A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Human Evolution
(Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 49–53; and
W. H. Thorpe, 
Science, Man, and Morals
(London, Methuen, 1965), pp. 87–92. For animals see
Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
Ethology,
trans. Erich Klinghammer (New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Win-
ston, 1970), pp. 217–248.
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novelty and surprises and the occasions for ingenuity and invention that
such activities provide. The multiplicity of spontaneous activities is an
expression of the delight that we take in imagination and creative fantasy.
Thus the Aristotelian Principle characterizes human beings as impor-
tantly moved not only by the pressure of bodily needs, but also by the
desire to do things enjoyed simply for their own sakes, at least when the
urgent and pressing wants are satisfied. The marks of such enjoyed activi-
ties are many, varying from the manner and way in which they are done to
the persistence with which they are returned to at a later time. Indeed, we
do them without the incentive of evident reward, and allowing us to
engage in them can itself act often as a reward for doing other things.
22
Since the Aristotelian Principle is a feature of human desires as they now
exist, rational plans must take it into account. The evolutionary explana-
tion, even if it is correct, is not of course a justification for this aspect of
our nature. In fact, the question of justification does not arise. The ques-
tion is rather: granted that this principle characterizes human nature as we
know it, to what extent is it to be encouraged and supported, and how is it
to be reckoned with in framing rational plans of life?
The role of the Aristotelian Principle in the theory of the good is that it
states a deep psychological fact which, in conjunction with other general
facts and the conception of a rational plan, accounts for our considered
judgments of value. The things that are commonly thought of as human
goods should turn out to be the ends and activities that have a major place
in rational plans. The principle is part of the background that regulates
these judgments. Provided that it is true, and leads to conclusions match-
ing our convictions about what is good and bad (in reflective equilib-
rium), it has a proper place in moral theory. Even if this conception
should not be true of some persons, the idea of a rational long-term
plan still applies. We can work out what is good for them in much the
same way as before. Thus imagine someone whose only pleasure is to
count blades of grass in various geometrically shaped areas such as park
squares and well-trimmed lawns. He is otherwise intelligent and actually
possesses unusual skills, since he manages to survive by solving difficult
mathematical problems for a fee. The definition of the good forces us to
admit that the good for this man is indeed counting blades of grass, or
more accurately, his good is determined by a plan that gives an especially
prominent place to this activity. Naturally we would be surprised that
such a person should exist. Faced with his case, we would try out other
22. This seems also to be true of monkeys. See Eibl-Eibesfeldt, ibid., p. 239.
379
65. Aristotelian Principle

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hypotheses. Perhaps he is peculiarly neurotic and in early life acquired an
aversion to human fellowship, and so he counts blades of grass to avoid
having to deal with other people. But if we allow that his nature is to
enjoy this activity and not to enjoy any other, and that there is no feasible
way to alter his condition, then surely a rational plan for him will center
around this activity. It will be for him the end that regulates the schedule
of his actions, and this establishes that it is good for him. I mention this
fanciful case only to show that the correctness of the definition of a
person’s good in terms of the rational plan for him does not require the
truth of the Aristotelian Principle. The definition is satisfactory, I believe,
even if this principle should prove inaccurate, or fail altogether. But by
assuming the principle we seem able to account for what things are
recognized as good for human beings taking them as they are. Moreover,
since this principle ties in with the primary good of self-respect, it turns
out to have a central position in the moral psychology underlying justice
as fairness (§67).
66. THE DEFINITION OF GOOD APPLIED TO PERSONS
66. Good Applied to Persons
Having defined a person’s good as the successful execution of a rational
plan of life, and his lesser goods as parts thereof, we are in a position to
introduce further definitions. In this way the concept of goodness is
applied to other subjects that have an important place in moral philoso-
phy. But before doing this we should note the assumption that the primary
goods can be accounted for by the thin theory of the good. That is, I
suppose that it is rational to want these goods whatever else is wanted,
since they are in general necessary for the framing and the execution of a
rational plan of life. The persons in the original position are assumed to
accept this conception of the good, and therefore they take for granted
that they desire greater liberty and opportunity, and more extensive means
for achieving their ends. With these objectives in mind, as well as that of
securing the primary good of self-respect (§67), they evaluate the concep-
tions of justice available to them in the original position.
That liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and above all self-re-
spect are primary goods must indeed be explained by the thin theory. The
constraints of the principles of justice cannot be used to draw up the list
of primary goods that serves as part of the description of the initial
situation. The reason is, of course, that this list is one of the premises
from which the choice of the principles of right is derived. To cite these
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principles in explaining the list would be a circular argument. We must
assume, then, that the list of primary goods can be accounted for by the
conception of goodness as rationality in conjunction with the general
facts about human wants and abilities, their characteristic phases and
requirements of nurture, the Aristotelian Principle, and the necessities of
social interdependence. At no point can we appeal to the constraints of
justice. But once we are satisfied that the list of primary goods can be
arrived at in this way, then in all further applications of the definition of
good the constraints of right may be freely invoked. I shall not argue the
case for the list of primary goods here, since their claims seem evident
enough. I shall, however, come back to this point from time to time,
especially in connection with the primary good of self-respect. In what
follows I take the list as established and apply the full theory of the good.
The test of this theory is that it should fit our considered judgments of
value in reflective equilibrium.
Two fundamental cases for the theory of the good remain to be consid-
ered. We must see whether the definition holds for both persons and
societies. In this section I discuss the case of persons, leaving the ques-
tion of a good society for the last chapter when all parts of justice as
fairness can be brought to bear. Now many philosophers have been will-
ing to accept some variant of goodness as rationality for artifacts and
roles, and for such nonmoral values as friendship and affection, the pur-
suit of knowledge and the enjoyment of beauty, and the like. Indeed, I
have emphasized that the main elements of goodness as rationality are
extremely common, being shared by philosophers of markedly different
persuasions. Nevertheless, it is often thought that this conception of the
good expresses an instrumental or economic theory of value that does not
hold for the case of moral worth. When we speak of the just or the
benevolent person as morally good, a different concept of goodness is
said to be involved.
23
I wish to argue, however, that once the principles of
right and justice are on hand, the full theory of goodness as rationality can
in fact cover these judgments. The reason why the so-called instrumental
or economic theory fails is that what is in effect the thin theory is applied
directly to the problem of moral worth. What we must do instead is to use
this theory only as a part of the description of the original position from
which the principles of right and justice are derived. We can then apply
the full theory of the good without restrictions and are free to use it for
23. See C. A. Campbell, “Moral and Non-Moral Values,”