Conclusion
The article has extensively analyzed two important points – i) the mutually opposed and diverse
ontological foundations and the epistemological approaches of Western and Islamic IR theories;
and ii) the historical and cultural developments and forces that contributed to and shaped their
respective ontologies and epistemologies. The issue areas where they sharply collide are: nation-
state versus Islamic universal order, reason versus morality and ethics, secularism versus the
integration of faith and politics, and God’s sovereignty versus human sovereignty/authority.
Such differences remain despite overlapping connections between Western and Islamic thought.
Definitely, certain strands of both Western and Islamic thought share similar anxieties about
modern rationalism, instrumental rationality and liberal-capitalism (See, Euben 1999), but that
hardly puts Western and Islamic thought on the same page. In brief, the clash is between
Eurocentrism and Islamic universalism with its urge for a global Islamic moral order. Both sets
of theories have their internal dissenting voices which were and are not sufficiently strong to go
for a theoretical overhaul to reshape the basic approaches to initiate and promote dialogues and
cooperation between Islam and the West. In the Islamic tradition, the non-traditionalist thinkers
have made their imprints but did not succeed to force the traditionalists to take a back seat; in the
Western IR tradition, the critical, postcolonial and postmodern scholars have shaken up the
26
epistemological boundaries but never crossed the boundaries to successfully open up spaces for
the non-West, including the Muslim world. Theoretical controversies and conflicts, with
occasional practical duel, as a result, continue to characterize Islamic and Western international
theories.
The analysis in this paper also highlights that, like its Western counterpart, Islam offers a series
of theories of international relations, as the three Islamic approaches and perspective extensively
analyzed in this paper suggest. Until the 1960s and 1970s, many Western IR scholars had
contended that Islam was disconnected from international relations in that it was primarily
grounded in the Divine sources and that it was apathetic to reason and positivistic methods of
inquiry (See, for example, Proctor 1966). The Qur’an instructs Muslims to establish and spread a
moral order from the local to the global level and the Muslims see Islam as a complete guide for
humans – from politics to economics to relations between and amongst humans and states. Islam
has naturally, through its historical course of development, developed its own ideas and theories
to deal with, and strike out a balance, between religion and the practical world. The three Islamic
IR approaches of traditionalism, modernism and the jihadist perspective were as much
influenced by religious beliefs and values as they were by the anarchical settings of different
time periods. The three approaches and perspective differ in terms of epistemological
understandings and explanations of world realities but they are firmly based on the Qur’an and
the Hadiths. The differences and debates between the approaches speak of the inter-paradigm
debates that characterize Western IR theory – between idealism and realism, between science
and traditionalism and between positivism and post-positivism. To put it briefly, with their
distinct ontological foundations and epistemological approaches, Western and Islamic IR
theories remain competing models to explain world affairs. Lastly, the jihadists’ resort to armed
struggle to liberate Muslim lands from the West and its local collaborators and eventually
proclaim the supremacy of Islam in the world, as the IS intends, has put it in sharp conflict with
the West-led world order. Even in the absence of the IS, the theoretical conflicts between Islamic
and Western IR theories will continue.
Notes:
1. See the first issue of Dabiq Magazine online at:
https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?cid=cda4ca4a6bf4a9e2&id=documents&resid=CDA4CA4A6BF4A9E
2!404&app=WordPdf&authkey=!AC6WgJ3xRmJBof0&
(accessed: 5 December 2016).
27
2. Of the two sects of Islam, Shia Islam emphasizes Imams (divinely guided leaders on religious and political
affairs) rather than caliphs. The Shias view the different caliphs as oppressive and illegitimate since they
did not come from the family or tribe of the Prophet of Islam, or had any blood relations to the Prophet.
3. The concept of assabiya was originally developed by the fourteenth century Arab historian and thinker Ibn
Khaldun and explained in his book The Muqaddima (Introduction to Universal History).
4. In the modern context, there is a growing debate on postsecularism and political theology that brings into
focus internal pluralism in secular thought in Western IR. See, for example, Mavelli and Petito (2012).
5. Neither the Qur’an nor the Hadiths directly refers to this type of division of the world. However, all four
major branches of Islamic jurisprudence deliberate on this bipartite division – Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and
Shafi’i. See, Bsoul (2007).
6. A Muslim majority state, according to the traditionalists, is a part of the Dar al-Harb if that state is not
ruled by Islamic law that ensures the security of Muslims’ lives, properties and the Faith. That means the
nature of the governments, Islamic or non-Islamic, is important in understanding the basic differences
between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb.
7. The concept of jihad has many meanings and Muslim scholars differ on the question of under what
circumstances jihad could be invoked. Hassan (2007: 7) refers to two particular perspectives on this
concept. First, historical circumstances, such as constant warfare between Muslims and non-Muslims (the
Persians and the Romans, for example) influenced Muslim jurists to develop this concept and make sure
that it is applied to correct situations. So it was context-specific. Secondly, the objective of jihad is to fight
oppression and establish justice, one of the primary missions of Islam. Jihad does not necessarily mean a
fight against non-Muslims.
8. Al-Afghani and ‘Abduh opposed the religious leaders who solely emphasized emulation of the original
texts and who were closed to texts-based religious interpretations of emerging issues not covered by the
Qur’an or the Hadiths in the fear of diluting the original message. According to them, Islamic decline,
beginning in the 13
th
century, was largely due to the dominance of the traditional Islamic thinkers and
religious leaders (see Rahman, 1984).
9. See Osama bin Laden’s interview with ABC reporter John Miller in May 1998, available at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/miller.html
(accessed 10 December 2016).
10. Al-Baghdai’s speech is contained in the first issue of Dabiq, the official magazine of the Islamic State,
published in the Arabic month of Ramadan, 1435(H), available at:
https://ia902500.us.archive.org/24/items/dbq01_desktop_en/dbq01_desktop_en.pdf
; (accessed: 15
December 2016).
11. Such rigid views are expressed in a feature story under the title ‘It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood’
published in the Dabiq Magazine. Available online at:
http://www.slideshare.net/Malaysia_Politics/isis-
dabiq-magazine-2
; accessed: 15 December 2016.
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