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G
ET
U
P,
K
YLE
A
bout a month into my tour with the GROM, I was woken by a
shake on my shoulder.
I jumped upright in bed, ready to deck whoever had snuck into
my quarters.
“Hey, hey, it’s cool,” said the lieutenant commander who’d
woken me. He was a SEAL, and my boss. “I need you to get
dressed and come to my office.”
“Yes, sir,” I mumbled. I pulled on a pair of shorts and my flip-
flops and went down the hall.
I thought I was in trouble, though I wasn’t sure what for. I’d
been on good behavior working with the Poles, no fights to speak
of. I searched my mind as I walked toward his office, trying to
prepare a defense. My mind was still fairly blank when I got there.
“Kyle, I’m going to need you to get your sniper rifle and pack up
all your gear,” the lieutenant commander told me. “You’re going to
Fallujah.”
He started telling me about some of the arrangements and threw
in some operational details. The Marines were planning a big push,
and they needed snipers to help out.
Man, this is going to be good,
I thought.
We are going to kill
massive amounts of bad guys. And I’m going to be in the
middle of it.
A
N
A
RMED
C
AMP
F
rom a historical point of view, there were two battles for Fallujah.
The first took place in the spring, as I’ve mentioned before. Political
considerations, mostly driven by wildly distorted media reports and
a lot of Arab propaganda, caused the Marines to back off their
offensive soon after it was begun, and well before it achieved its aim
of kicking the insurgents out of the city. In place of the Marines,
Iraqis loyal to the interim government were supposed to take
control and run the city.
That didn’t work. Pretty much the moment the Marines pulled
back, the insurgents completely took over Fallujah. Civilians who
were not connected with the insurgency were killed, or fled the city.
Anyone who wanted peace—anyone with any sense—left as soon
as they could, or ended up dead.
Al-Anabar Province, the area that contained the city, was
studded with insurgents of various forms. A lot were Iraqi
mujahedeen, but there were also plenty of foreign nationals who
were members of “al-Qaeda in Iraq” or other radical groups. The
head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi—had his
headquarters in the city. A Jordanian who had fought with Osama
bin Laden in Afghanistan, he was committed to killing Americans.
(Despite numerous reports to the contrary, as far as is known,
Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi escaped from Fallujah and is still at
large.)
The insurgents were one-part terrorists, another-part criminal
gangs. They would plant IEDs, kidnap officials and their families,
attack American convoys, kill Iraqis who didn’t share their faith or
politics—anything and everything they could think of. Fallujah had
become their safe haven, an anti-capital of Iraq dedicated to
overthrowing the interim government and preventing free elections.
Al-Anabar Province and, more specifically, the general area
around Fallujah became known through the media as the Sunni
Triangle. That’s a very, very rough approximation both of the area
—contained between Baghdad, Ramadi, and Baqubah—and the
ethnic composition.
(Some background on Islam in Iraq: There were two main
groups of Muslims in Iraq, Sunnis and Shiites. Before the war,
Shiites lived mostly in the south and east, say from Baghdad to the
borders, and Sunnis dominated around Baghdad and to the
northwest. The two groups coexisted but generally hated each
other. While Shiites were the majority, during Saddam’s time they
were discriminated against and not allowed to hold important
offices. Farther north, the areas are dominated by Kurds, who,
though mostly Sunni, have separate traditions and often don’t think
of themselves as being part of Iraq. Saddam considered them to be
an inferior people; during one political suppression, he ordered
chemical weapons used and waged a despicable ethnic-cleansing
campaign.)
W
hile using Fallujah as a base to attack the surrounding area and
Baghdad, the insurgents spent considerable time fortifying the city
so they could withstand another attack. They stockpiled ammo and
weapons, prepared IEDs, and fortified houses. Mines were planted,
and roads closed off so they could be used for ambushes. “Rat
holes” were created in compound walls, allowing insurgents to
move from one house to another, avoiding streets. Many if not all of
the two hundred mosques in the city became fortified bunkers, since
the insurgents knew that Americans respected houses of worship as
sacred and therefore were reluctant to attack there. A hospital was
turned into an insurgent headquarters and used as a base of
operations for the insurgents’ propaganda machine. In sum, the city
was a terrorist fortress by the summer of 2004.
In fact, the insurgents were confident enough to regularly launch
rocket attacks against U.S. bases in the area and ambush convoys
moving on the main roads. Finally, the American command decided
that enough was enough—Fallujah had to be retaken.
The plan they drew up was called Phantom Fury. The city would
be cut off so that enemy supplies and reinforcements could no
longer get in. The insurgents in Fallujah would be rooted out and
destroyed.
While Marines from the First Marine Division made up the
backbone of the attack force, all of the other services added key
pieces. SEAL snipers were integrated with small Marine assault
groups, providing overwatch and performing traditional sniper
missions.
The Marines spent several weeks getting ready for the assault,
launching a variety of operations to throw the insurgents off-
balance. The bad guys knew something was coming; they just didn’t
know where and when. The eastern side of the city was heavily
fortified, and the enemy probably thought that’s where the attack
would be launched.
Instead, the attack would come from the northwest and roll
down into the heart of the city. That’s where I was headed.
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