Anis H. Bajrektarevic is a Professor and a Chairperson for International Law and Global

INTERESTS & INFLUENCES OF MAJOR EXTERNAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA
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The Tengiz oil field is Kazakhstan’s largest oil
producing field and has undergone massive ex-
pansion led by Chevron, and exploration “[has
risen in costs] from $23bn to about $40bn.”[33]
The expansion took five years to complete and
costs $7.2 billion. Tengiz, by comparison, is the
size of the American city, Chicago. According to
Chevron, Tengiz also produces something
called “sour gas” which is gas that has higher
concentration toxic hydrogen sulfide. Due to
this need, there will be a Second Generation
plant with the largest sour gas processing units
in the world.[34] 
Kazakhstan also is involved in the exploitation
of the Caspian Sea resources and is involved in
the demarcation process. There are multiple
plans to divide up the Caspian Sea for resource
exploitation. On January 25, 2006, the Presi-
dents of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a Proto-
col on Amendments to the Protocol on the
Russia-Kazakhstan Agreement on Delimiting
the Northern Part of the Caspian Sea, aimed at
exercising sovereign power over subsurface re-
source management. The instability of Russian
energy politics and its “energy arrogance” has
driven Kazakhstan to seek other energy part-
ners, including “long-term partnerships with
major international oil companies… which will
enable [Kazakhstan] to exploit [their] natural re-
sources effectively.”[35] Russia has focused on
blocking Western access to gas and oil to re-
duce competition: “in Central Asia, Russia has
carried out the task of neutralizing alternatives
to pro-Russian projects of integration in the
post-Soviet space.”[36] Kazakhstan has taken
the pragmatic foreign policy approach to de-
marcation by securing its own rights while rec-
ognizing the superiority of Russia only to not
jeopardize its own ambitions.
The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU) and the integration of regional
economies was designed to stabilize regional
markets. The Kazakh tenge was devalued in
February 2014. On August 19, 2015, the tenge
lost more than a quarter of its value caused by
a sharp fall in world crude oil prices. As a result,
Kazakhstan introduced a freely floating ex-
change rate which helped stabilize Kaza-
khstan’s economy. According to Reuters, “the
official tenge rate tumbled by [26.2%] to 255.26
per dollar on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange in
response to the policy shift.”[37]
Kazakhstan’s economy also “suffered a 40% fall
in exports between January and July [2015],
said National Economy Minister Yerbolat
Dosayev.” Imports shrank by 20% between Jan-
uary and July 2015. Kazakhstan President
Nazarbayev called the EU and U.S. sanctions
against Russia barbaric as the sanctions had a
ripple effect throughout the region. Kazakhstan
"also suffered under the impact of western
sanctions against Russia and, as a metals ex-
porter, from low commodities prices.[38] Kaza-
khstan’s economy was also impacted by the
Chinese yuan and the “correction” to the Chi-
nese economy.