historian Gerard Libaridian, who was also President
Ter-Petrosian’s chief foreign policy adviser, that to politicize the “geno
cide issue” was to demean it. Once the issue became political, he said, it
became an imperative for both sides to stick to intransigent positions,
rather than engage in intelligent debate. “It seems that in the battle for
and against recognition, both sides appear to be repeating the logic of
the past in order to justify it,” Libaridian wrote. “The tail ends of the
two rejectionist positions—comprehensive rejection of the other—seem
to be feeding off each other.”
8
Much of the discussion of the issue was less about history than a
visceral assertion of victimhood vis-à-vis one’s neighbors. Armenians’
perception that they had been destroyed in 1915 had a strong resonance
in 1988, when the Nagorny Karabakh dispute began. “Fear of being de
stroyed, and destroyed not as a person, not individually, but destroyed
as a nation, fear of genocide, is in every Armenian,” Lyudmila Haru
tiunian, a well-known Armenian sociologist told me. “It is impossible
to remove it.”
9
Harutiunian made the point that in colloquial speech,
most Armenians call both Turks and Azerbaijanis “Turks” and make no
distinction between them. In 1988, the “Turkish threat” of 1915 was
therefore transposed onto the Azerbaijanis and a memorial to the vic
tims of the Sumgait pogroms was put up on Tsitsernakaberd hill near
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79
the Genocide memorial. But when Armenians committed acts of vio
lence against Azerbaijanis, Harutiunian said, many in Armenia refused
to believe they had happened. “Armenians responded with approxi
mately the same methods [as the Azerbaijanis], but the Armenians’ his
torical memory does not have a basis for that.”
War changed the nature of the debate. In 2000, with the Nagorny
Karabakh dispute unresolved, it was inevitable that Azerbaijan would
get involved in the Genocide controversy. In October 2000, President
Aliev declared: “In history there was never such a thing as the ‘Ar
menian genocide,’ and even if there had been, it would be wrong to
raise the matter after 85 years.”
10
After its defeat and suffering at the
hands of the Armenians, Aliev wanted to assert Azerbaijan’s right to
victimhood too.
Yerevan has many secrets. One of them, I believed, lay among a jumble
of garages, outhouses, and vegetable plots behind a tall apartment
block at No. 22 Vardanants Street, not far from the city center. At the top
of a narrow flight of steps was a small open space, surrounded by rusty
green garages and piled with bricks and sand. Here, I was pretty sure,
had been a mosque, used by Yerevan’s Azerbaijanis, that had had the
misfortune not to be classified as “Persian” and was demolished.
The space was so miserable and empty that I wondered if I was in
the right spot. At the foot of the steps, an old woman in a floral dress,
sitting on a camp stool with a cloth laid on the ground before her, was
selling grapes, beans, and onions. She had a swarthy face and drop ear-
rings; it looked as though she came in from the countryside every day
to sell fruit and vegetables. “Was there ever a mosque up there?” I asked
her, pointing up the steps. Yes, she answered, there had been.
“What happened to it?”
“We didn’t touch it till the last day, after they destroyed the Ar
menian church in Baku.” She seemed to mean the beginning of 1990.
“But why did they knock it down?”
“Why leave it?” she shrugged. “We are Christians, they are Mus
lims. When there were problems with Azerbaijan, our Armenians came
and destroyed it in three days. They brought a special machine, I don’t
know what it’s called, which goes like this . . .” She made a flat rolling
motion with the palm of her hand, miming the path of a bulldozer.
I said, tentatively, that a building shouldn’t be made to suffer for the
actions of people.
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“Yes, walls aren’t to blame,” the woman agreed. “But they fight
against everything. What’s left for the people? What kind of life is
that?” Her words didn’t make sense, but I guessed that the “they” she
was talking about had nothing to do with the mosque.
