A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part? We may suppose that these feelings and attitudes have been gener-
ated by participation in the association. Thus once a person’s capacity for
fellow feeling has been realized by his acquiring attachments in accord-
ance with the first psychological law, then as his associates with evident
intention live up to their duties and obligations, he develops friendly
feelings toward them, together with feelings of trust and confidence. And
this principle is a second psychological law. As individuals enter the
association one by one over a period of time, or group by group (suitably
12. For a discussion of these points, see Roger Brown, 
Social Psychology,
pp. 239–244.
411
71. The Morality of Association

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limited in size), they acquire these attachments when others of longer
standing membership do their part and live up to the ideals of their
station. Thus if those engaged in a system of social cooperation regularly
act with evident intention to uphold its just (or fair) rules, bonds of
friendship and mutual trust tend to develop among them, thereby holding
them ever more securely to the scheme.
Once these ties are established, a person tends to experience feelings
of (association) guilt when he fails to do his part. These feelings show
themselves in various ways, for example, in the inclination to make good
the harms caused to others (reparation), if such harms have occurred, as
well as in a willingness to admit that what one has done is unfair (wrong)
and to apologize for it. Feelings of guilt are also manifest in conceding
the propriety of punishment and censure, and in finding it more difficult
to be angry and indignant with others when they likewise fail to do their
share. The absence of these inclinations would betray an absence of ties
of friendship and mutual trust. It would indicate a readiness to associate
with others in disregard of the standards and criteria of legitimate expec-
tations that are publicly recognized and used by all to adjudicate their
disagreements. A person without these feelings of guilt has no qualms
about the burdens that fall on others, nor is he troubled by the breaches of
confidence by which they are deceived. But when relations of friendship
and trust exist, such inhibitions and reactions tend to be aroused by the
failure to fulfill one’s duties and obligations. If these emotional con-
straints are missing, there is at best only a show of fellow feeling and
mutual trust. Thus just as in the first stage certain natural attitudes de-
velop toward the parents, so here ties of friendship and confidence grow
up among associates. In each case certain natural attitudes underlie the
corresponding moral feelings: a lack of these feelings would manifest the
absence of these attitudes.
The second psychological law presumably takes hold in ways similar
to the first. Since the arrangements of an association are recognized to be
just (and in the more complex roles the principles of justice are under-
stood and serve to define the ideal appropriate), thereby insuring that all
of its members benefit and know that they benefit from its activities, the
conduct of others in doing their part is taken to be to the advantage of
each. Here the evident intention to honor one’s obligations and duties is
seen as a form of good will, and this recognition arouses feelings of
friendship and trust in return. In due course the reciprocal effects of
everyone’s doing his share strengthen one another until a kind of equilib-
412
The Sense of Justice

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rium is reached. But we may also suppose that the newer members of the
association recognize moral exemplars, that is, persons who are in vari-
ous ways admired and who exhibit to a high degree the ideal correspond-
ing to their position. These individuals display skills and abilities, and
virtues of character and temperament, that attract our fancy and arouse in
us the desire that we should be like them, and able to do the same things.