American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U. S. Military History

F
INALLY, A
 P
LAN
B
y early June, the Army had come up with a plan to take Ramadi
back from the insurgents. In Fallujah, the Marines had worked
systematically through the city, chasing and then pushing the
insurgents out. Here, the insurgents were going to come to us.
The city itself was wedged between waterways and swampland.
There was limited access by road. The Euphrates and the
Habbaniyah canal bounded the city on the north and west; there
was one bridge on either side near the northwestern tip. To the
south and east, a lake, swamps, and a seasonal drainage canal
helped form a natural barrier to the countryside.
The U.S. forces would come in from the perimeters of the city,
the Marines from up north, and the Army on the other three sides.

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We would establish strongholds in various parts of the city,
demonstrating that we were in control—and essentially daring the
enemy to attack. When they did attack, we would fight back with
everything we had. We’d set up more and more footholds,
gradually extending control over the entire city.
The place was a mess. There was no functioning government,
and it was beyond lawless. Foreigners entering the city were instant
targets for killing or kidnapping, even if they were in armored
convoys. But the place was a worse hell for ordinary Iraqis.
Reports have estimated that there were more than twenty insurgent
attacks against Iraqis every day. The easiest way to be killed in the
city was to join the police force. Meanwhile, corruption was rife.
The Army analyzed the terrorist groups in the city and decided
there were three different categories: hard-core Islamist fanatics,
associated with al-Qaeda and similar groups; locals who were a
little less fanatic though they still wanted to kill Americans; and
opportunistic criminal gangs who were basically trying to make a
living off the chaos.
The first group had to be eliminated because they would never
give up; they would be our main focus in the coming campaign. The
other two groups, though, might be persuaded to either leave, quit
killing people, or work with the local tribal leadership. So, part of
the Army plan would be to work with the tribal leadership to bring
peace to the area. By all accounts, they had grown tired of the
insurgents and the chaos they had brought, and wanted them gone.

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The situation and plan were a lot more complicated than I can
sum up. But to us on the ground, all of this was irrelevant. We
didn’t give a damn about the nuances. What we saw, what we
knew, was that many people wanted to kill us. And we fought
back.