188
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the traditional model of direct democracy – the
general assembly – is but another manifestation of forcing consensus and unitary decisions on
plural people. As we have already seen, “the moment of decision” – whether it is reached by
majoritarian, proportion, or modified- consensus procedures (the latter being the procedure
utilized by most generally assemblies during the 2011 occupations) – cannot help but smother
difference and plurality by requiring that a single decision be reached. If the occupations have
indeed provided a testing ground for alternative models
of democracy, then it is worth
considering whether the model of democracy employed in the occupations themselves
reproduces the same dynamics that have rendered state-based democracy so thoroughly
undemocratic. In essence, the general assembly shares with the state-centric model of
democracy a drive toward reaching singular decisions and enforcing uniformity on an inherently
heterogeneous people. Though the city-wide general assembly brings people (those that
participate anyway) closer to the exercise of sovereign power than the state does, it nonetheless
is still premised upon sovereignty and unanimity. While “unanimous direct democracy…
is
a
genuine solution to the problem of autonomy and authority” (Wolff 1970, 27) it is, as I and
others
have already shown, an impossible and oppressive ideal in a pluralistic world.
As such, radical democracy should not be equated with the traditional ideal of direct democracy:
the one big meeting in which all the people deliberate and decide. My contention is that direct
democracy – insofar as it is equated with a single general assembly – falls well short of the
democratic ideal.
Direct democracy is not democratic enough!
Consider the perspective of anti-
authoritarian elements within the Barcelona occupation of the
Indignados
movement.
It inevitably recreates the specialists, centralization, and exclusion we associate
with existing democracies. Within four days…the experiment in direct democracy
was already rife with false and
manipulated consensus, silenced minorities,
189
increasing abstention from voting, and domination by specialists and internal
politicians (Crimethinc 2011).
In essence, direct democracy replicates the core features of statist democracy: the aim is to
legitimize the centralization of power and the corresponding imposition of unity. Rather than
acting as wellspring for collective action, it was a legitimation-machine that suppressed
creativity and diversity.
The central assembly did not give birth to one single initiative. What it did, rather,
was to grant legitimacy to initiatives worked out in the commissions; but this
process must not be portrayed in positive terms. This granting of legitimacy was
in fact a robbing of the legitimacy of all the decisions
made in the multiple spaces
throughout the plaza not incorporated into an official commission. Multiple times,
self-appointed representatives of this or that commission tried to suppress
spontaneous initiatives that did not bear their stamp of legitimacy. At other times,
commissions, moderators, and internal politicians specifically contravened
decisions made in the central assembly, when doing so would favor further
centralization…
…Again and again in the plaza, we saw a correlation between [direct democracy]
and the paranoia of control: the need for all decisions and initiatives to pass
through
a central point, the need to make the chaotic activity of a multitudinous
occupation legible from a single vantage point—the control room, as it were. This
is a statist impulse. The need to impose legibility on a social situation—and social
situations are always chaotic—is shared by the democracy activist, who wishes to
impose a brilliant new organizational structure; the tax collector, who needs all
economic activity to be visible so it can be reappropriated; and the policeman,
who desires a panopticon in order to control and punish.
The dichotomy between representative and direct democracy is not, therefore, analogous to the
dichotomy between centralization and decentralization – both
forms of democracy are
centralizing. If there is to be a decentralized form of democracy, it is through networks.
Networks are not relevant simply because they make coordination possible on a large scale as
others have argued, though that is surely still important. They are important because they foster
decentralized organization and, in doing so, disperse power. “It is a question of mode, not scale”
(Crimethinc 2011). The goal is neither to “scale-up” direct democracy to the global level, or
190
“scale-down” direct democracy to the neighborhood level. Rather, the
objective is to foster an
alternative model of organization at all levels.
But what does network democracy look like in the smaller and more local context of an
occupation, rather than the (oddly more familiar) context of transnational movements or the
global “day of action”? Theorizing network democracy in the context of an occupation means
rejecting the goal of having one central assembly in which all can participate. This is not a
rejection of assemblies, as such, but the general assembly, in particular. We, instead, would have
many different assemblies working on more specific issues, many different groups engaging in a
variety of projects. The core insight here is that not everyone has to get together,
deliberate and
decide on every issue in order for democracy to be in place. I again take inspiration from anti-
authoritarians in Barcelona.
Like all states, [direct] democracy is based on the centralization and
monopolization of decisionmaking…Imagine [instead] a
Placa de Cataluna
with
diverse assemblies, where everyone could launch initiatives without going
through a centralized and stagnant meeting, thus letting everyone experience
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
