Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

arbitrarily
. Interference is arbitrary when it is 
chosen or rejected without consideration of the interest or opinions of those 
affected. An agent may dominate another, however, without every interfering 
with that person. Domination consists in standing in a set of relations which 
makes an agent 
able
to interfere arbitrarily with the actions of others. 

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Freedom on this view is not the same as non-interference for two reasons. First, a person may be 
unfree if they are never actually interfered with and it is the power to interfere, rather than the 
interference itself that presents the primary normative problem. Second, a free person may 
experience interference; in other words, not all interference is a source of unfreedom. 
Thus when a person has a personal or institutional power that makes him or her 
able to interfere with my action arbitrarily, I am not free, even if in fact the 
dominating agent has not directly interfered with my actions. Conversely, a 
person whose actions are interfered with for the sake of reducing or eliminating 
such relations of domination is not unfree…It is appropriate for governing agents 
to interfere in actions in order to promote institutions that minimize domination.
Interference is not arbitrary if its purpose is to minimize domination, and it if it is 
done in a way that takes the interests and voices of affected persons into account 
(
ibid
.). 
It is worth pointing out an inconsistency between two formulations of “arbitrariness” in the 
above definitions. In the first paragraph, interference is arbitrary if it does not take into 
“consideration” the “interest and opinions of those affected.” In the second paragraph, 
interference is arbitrary if it is not done for the “the sake of reducing or eliminating…relations of 
domination.” These are two very different principles. On the one hand, the first formulation is 
exceptionally weak protection against interference: all an interfering agent has to do is 
“consider” the effects of the interference on the affected parties. I can certainly consider a 
person’s interests and still act against them. On the other hand, it conflicts with the second 
formulation, since presumably many people who enjoy positions of domination would strongly 
object to measures that reduce their position of domination. Such interference seems clearly to 
be against that person’s interests, since presumably they would prefer to maintain their position 
of domination, or, in Hayek’s (2007, 72) words, their “antisocial privileges.” For these reasons, I 
think the second formulation is much clearer: interference is not arbitrary and thus compatible 

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with freedom, when the interference is done to reduce or eliminate relationships of domination, 
so long as the dominating party’s interest and voice are still taken into account.
As Pettit (2001, 141) suggests, however… 
…There is a paradox lurking here…No one can be given [freedom] as a gift from 
others who are powerful enough to be able to withhold it. Let some others have 
that sort of power and nothing they do can effectively transfer such control. The 
only way for a person to enjoy discursive control is to command it: to be powerful 
enough in relation to others for the denial of such control…to be impossible or 
excessively costly for others. 
In other words, Pettit sees that non-dominating relationships cannot be 
given
by the dominating 
agent for the simple reason that if the dominating agent is powerful enough to “give” freedom 
from someone, they are powerful enough to take it away. Power inequalities between people 
cannot be resolved by the powerful imposing restrictions on themselves or affording rights to the 
less powerful, for what is to stop the powerful from willy-nilly removing the restrictions or 
ignoring the rights? This is an absolutely crucial insight, one that turns out to be central to the 
anti-authoritarian perspective presented in the remainder of the dissertation. In the next chapter, 
I will explore the anti-authoritarian analysis of power and uncover why anti-authoritarians are 
much less sanguine about checks on state power than are liberals and, more importantly, see how 
anti-authoritarian theorists seek to organize society in ways that mobilize power against its 
centralization. In short, I will develop an account of “centrifugal power” as a mechanism for 
preventing the rise of dominating relationships. Then, in the following chapter, I will more 
directly respond to the paradox that Pettit identifies above: freedom as non-domination is not 
something that can be given, it must be taken. I will argue that the anarchist practice of direct 
action exemplifies this dynamic: to undo domination, the dominated must literally change the 
“distribution” of power in society through actions that amplify and assert their power. 

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For now, let me focus on the task at hand: Freedom as non-domination should be 
appealing to libertarians because it seems to overcome freedom as non-interference’s basic 
problems. It does not make problematic (indeed, impossible) ontological assumptions about 
independence, but instead is compatible with humans as entangled and interdependent beings. It 
does not justify the oppressive social relationships necessary to sustain an illusion of 
independence, nor does it condemn those who are clearly dependent to a condition of being 
incapable or unworthy of freedom. Finally, it avoids the problem that a view of freedom based 
on self-sovereignty is ultimately self-defeating principle, for all save the sovereign (or the 
egoist). 
Whereas freedom as non-interference implies a model of self-determination as 
independence, freedom as non-domination implies a model of self-determination as relational.
While Young argues that the application of this second concept of self-determination can be 
extended from individuals to collectives or peoples, as a way of interpreting the claims 
indigenous people make for self-determination, I would like to take this argument in a somewhat 
different direction. The main implication that I wish to draw from Pettit and Young’s freedom as 
non-domination is that that individual self-determination is a relational concept that requires 
engagements with others. In Young’s (2007, 40) words: “To ensure nondomination, their 
relations must be regulated both by institutions in which they all participate and by ongoing 
negotiations among them.”
5
For individual freedom to be established and maintained, then, 
requires some kind of ongoing democratic institutions and/or practices. More precisely, an agent 
is self-determining only if the relations in which they stand to others are not characterized by 
domination. Freedom, on this view, is characterized not so much by soverign independence, but 
by egalitarian interdependence. Individual liberty is less focused on walling oneself off from 
5
Young (2007), 40. 

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relationships to other people, and more about ensuring that the relationships we inevitably have 
with others are non-dominating.