A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Welfare and Competition
(London, George
Allen and Unwin, 1952), pp. 60–69 and I. M. D. Little, 
A
Critique of Welfare Economics,
2nd ed.
(Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1957), ch. VI, esp. pp. 112–116. See Sen’s remarks on the limitations
of the principle of efficiency, 
Collective Choice and Social Welfare,
pp. 22, 24–26, 83–86.
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The Principles of Justice

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distribution of income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior
distributions of natural assets—that is, natural talents and abilities—as
these have been developed or left unrealized, and their use favored or
disfavored over time by social circumstances and such chance contingen-
cies as accident and good fortune. Intuitively, the most obvious injustice
of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be
improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of
view.
The liberal interpretation, as I shall refer to it, tries to correct for this
by adding to the requirement of careers open to talents the further condi-
tion of the principle of fair equality of opportunity. The thought here is
that positions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all should
have a fair chance to attain them. Offhand it is not clear what is meant,
but we might say that those with similar abilities and skills should have
similar life chances. More specifically, assuming that there is a distribu-
tion of natural assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability,
and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same pros-
pects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system. In all
sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and
achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expecta-
tions of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be af-
fected by their social class.
11
The liberal interpretation of the two principles seeks, then, to mitigate
the influence of social contingencies and natural fortune on distributive
shares. To accomplish this end it is necessary to impose further basic
structural conditions on the social system. Free market arrangements
must be set within a framework of political and legal institutions which
regulates the overall trends of economic events and preserves the social
conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity. The elements of this
framework are familiar enough, though it may be worthwhile to recall the
importance of preventing excessive accumulations of property and wealth
and of maintaining equal opportunities of education for all. Chances to
acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not depend upon one’s class
position, and so the school system, whether public or private, should be
designed to even out class barriers.
While the liberal conception seems clearly preferable to the system of
11. This definition follows Sidgwick’s suggestion in 
The Methods of Ethics,
p. 285n. See also
R. H. Tawney, 
Equality
(London, George Allen and Unwin, 1931), ch. II, sec. ii; and B. A. O.
Williams, “The Idea of Equality,” in 
Philosophy, Politics, and Society,
ed. Peter Laslett and W. G.
Runciman (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 125f.
63
12. The Second Principle

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natural liberty, intuitively it still appears defective. For one thing, even if
it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies,
it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by
the natural distribution of abilities and talents. Within the limits allowed
by the background arrangements, distributive shares are decided by the
outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral
perspective. There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income
and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by
historical and social fortune. Furthermore, the principle of fair opportu-
nity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of
the family exists. The extent to which natural capacities develop and
reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class
attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be
deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and
social circumstances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances
of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we
may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also miti-
gates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself. That the liberal
conception fails to do this encourages one to look for another interpreta-
tion of the two principles of justice.
Before turning to the conception of democratic equality, we should
note that of natural aristocracy. On this view no attempt is made to
regulate social contingencies beyond what is required by formal equality
of opportunity, but the advantages of persons with greater natural endow-
ments are to be limited to those that further the good of the poorer sectors
of society. The aristocratic ideal is applied to a system that is open, at
least from a legal point of view, and the better situation of those favored
by it is regarded as just only when less would be had by those below, if
less were given to those above.
12
In this way the idea of