A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

participation. It requires that all citizens are to have an equal right to take
part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that
establishes the laws with which they are to comply. Justice as fairness
begins with the idea that where common principles are necessary and to
everyone’s advantage, they are to be worked out from the viewpoint of a
suitably defined initial situation of equality in which each person is fairly
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Equal Liberty

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represented. The principle of participation transfers this notion from the
original position to the constitution as the highest-order system of social
rules for making rules. If the state is to exercise a final and coercive
authority over a certain territory, and if it is in this way to affect perma-
nently men’s prospects in life, then the constitutional process should
preserve the equal representation of the original position to the degree
that this is practicable.
For the time being I assume that a constitutional democracy can be
arranged so as to satisfy the principle of participation. But we need to
know more exactly what this principle requires under favorable circum-
stances, when taken to the limit so to speak. These requirements are, of
course, familiar, comprising what Constant called the liberty of the an-
cients in contrast to the liberty of the moderns. Nevertheless, it is worth-
while to see how these liberties fall under the principle of participation.
The adjustments that need to be made to existing conditions, and the
reasoning that regulates these compromises, I discuss in the following
section.
We may begin by recalling certain elements of a constitutional regime.
First of all, the authority to determine basic social policies resides in a
representative body selected for limited terms by and ultimately account-
able to the electorate. This representative body has more than a purely
advisory capacity. It is a legislature with lawmaking powers and not
simply a forum of delegates from various sectors of society to which the
executive explains its actions and discerns the movements of public senti-
ment. Nor are political parties mere interest groups petitioning the gov-
ernment on their own behalf; instead, to gain enough support to win
office, they must advance some conception of the public good. The con-
stitution may, of course, circumscribe the legislature in numerous re-
spects; and constitutional norms define its actions as a parliamentary
body. But in due course a firm majority of the electorate is able to achieve
its aims, by constitutional amendment if necessary.
All sane adults, with certain generally recognized exceptions, have the
right to take part in political affairs, and the precept one elector one vote
is honored as far as possible. Elections are fair and free, and regularly
held. Sporadic and unpredictable tests of public sentiment by plebiscite or
other means, or at such times as may suit the convenience of those in
office, do not suffice for a representative regime. There are firm constitu-
tional protections for certain liberties, particularly freedom of speech and
assembly, and liberty to form political associations. The principle of loyal
opposition is recognized, the clash of political beliefs, and of the interests
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36. Political Justice and the Constitution

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and attitudes that are likely to influence them, are accepted as a normal
condition of human life. A lack of unanimity is part of the circumstances
of justice, since disagreement is bound to exist even among honest men
who desire to follow much the same political principles. Without the
conception of loyal opposition, and an attachment to constitutional rules
which express and protect it, the politics of democracy cannot be properly
conducted or long endure.
Three points concerning the equal liberty defined by the principle of