11
That the Armenians could erase an Azerbaijani mosque inside their
capital city was made easier by a linguistic sleight of hand: the Azer
baijanis of Armenia can be more easily written out of history because
the name “Azeri” or “Azerbaijani” was not in common usage before the
twentieth century. In the premodern era, these people were generally
referred to as “Tartars,” “Turks,” or simply “Muslims.” Yet they were
neither Persians nor Turks; they were Turkic-speaking Shiite subjects of
the Safavid Dynasty of the Iranian Empire—in other words, the ances
tors of people whom we would now call “Azerbaijanis.” So when the
Armenians refer to the “Persian mosque” in Yerevan, that name ob
scures the fact that most of the worshippers there, when it was built in
the 1760s, would have been, in effect, Azerbaijanis.
In modern-day Armenia these basic facts are simply not known.
But that Armenia was home to many Turkic-speaking Muslims would
have seemed only natural to one Armenian national hero, the great
eighteenth-century troubadour Sayat-Nova, after whom one of Yere
van’s big avenues is named. Born in Armenia, he trained as a monk in
the monastery of Sanahin but became a poet at the court of the Georgian
king Irakli II in Tiflis. Sayat-Nova composed verse in Armenian, Azeri,
Georgian, and Persian (one of his most famous poems moves between
all four). The majority of his surviving ballads are in Azeri, which was
the lingua franca of the Caucasus at that time.
Yet by the twentieth century the Azerbaijanis people, who had lived
in eastern Armenia for centuries, had become its silent guests, margin
alized and discriminated against. The Armenians asserted their right to
their homeland at the expense of these people. In 1918–1920, tens of
thousands of Azerbaijanis were expelled from Zangezur. In the 1940s,
tens of thousands more were deported to Azerbaijan to make way for
incoming Armenian immigrants from the Diaspora. The last cleansing,
in 1988–1989, got rid of the rest.
If modern Armenians remember their former Azerbaijani neigh
bors, it is generally as farmers. They say you could always rely on them
to sell the best quality fruit and vegetables in the markets. Yet many
were also well-to-do townsfolk whose descendants form a powerful po
litical community in exile in Azerbaijan. They are known as the Yeraz, or
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81
“Yerevan Azerbaijanis.” A prominent Yeraz, the former presidential ad
viser Eldar Namazov, told me that his grandfather had been a merchant
who owned large parts of what is now the city’s National Park. His fam
ily was forced to leave Armenia in 1947. “In our family there were al
ways many tales of what the Armenians did to the Azerbaijanis in the
city of Yerevan,” Namazov reminisced. “I had many relatives who died
at the beginning of the century during the slaughter of Azerbaijanis
in the city of Yerevan and very many of our relatives died during the
deportations.”
12
Officially, there are now around eight thousand Azerbaijanis in Ar
menia. In reality, the figure must be much lower; there are perhaps only
a few hundred left, mostly pensioners. And yet Yerevan has many Azer
baijanis in it every day, driving their trucks into the city, buying fruit
and vegetables and selling cheap consumer goods or washing powder
in the markets. How so? They are actually Iranian Azerbaijanis, for
whom Armenia is a profitable market. Their gaudily colored trucks,
with bright snub-nosed orange cabs and green and blue tarpaulins,
crawl along Armenia’s roads to virtually captive buyers in the land-
locked republic. Perception is everything. Iran is a friendly neighbor,
and the drivers, although Azerbaijani by language and ethnicity, are
Iranian citizens—the living equivalent, you might say, of the “Persian
mosque.” They are easily tolerated by Armenians, who do good busi
ness with them.
The Iranian Azerbaijanis are not numerous. It would need Arme
nia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan to reopen for Yerevan to re-
cover its former dynamism—the kind of business and bustle that Villari
found so attractive in 1905. But in the year 2000 that seemed a remote
prospect. The tortuous postwar geography of the Caucasus, with all its
closed borders and front lines, made Moscow or Los Angeles closer to
Yerevan than Erzerum or Baku. The Eastern bazaar was still closed.
6
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