Key words: Western international theories, Islamic international theories, secularism versus
Islamic faith, Muslim traditionalists, Muslim modernists, ontological and epistemological bases
of Western and Islamic international theories
In 2010 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan published a co-edited volume entitled ‘Non-Western
International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia’ challenging the prevailing
idea that international relations (IR) theory was an exclusive Western project. Their volume
primarily offers distinct Asian IR traditions and voices to provide readers with alternative
comparative IR perspectives. Two years later Tickner and Blaney (2012) published their co-
edited book ‘Thinking International Relations Differently’ raising powerful voices against
Western dominance in the discipline of IR. Tickner and Blaney’s edited book presents diverse
non-Western scholarly perspectives on central concepts and issues in a West-dominated IR – the
state, security, authority and sovereignty, secularism and religion, globalization and so on, and
thus questions the taken-for-granted concepts, categories and epistemologies of Western IR.
2
Likewise, Shilliam (2011) has problematized the concept of global modernity which the West
views as an exclusive Western contribution to the world and so frames the contours of IR to deal
with the non-West. Shilliam questions the very foundations of Western social and political
thought, brings to light non-Western ideas and perspectives on modernity, probes their
significance for IR and thus opens up new spaces for further engagements with non-Western
modernities. None of these three major books on non-Western IR theories and perspectives has,
however, attempted to map out and analyze the relatively unexplored discourses on Islam and IR.
Though Acharya and Buzan (2010) exclusively focus on Asian IR perspectives and theories, they
left the Middle Eastern IR theories and praxis out of purview citing reasons for lack of expertise
and resource constraints. A single contribution by Tadjbakhsh (2010) to Acharya and Buzan’s
volume attempts to outline how Islamic IR contradicts Western IR theories
premised on
positivistic and empiricist undertakings to account for the link between cause and effect.
Tadjbakhsh contends that there is a fundamental disjuncture between Islamic and Western IR
theories, but she does not highlighting the disjuncture from ontological and epistemological
angles to clearly map out the nature and implications of the disjuncture.
Back in 1993 Samuel Huntington published his seminal article ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’
juxtaposing Islamic, Western and other civilizations, and had reached the conclusion that
conflicts between Islamic and Western civilizations were unavoidable, especially in the context
of the collapse of the bipolar world structure in 1991. The problem with Huntington’s thesis was
that he more highlighted (and perhaps exaggerated) the conflicting aspects of Islam and the
West, viewed Islam as a monolithic religion, discussed little about the multiple groups and
voices within Islam. Nor did he theorize the inevitability of conflicts between the Islamic and
Western civilizations. More rigorous attempts to problematize relations between Islam and the
West were made by scholars working in the critical and neo-Gramscian theoretical traditions of
IR. Pasha (2013, 2012, 2010), for example, has accounted for violence by Islamic radicals in
relations to globalizing Western modernity that restricts cultural horizons to prevent
authentication of non-Western forms of life. He explains Islamic resistance to the West by
looking at how conditions of late modernity have ruptured and displaced Islamic Faith in what he
calls ‘Islamic Cultural Zones’. Though Pasha’s contributions to understanding conflicts between
Islam and the West are appreciable, he remains narrowly focused on how the Islamic radicals
3
become disenchanted with Western modernity and why violence erupts; the positions of the vast
majority of Muslims – the modernists, the secularists and even the ‘Western Muslims’ receive no
or little attention. Likewise, Shani (2008, 2007) has attempted to contribute to the ‘post-Western’
turn in IR by engaging Islamism and Sikhism as critical political discourses, and thus challenges
the secular Western IR to make space for other IR traditions. His discussions on Islamic IR,
however, remain more of a general type as there is little effort to bring into focus how Islamic
Faith looks at relations with the non-Islamic world or how Islamic thinkers belonging to different
schools of thought have interpreted Islamic approaches to the ‘non-Islamic Other’. In the post-
9/11 context, a bevy of Muslim writers
(
See, for example, Abo-Kazleh 2006; Bsoul 2007;
Hassan 2007; Sabet 2003; Takim 2011) and scholars made efforts to re-conceptualize Islamic IR
theories – their basic concepts, foundations and approaches to relationships with non-Islamic
states but their analyses fall short of going deep into the horizon of ontological and
epistemological differences between Islamic and Western IR theories.
The recent rise of the Islamic State (IS), proclaimed on 29 June 2014 and finally defeated by
early December 2017, that aimed at reunifying the Muslim Middle Eastern states by redrawing
the political map of the region has apparently ignited debates between Islamic and Western
conceptions of universalisms and IR theories (Nuruzzaman, 2015). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
self-styled caliph of the IS, made a speech the same day the IS was declared outlining the basic
thrust and action program of his new Islamic state. He highly spoke of the need for a khilafah
(caliphate) to establish the Sharia (Qur’anic laws) and thus assert the past glorious role of Islam
in world affairs. He categorically said: “The establishment of a caliphate is an obligation. The
religion cannot be in place unless the Sharia is established” (Al Jazeera 2014). Dabiq Magazine,
the official mouthpiece of the IS, in its first issue released in July 2014, carried the cover story
‘The Return of Khilafah’. Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-`Adnani, the official spokesperson of the
IS, declared the khilafah and concluded the announcement with the following words: “The sun of
jihad has risen. The glad tidings of good are shining. Triumphs loom on the horizon. The signs of
victory have appeared”.
1
4
The khilafah
2
strives to create an Islamic governance system where all Muslims, irrespective of
their ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences, constitute a single community called the umma, are
tied up together by a common feeling of solidarity called assabiya,
3
and only one caliph at any
given time can legally exist to rule the umma (Bouzenita 2007, p. 36)
and guide their temporal
and spiritual lives. The concept of khilafah thus directly contradicts the Westphalian system of
nation-states with different governments ruling over mostly ethnically and culturally
homogeneous peoples within fixed territorial boundaries. Furthermore, whereas the Westphalian
state system rests on the idea that each state lawfully enjoys an exclusive claim to sovereignty,
the khilafah recognizes only God’s sovereignty on earth and over the whole universe; it is loath
to the idea that humans and their governments can ever claim sovereignty, even in the
management of temporal issues and affairs. Whereas the Westphalian states focus on the
temporal and delink it from the spiritual, a point elaborated below, the khilafah integrates both
the temporal and the spiritual as it seeks to create a universal moral order in light of God’s
teachings, as revealed in the Qur’an (Takim 2011, pp. 6-8). The basic differences between the
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